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 THE DANCING FLOOR OF WAR: A STUDY OF THEBAN 
IMPERIALISM WITHIN BOEOTIA, CA. 525–386BCE 
This thesis is a reexamination of Thebes’ relationship with the neighbouring Greek 
poleis (city states) of Boeotia in early Greek history, including but not limited to the 
so-called Boeotian League or Confederation. Although it is generally acknowledged 
that Thebes was the dominant city of Boeotia in the Archaic and Classical Periods, 
scholarly opinion has varied on how to classify Thebes’ dominance. At some point 
in the period considered here, the Boeotian states gathered themselves together into a 
regional collective, a confederation. The features of this union (in which Thebes was 
the leading participant) obscure Thebes’ ambitions to subjugate other Boeotian 
states. I argue here that it is appropriate to define Thebes’ relationship with Boeotia 
as imperialist. 
I begin with a methodological consideration of the application of imperialism to 
ancient Greek history. The thesis considers in the first chapters three stages of 
development in Theban imperialism: firstly an early period (ca. 525) in which 
Thebes encouraged nascent Boeotian ethnic identity, promoting its own position as 
the natural leader of Boeotia. Secondly, a period (ca. 525–447) in which a military 
alliance of Boeotian states developed under the leadership of Thebes. Thirdly, a 
period which was the earliest true form of the Boeotian Confederation, contrary to 
scholarship which pushes the date of the Boeotian collective government back to the 
sixth century. I argue that the Boeotian federal constitution of 447–386 gave Thebes 
sufficient control of Boeotia to be classified as an imperialist structure. 
A final chapter independently considers the evidence of Boeotian coinage, which has 
often been used problematically to inform historical analysis of Boeotian relations. I 
argue that on cultural and economic grounds alone the numismatic evidence suggests 
that Thebes’ dominance in Boeotia extended to monetary influence. 
   
 τοὺς δὲ Βοιωτοὺς ὑπὸ σχολῆς ἐκλυοµένους ἀεὶ βουλόµενος ἐν τοῖς 
ὅπλοις συνέχειν, ὁπότε βοιωτάρχης αἱρεθείη, παραινῶν ἔλεγεν ‘ἔτι 
βουλεύσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἐὰν γὰρ ἐγὼ στρατηγῶ, στρατευτέον ἐστὶν 
ὑµῖν·’ καὶ τὴν χώραν ὑπτίαν οὖσαν καὶ ἀναπεπταµένην ‘πολέµου 
ὀρχήστραν’ προσηγόρευεν, ὡς µὴ δυναµένους κρατεῖν αὐτῆς, ἂν µὴ τὴν 
χεῖρα διὰ πόρπακος ἔχωσι. 
Wanting to keep in arms the Boeotians, who were growing dissolute with 
idleness, when Epameinondas was elected as their Boeotarch, he used to 
encourage them, saying: “Yet consider, gentlemen: if I am your general, 
you must be soldiers.” He called the country, which was flat and open, 
“the dancing floor of war”, because they could not rule it unless their 
hands were upon their shields. ([Plut.], On the Sayings of Kings and 
Commanders 193e) 
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION, SPELLING & ABBREVIATIONS 
All translations in this thesis are my own. All dates are BCE unless otherwise stated. 
Throughout this thesis I have used as much as possible the traditional Anglicised and 
Romanised transcriptions of Greek names, based on the Thucydidean Attic forms 
(e.g. Ismenias and Plataea, not Hismenias and Plataiai), in the hopes that the benefits 
of readability will outweigh the loss of fidelity to the original. For Greek terms, 
however, I have been very faithful to the Greek and not translated any except the 
very familiar polis. 
Abbreviations used are those of Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth eds., 
(2003) Oxford Classical Dictionary, third edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 
with these additions: 
ACT Hornblower (1991–2008). 
BNJ Worthington ed. (n.d.). 
CB Schachter (1981–94). 
CH How and Wells (1912). 
IGCH Thompson, Mørkholm and Kraay eds. (1973). 
HCT Gomme, Andrewes, Dover (1945–81). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Βοιωτῶν µὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ πλεονεκτούµενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων δυσµενῶς 
αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν… For many of the Boeotians, suffering from Theban 
greed, dislike them. (Xen. Mem. 3.5.2) 
At times the Boeotians were united in a league dominated by the 
Thebans, but such a league, in which force often had to be employed, 
was a far different and less effective means of achieving unity than the 
common Athenian citizenship.1 
This thesis aims to demonstrate that Thebes dominated the other poleis in the 
Boeotian region from the late sixth century (ca. 525) until the development of a 
wider policy of Theban ambitions in the early fourth century.2 The regional politics 
of Boeotia consisted, in almost equal measures, of fractious disagreement and 
surprising cooperation between poleis; although it has been generally acknowledged 
that Thebes was a major player, the degree of aggression has been a point of some 
equivocation. In view of the formal structure of Boeotian cooperation (the so-called 
Boeotian League or Confederation), scholarship has tended to assume that 
disagreement was the exception to the cooperative norm.3 Fine’s assessment, quoted 
above, is typical of the cautious tendency to see Thebes’ domineering behaviour 
within Boeotia as an intermittent phenomenon.4 I examine the substance of Thebes’ 
relationship with the Boeotians in order to determine the validity of this analysis. 
This thesis explores the period from the beginnings of Boeotian interstate 
cooperation for military purposes (perhaps a συµµαχία, “defensive and offensive 
alliance”) in the late Archaic Period, the point which I identify as the beginning of 
Theban imperialism, to the imposition of the terms of the King’s Peace on Boeotia in 
                                                
1 Fine (1983), 179. 
2 See Hansen (2004), esp. 437–459, on the other poleis of Boeotia.  
3 Throughout this thesis I use the term “cooperate” and its derivates as the broadest term for the 
variety of interactions involving more than one Boeotian state. I use this in a strictly literal and neutral 
sense, without the voluntary connotation which is often read into the word. 
4 Cf. Buckler (1980), 21; Buck (1994), 5; Buckley (1996), 238. Particularly telling is Bakhuizen 
(1994), 326, on the Classical Period as a whole: “Theban power … was not an absolute leadership 
because of the full participation of all the Boeotians in voting and fighting”. Contra: Bury (1959), 
161; Morris and Powell (2006), 369: “[Thebes] had controlled the other cities in Boeotia since before 
500 B.C.” 
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386.5 This was not the end of Theban imperialism. In fact, the so-called Theban 
hegemony began earlier in Boeotia (375–362) and was the acme of Theban power in 
Boeotia, and is thoroughly discussed, though generally as a separate phenomenon, 
by scholars such as Buckler.6 The overall aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that 
Thebes’ imperialism in Boeotia was not a new phenomenon in the fourth century: 
Thebes had built an effective empire in progressive stages from the late sixth 
century. 
This thesis is not concerned with cataloguing Thebes’ relationships with individual 
Boeotian settlements, whether independent poleis or “villages” (κῶµαι),7 except 
where that relationship may elucidate the more general attitude of Thebes towards 
Boeotia: as I will discuss in chapter one, Theban rhetoric even in conflict with 
individual poleis referred to the Boeotians as a whole. Thebes’ interactions with its 
neighbours were frequently antagonistic. Moreover, there are a substantial number of 
Boeotian settlements for which there is no recorded act of subjugation but which 
nevertheless seem to have fallen under Theban control; in particular many 
settlements of eastern Boeotia, from Aulis to Anthedon, seem to have been Theban 
subordinates or satellites throughout the Archaic and Classical Period. 
There is no focused discussion of Thebes’ relationship with Boeotia. Buck and 
Cloché have treated the matter only incidentally to the history of one party or the 
other.8 Dull’s little-read thesis considers (despite the promising title, “A Study of the 
Leadership of the Boeotian League from the Invasion of the Boiotoi to the King’s 
Peace”) largely the limited scope of the period 447–386, and limits itself to the 
discussion of leadership of the Boeotian Confederation.9 Two developments in 
scholarship in particular prompt reanalysis of the relationship between Thebes and 
Boeotia in the period considered here. Firstly, Schachter and Larsen have recently 
                                                
5 LSJ s.v. συµµαχία, but see Hall (2007a), 102, on the dubious distinction of συµµαχία from ἐπιµαχία: 
perhaps, in Thucydides’ use at least, a solely defensive alliance. 
6 Buckler (1980) remains the standard account; see esp. 15–45 on the relationship with Boeotia; 
Larsen (1968), 175–78, and Beck (1997), discuss the Boeotian Confederation of the fourth century; 
Beister (1989), Thebes’ hegemony, with particular comparison to Athens and Sparta; Bakhuizen 
(1994), 313–26, on Boeotia as Theban dependency. 
7 See Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 75–76, on the problems of the terms for “second-” and “third-
order” sites. 
8 Buck (1979), (1994); Cloché (1952). 
9 Dull (1976). 
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rejected the standing belief that federalism in Boeotia dates back to the sixth 
century.10 This trend does not, however, negate the evidence of interactions between 
the Boeotian states from the late Archaic Period onwards. Thebes is prominent in 
these sources, and I will reconsider these occurences as evidence of Thebes’ 
imperialism. Secondly, it is by now widely recognised that the dating of the 
numismatic evidence for Boeotia in the Archaic and Classical Period is highly 
problematic,11 and should no longer be used to inform the historical situation of 
Boeotia (as in past scholarship) without extreme caution.12 Following the re-
evaluations of the chronology of Boeotian coinage problematises many analyses of 
Boeotian history.13 
Boeotia was unusual amongst Greek regions in the Classical Period. Although it was 
divided into as many as twenty-six known poleis and about forty settlements in 
total,14 the strife attendant on close neighbours was accompanied by not only a 
degree of cultural and religious unity, but also a broader identity within Boeotia that 
cut across civic boundaries.15 The cooperation which resulted from this shared 
identity is often referred to as the Boeotian League or Confederation.16 This 
terminology, however, is modern; for the duration of the Archaic and Classical 
Periods the group only used (or appropriated) the regional ethnic, oἱ Βοιωτοί, to 
describe their unity.17 Moreover, modern analysis has created terminology for 
periodisation of Boeotian cooperation which is inconsistent and implies both a 
                                                
10 CB 2:216, Larson (2007). 
11 Buck (1994), xviii. 
12 Roesch (1981), 271. 
13 Hansen (2004), 432–33, gives a neat summary of these revisions and adds some of his own; 
unfortunately, these are not yet fully argued or systematic. 
14 See Hansen (1995b), 13–24, for the enumeration of Boeotian poleis from the archaic period to 386; 
Hansen (2004) takes a broader view and includes lesser settlements. 
15 Prevalent practice (especially in numismatics: J. Jones 1986, s.v. “ethnic”) in discussing ancient 
Greek identity terms uses “ethnic” (ἐθνικόν) for the descriptive terms relating to the polis as well as 
the ἔθνος, e.g. Ἀθηναῖος as the ethnic of Ἀθῆναι; this is difficult and even inappropriate when 
discussing both at the same time, as in the case of Boeotia (see Hansen and Nielsen [2004], 60–62). I 
will therefore generally use the terms “civic” for the polis-ethnic and “ethnic” for the ἔθνος-ethnic. 
16 English scholarship tends to refer to the Boeotian “League”, although League is imprecise, 
covering a variety of concepts from συµµαχία to κοινόν; Mackil (2003), 1–4, argues that the most 
appropriate term for ancient Greek federalism is “Confederation”, cf. Ehrenberg (1969), 112, on 
“leagues”; Salmon (1994), on terminology for Boeotia. 
17 Occasionally, scholars have appealed to some form of “slippage”, i.e. that a source uses the ethnic 
but means the civic or vice versa. I will assume throughout this thesis that the distinction between 
Βοιωτός and any civic term is always meaningful; to do otherwise presumes more recklessly to know 
better than the source.   
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structure and a development which the ancient Greeks did not themselves identify 
(see Table 1): I will therefore avoid terms such as the “first league”, etc. 
 
Dates (1) Salmon (2) González  (3) Hansen (4) Buck 
ca. 700–520 Union des 
Béotiens 
“Archaic period”   
ca. 520–479 First 
Confederation 1 
 Early Boeotian 
League 
479–457  First 
Confederation 2 
 
457–447  First 
Confederation 3 
 Boeotian League 
(under Athenian 
hegemony) 
447/6–386 Première 
confédération  
First 
Confederation 4 
First Federation Boeotian League 
386–379     
379–338 Ligue thébain 
(état fédéral à 
tendence 
unitaire) 
Second 
Confederation 
Second 
Federation 
Boeotian League 
restored 
338–172 Seconde 
confédération 
Third 
Confederacy 
Third Federation  
172–146    
Table 1. Terminology for periodisation of the so-called Boeotian Confederation in (1) 
Salmon (1994); (2) González (2006); (3) Hansen (2004); (4) Buck (1979) and (1994). 
 
I begin with two considerations of methodological issues: firstly, a discussion of the 
application of imperialism studies to ancient Greek history and how to identify 
imperialist structures, followed by a discussion of the sources used in this thesis and 
the evidential issues with our historiographical sources for Boeotian history. 
IMPERIALISM IN ANCIENT GREECE 
This thesis uses imperialism as the lens for considering Thebes’ position in the 
regional politics of Boeotia. In the following section I will discuss what exactly I 
mean by imperialism. “Imperialism” and the related noun “empire” are difficult 
terms to define, and largely modern concepts; however, it is possible to come to a 
broad definition or typology which can be applied to ancient states. 
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Imperialism, a modern term, has often been approached as a tenuous optic for 
history, especially for the ancient world.18 What exactly constitutes imperialism is 
the subject of a great deal of critical debate. Thus, Cain and Harrison: “[imperialism 
is] an essentially contested concept”;19 Hobson: “amid the welter of vague political 
abstractions to lay one’s finger accurately upon any ‘ism’ so as to pin it down and 
mark it out by definition seems impossible”.20  
Doyle defines empires thus: “Empires are relationships of political control imposed 
by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other politics.”21 This is 
not an exact definition but an exegesis. The breadth of scope in the explanation is 
noteworthy, although Doyle also argues that it is important to keep the relationship 
between empire and imperialism in mind, i.e. that imperialism is whatever leads to 
empire.22 Such a proviso would naturally severely limit an analysis of Theban 
imperialism, as Boeotia is not identified as truly subject to Thebes in any source 
until the period of the Theban hegemony.23 However, this proviso tends towards a 
circular definition. If both “empire” and “imperialism” are treated as unquantifiable, 
then imperialism leads to empire, but empire results from imperialism. Finley offers 
a useful rebuttal: “Missing opportunities, ‘not playing the game well’, hardly prove 
the absence of ‘ambitions’.”24 Many of the surviving instances of Theban 
imperialism which I will discuss in this thesis come to light due to the prominent 
intervention of external powers, in particular Athens and Sparta, with resulting 
failure of the Theban attempts to subordinate: so Thebes was frustrated at Plataea in 
                                                
18 In particular, in post-colonial scholarship, imperialism is used as a dysphemism which is not 
necessarily applicable to the ancient view of empires: cf. Saïd (1979, 1993) on post-colonialism; 
Garnsey and Whittaker (1978b), 1–3, and Champion (2009), 87–90, on ancient-world applications. 
19 Cain and Harrison (2001), 3. 
20 Hobson (1902), 1. 
21 Doyle (1986), 19. See Reynolds (1981), 19–68, on the classical analysis of a relationship between 
“power” and “imperialism” through a search for security, and Davies (1994), 53–62, on the 
usefulness of “sovereignty” in the analysis of Greek history despite the lack of Greek vocabulary. 
22 Doyle (1986), 33, and 45: “Imperialism is simply the process or policy of establishing or 
maintaining an empire.” 
23 Isoc. 14.9–11; Diod. 15.38.3–4, 15.50.2. See Larsen (1968), 177. The dichotomisation of the 
imperialist city (“metropole”) and subjects (“frontier”/“periphery”) is part of the process of empire: 
Ludden (2011), 135–36. 
24 Finley (1978a), 2. 
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the sixth century and Orchomenus in the early fourth.25 In this thesis I will accept 
that empire is the desired result of imperialism, but that imperialism is a quantifiable 
attitude and need not be entirely successful. I will argue that Thebes’ interactions 
with Boeotia fall within the imperialist spectrum of imposed political control, even if 
Boeotia was not overtly subject to Thebes until after the period discussed here. 
The application of imperialism to the study of Greek history has frequently been 
limited to discussion of legal structures of imperial administration; that is, direct and 
formal control of the powerful state over the subordinate states. This was thus the 
underlying concern of Ferguson, the first dedicated study of Greek imperialism.26 
The extraction of tribute from Delian League members by the Athenian state, 
instituted by a binding oath, is the only less contentious example of imperialism 
within the Greek world.27 I will argue that we cannot identify the existence of a legal 
structure to enforce Theban imperialism in Boeotia under after the Battle of 
Oenophyta (447). This did not preclude Thebes from controlling Boeotian affairs 
before then. 
The Theban relationship with the rest of Boeotia is generally identified as 
“hegemonic”. Doyle defines hegemony as a lesser degree of control between states, 
where the powerful state controls only the external affairs (foreign relations) of the 
subordinate states.28 In Greek history, hegemony (ἡγεµονία) is generally linked to 
military leadership.29 However, scholars have distinguished broadly between 
hegemony and empire (ἀρχή) in ancient Greece solely on moral perspective, and not 
on quantitative grounds: this is epitomised in van Wees’ characterisation of ἀρχή as 
the “evil twin” of ἡγεµονία.30 Both, therefore, should be considered as part of the 
broad spectrum of imperialism. Hammond has suggested that the relationship 
between kindred states, such as Thebes and the rest of Boeotia, should also be 
                                                
25 Ferguson (1913) argued that imperialism could not be successful with in the state system of ancient 
Greece, and that Athens and Sparta both stumbled when they attempted to strengthen their 
hegemonies. 
26 Ferguson (1913). Ferguson himself argued (vii) that the Greek states did not lend themselves to 
becoming fully-formed empires, and therefore the scope of his investigation was largely limited to 
structures within the imperialist states. 
27 The classic study of the formal aspects of fifth-century Athenian imperialism is Meiggs (1972). 
28 Doyle (1986), 40. 
29 Wickersham (1994) is an invaluable analysis of hegemony in Greek historiography. 
30 Van Wees (2004), 8, summarising Wickersham (1994). 
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excepted from the definitions of imperialism,31 but as I argue in chapter one, kinship 
is a matter of construction, and not of incontrovertible fact, as with Athens’ 
purported ethnic relationship with the Ionians in the Delian League. 
A formal, legal and deliberate policy of imperialism is inadequate to address all 
empires and imperialist attitudes: “Empire is a state of affairs even when the imperial 
power is not formally constituted as such”.32 By way of comparison, such an 
approach has recently received broad acceptance in discussions of Republican 
Roman imperialism, especially in the eastern Mediterranean.33 Doyle for example 
has argued persuasively that maintaining a limited definition of territorial control not 
only ignores both current popular and scholarly use of the terms “imperialism” and 
“empire”, but employs an inconsistent criterion, as the general assumption that 
territorial possession is coextensive with political control of that territory is not 
reliably borne out in practice.34 He defines instead “empire” as “effective control, 
whether formal or informal, of a subordinated society by an imperial society”.35 It is 
this concept of effective control which I will apply to Thebes’ relations with other 
Boeotian states. 
Finley, acknowledging the need for a less restrictive approach to imperialism in 
ancient Greece, has set out an admittedly crude typology of empires, with six criteria 
for demonstrating “imperialism”: 
(1) restriction on freedom of action in inter-state relations; 
(2) political, administrative and/or judicial interference in local 
affairs; 
(3) compulsory military and/or naval service; 
(4) the payment of ‘tribute’ in some form, whether in the narrow 
sense of a regular lump sum or as a land tax or in some other way; 
(5) confiscation of land, with or without subsequent emigration of 
settlers from the imperial state; 
                                                
31 M. Hammond (1948), 108–9. 
32 Lichtheim (1971), 4. 
33 E.g. Gruen (1984); Eckstein (2006). 
34 Doyle (1986), 33. 
35 Doyle (1986), 30. 
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(6) other forms of economic subordination or exploitation, ranging 
from control of the seas and Navigation Acts to compulsory delivery of 
goods at prices below the prevailing market price and the like.36  
I will argue that all six criteria can be identified in Boeotia under Thebes, and that in 
particular criteria (1), (3), (5) and (6) were features of early Theban imperialism; 
while criteria (2) and (4) and were only exercised from the mid-fifth century 
onwards, under the auspices of the formal Boeotian Confederation. Most significant 
here, however, is the vocabulary of power: restriction, interference, compulsion, 
confiscation, subordination. The use of force, or the threat of force, as a form of 
persistent control of other states is the common factor in these criteria. 
Finley’s fourth criterion (“the payment of ‘tribute’ in some form”) has been one of 
the most widely recognised indications of imperialism.37 In ancient Greek history, 
the extraction of tribute from the Delian League and Athenian moves to appropriate 
the resources of the League treasury are central to discussion of Athenian 
imperialism.38 However, the matter of tribute or tax in the Delian League was 
originally tied up with a military levy (e.g. αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι, “arrears 
of tribute and ships”, Thuc. 1.99.1).39 The shift to primarily monetary forms of 
tribute enhanced Athenian opportunities for exploitation, but the exploitation of 
League resources predated Athens’ enforcement of the monetary φόρος. Mandatory 
military contributions for the benefit of the metropole was also a form of economic 
exploitation.40 Thus, the third criterion (“compulsory military/naval service”) should 
perhaps be considered as fulfilling in some part the fourth criterion; neither one 
should necessarily be singled out from the general economic exploitation of the sixth 
criterion. They are certainly not unrelated. 
                                                
36 Finley (1978b), 107 ≈ Finley (1978a), 6, which gives consideration to Rome as well as Athens. 
37 E.g. Scheidel (2011), 194–96, on taxation in Rome and Han China. See the essays in Cain and 
Harrison (2001), 1:201–353, on the economic aspects of imperialism. The origins of imperialism 
studies in Marxism (such as Hobson [1902], the father of imperialism studies) may explain the focus 
on economic exploitation. 
38 See Meiggs (1972), 234–54 and Finley (1978b), 114–17, on Athenian tribute; Meiggs (1972), 255–
72 and Finley (1978b), 117–21, on other forms of economic extraction in the Athenian empire. 
39 Foster (2010), esp. 34–43, argues that Thucydides’ presentation of imperialism focuses on the 
material resources of both the imperial powers (Athens, and in the “Archaeology”, Agamemnon and 
Minos) and of the periphery. On Thuc. 1.99.1, a famous explanation of why the Athenians came to 
imperialise the Delian League, she argues (111) that Thucydides places the blame on the allies for 
Athenian imperialism (contra de Romilly [1963], 91); a peripheral analysis of Athenian imperialism.  
40 See Weber (2001), 334, on Athenian profit from war. 
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It is important to note that in Boeotian history effective control could be achieved on 
a personal level, through relationships between individual citizens in each state, and 
not solely through the imposition of control over the decision-making bodies of a 
state. Thebes was an oligarchy until 379,41 and while the constitutions of the other 
Boeotian poleis are not always clear, they were certainly oligarchies between 447 
and the Peace of Antalcidas (Hell. Oxy. 16.2).42 Power therefore rested in the hands 
of a smaller group of men who could organise policy across state borders. 43 This 
was clearly the case in Boeotia in the early fourth century, as in the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia’s description of the factions of Leontiades and Ismenias (17.2).44  
Imperialism studies are generally an attitudinal analysis of foreign politics. As I will 
discuss below, ancient sources give little insight into Boeotian decision-making. It is 
very difficult therefore to demonstrate that Thebes adopted a particular policy, 
beginning in the late sixth century, of subordinating other Boeotian states. The few 
references to Theban politics are concerned with shifting blame, and highlight a high 
degree of factionalism and changing political ascendencies within Thebes (cf. Thuc. 
3.63; Hell. Oxy. 17).45 Andrewes, like other scholars, has focused on a demonstrable 
policy as an essential factor in identifying imperialism. 46 He argues that the lack of 
cohesive and consistent policy means we cannot call Sparta imperialist. I reject this 
methodological concern; it is sufficient to demonstrate, in lines with Schumpeter’s 
definition, “the object-less disposition of a state to expansion by force without 
assigned limits.”47  
                                                
41 A broad oligarchy until 382, and a very narrow oligarchy around the faction of Leontiades between 
382 and 379 (Buck [1994], 69–7, calls it a tyranny); cf. Buckler (1980), 34–45, on the rise of the 
democracy at Thebes. 
42 Buck (1994), 6. 
43 Examples of aristocrats drawing Thebes into local disputes abound, and constitute what Ludden 
(2011), 140, terms “imperial fission”, whereby activists at the “frontier” (see p. 5 n. 23) involve the 
“metropole”. 
44 Buck (1994), 12–14. 
45 Boeotia was almost proverbially factional, cf. Arist. Rhet. 1407a4–6; Thucydides’ statement that 
“the same people inhabited Attica always due to the long-standing freedom from stasis due to the 
poverty of the land” (τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν 
ἄνθρωποι ᾤκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεί, 1.2.5) implicitly critiques the tendency of rich-soil regions such as 
Boeotia to stasis; as Hornblower notes (ACT 1:12), this is strictly a non-sequitur. Thucydides presents 
poor land as a benefit to Athenian power: Foster (2010), 14. Amit (1973), 69, argues that just because 
the Theban excuses of oligarchic domination in the Persian Wars were convenient does not mean they 
were not true. 
46 Andrewes (1978), cf. Harris (1979), on the Roman “war machine”, critiqued in Raaflaub (1996). 
47 Schumpeter (1919), 6. 
 10 
As Champion notes, Finley’s typology invites a search for specific examples to fulfil 
the criteria.48 In this thesis, then, I focus on discussing the recognisable acts of 
Theban imperialism, particularly following the six criteria identified by Finley. 
These, I will argue, bring together a clear view of effective imperialism: within the 
view of Schumpeter’s long-standing definition, Thebes expanded its control over 
other states, although generally not its territory. In lieu of a demonstrable policy or 
attitude, I focus on the historical evidence for the forcible nature of relations between 
Thebes and Boeotia. 
SOURCES 
One of the goals of this thesis is to exercise caution with the sources available. This 
thesis relies largely on literary sources. There are no surviving epigraphic sources 
relating to the Boeotian Confederation before its fourth-century revival during the 
Theban hegemony.49 A very few inscriptions can be used to demonstrate aspects of 
Boeotian military cooperation in the Archaic period. The limitations of sources on 
Boeotian history in terms of quantity, chronological proximity, and personal bias, 
discussed in the following paragraphs, have resulted in a tendency to apply the 
available sources as widely as possible, sometimes overly so.50 In particular, 
chronologically scattered sources are used to fill in gaps in periods to which the 
sources did not originally apply: so the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, discussing the 
federal constitution in 395, has been used explain the functions of the Boeotarchs 
mentioned by Herodotus during the Plataean campaign of 479, and Hellenistic 
attestation of the Pamboeotian Games has been drawn back to the Archaic Period. I 
will take the view that such synchronistic uses of evidence require a more 
compelling reason than simple silence of more appropriate sources, and especially so 
when there are clear indications that the sources are not applicable. 
Due to the comparative paucity of surviving Boeotian sources, we are often in the 
dark on the internal history of Boeotia.51 Moreover, the Boeotian sources which do 
                                                
48 Champion (2009), 89. 
49 Rhodes and Lewis (1997), 122. 
50 Roesch (1981), 269–70. 
51 Not, it would seem, for want of Boeotian authors writing about Boeotia, despite Athenian 
disparagement of Boeotian cultural achievements: the Boeotian historians Daemachus, Anaxis and 
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survive (Hesiod, Pindar and Plutarch, most substantially) have particular problems as 
reliable sources for Boeotian history. All three were educated men who wrote in 
dialects other than Boeotian; in the cases of Hesiod and Pindar this reflects their 
Panhellenic poetic traditions.52 Although presumably their fellow Boeotian élites 
would not have been hindered in their enjoyment of Hesiod and Pindar’s work by the 
epic and Doric dialects,53 the use of external dialects reflects engagement with 
external, not local, culture. Hesiod’s Works and Days in particular uses Boeotia as 
the backdrop for a discussion contemporary issues, but is presented as a Panhellenic 
work and does little to acknowledge Boeotia. In the case of Pindar, we can observe 
how few of his surviving epinicia are written for Theban winners, though even these 
are written in Doric. Moreover, writing epic (albeit in a didactic mode) and epinician 
poetry, respectively, Hesiod and Pindar cannot be relied on for fidelity to any 
historic reality.54  
Plutarch, like the much earlier Boeotians, wrote in a non-Boeotian dialect, but in his 
case this is indicative of the substantial period which stands between his time and the 
Classical Period and the archaicising preference given to Atticism among 
intellectuals of the high Roman Empire. However, Plutarch’s bias towards his 
homeland is a reason for caution.55 For Plutarch, it seems, much of the internecine 
feuding of Boeotian states was no longer relevant, or less relevant in the broad 
Mediterranean scope of his scholarly interests. His patriotism encompassed at least 
Theban achievements, if not all of Boeotia: his lost Life of Epameinondas, paired 
with Scipio Africanus, was given pride of place as the opening piece; a hint is given 
by his characterisation of the Theban uprising against Spartan occupation of the 
Cadmea in the Pelopidas: 
                                                                                                                                     
Dionysodorus each wrote a fourth-century Hellenica (see FGrH 65, 67, 68): see Tuplin (2007) on 
what might be expected in a Hellenica. Diodorus’ statement (15.95.4) that Anaxis and Dionysodorus 
both finished with the end of Theban hegemony in 361 implies a valuable Boeotian perspective on the 
fourth century. Various works of regional history, Boeotica or Thebaica, are also attested: see FGrH 
3:ch. XII on Boeotian historiography and Harding (2007) on regional histories. 
52 Pelliccia (2009), 241, refers to Pindar, Bacchylides and Simonides as “international poets”. See 
West (1978), 26–27 and 31–32, on Hesiod’s style of Ionic. 
53 Anson (2009), 9. 
54 West (1978), 22–25, on didactic genre and the Works and Days; Kurke (1991) on the Panhellenic 
market for epinicia. 
55 Pelling (2010), xv, summarises the point neatly. 
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ὁ γὰρ καταλύσας τὸ τῆς Σπάρτης ἀξίωµα καὶ παύσας ἄρχοντας αὐτοὺς 
γῆς τε καὶ θαλάττης πόλεµος ἐξ ἐκείνης ἐγένετο τῆς νυκτός, ἐν ᾗ 
Πελοπίδας οὐ φρούριον, οὐ τεῖχος, οὐκ ἀκρόπολιν καταλαβών, ἀλλ' εἰς 
οἰκίαν δωδέκατος κατελθών, εἰ δεῖ µεταφορᾷ <χρησάµενον> τὸ ἀληθὲς 
εἰπεῖν, ἔλυσε καὶ διέκοψετοὺς δεσµοὺς τῆς τῶν Λακεδαιµονίων 
ἡγεµονίας, ἀλύτους καὶ ἀρρήκτους εἶναι δοκοῦντας.  
For the war which undid Sparta’s pretensions and stopped the Spartans’ 
rule on land and at sea began from that night, when Pelopidas, not by 
taking any garrison, barricade or citadel, but by coming into a house in a 
group of twelve, if the truth may be said by means of a metaphor, undid 
and shattered the fetters of Spartan hegemony, which seemed to be 
unloosenable and unbreakable. (13.7) 
His characterisation falls neatly in line with the Theban propaganda about the 
uprising. He does provide a helpful voice on the fourth century by preserving 
accounts derived from contemporary sources other than Xenophon and the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia, at least some of which presents a Theban point of view.56 His sources 
do not seem to be much different from those available to other historians,57 but he 
sometimes includes apocryphal material which renders him unreliable when we 
cannot ascertain his source. 
I will attempt nevertheless to use these internal sources to demonstrate cultural and 
discursive aspects of Theban imperialism where possible. For the most part, 
however, I must rely on texts intended for and written by non-Boeotians: Herodotus, 
Thucydides, Xenophon and the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. Herodotus certainly used 
contemporary Boeotian sources, for a Boeotian is one of the two Greek sources 
sources named in the Histories: Thersander of Orchomenus, an eyewitness to a 
dinner for Thebans and Persians before the Battle of Plataea (9.16).58 He visited 
Thebes, where he saw “Cadmean letters” at the Temple of Ismenian Apollo (5.59–
61). On the other hand, Herodotus’ tendency to seek out prominent figures 
(including Thersander) for his sources exposed him to the bias of invested sources; 
where these were Athenian the common anti-Boeotian sentiment may make its way 
into Herodotus’ account.59 Thucydides’ specific sources are generally impenetrable. 
While he claims to have had access to sources on the anti-Athenian side, he names 
                                                
56 Westlake (1985), 122. 
57 Westlake (1985), 122. 
58 Hornblower (2002), 374. 
59 See Bakhuizen (1989), 67–68, on ancient insults; Zeitlin (1989) on the more cerebral use of Thebes 
as “Other” in Attic drama; Cartledge (2000), 401, on the same discourse in modern scholarship. 
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only Peloponnesians specifically (5.26).60 Spartans, along with the Plataean refugees 
at Athens, may have been his only sources for the Plataean campaign (431–27). 
Therefore, while both fifth-century historians did use some Boeotian sources, neither 
of them can be relied upon for a Theban point of view.  
In using these texts, and particularly the work of the pro-Athenian and pro-Spartan 
authors which make up the bulk of the Classical historiographical corpus, it is 
important to keep in mind the Boeotian patriot Plutarch’s admonition regarding the 
style of Greek historians, particularly Herodotus: 
οὐ γὰρ µόνον, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀδικίας µὴ ὄντα δοκεῖν 
εἶναι δίκαιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κακοηθείας ἄκρας ἔργον εὐκολίαν µιµούµενον 
καὶ ἁπλότητα δυσφώρατον εἶναι. 
For it is not only, as Plato says, a most extreme injustice to seem fair 
without being so, but also the height of malignance to fake mildness and 
simplicity while being harsh. (De Hdt. mal. 854f) 
Plutarch explicitly argues here for implicit biases in Herodotus which secretly attack 
his subjects rather than offering overt critique. He carries on to single out the 
Boeotians and Corinthians as the main victims (“most of all his malice is used 
against the Boeotians and Corinthians”, µάλιστα πρός τε Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Κορινθίους 
κέχρηται, 854f), and accuses Herodotus of going overboard in his critique of Theban 
Medising:61 
δῆλός ἐστιν οὐ τοῦτο λέγων εἰς τὸν Ἀθηναίων ἔπαινον, ἀλλ' Ἀθηναίους 
ἐπαινῶν ἵνα κακῶς εἴπῃ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἔτι 
δυσχεραίνοι, Θηβαίους ἀεὶ καὶ Φωκέας πικρῶς αὐτοῦ καὶ κατακόρως 
ἐξονειδίζοντος, ὅπου καὶ τῶν προκινδυνευσάντων ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὴν 
γενοµένην µὲν οὐ, γενοµένην δ' ἄν, ὡς αὐτὸς εἰκάζει, καταψηφίζεται 
προδοσίαν; 
He is clearly not saying this to praise the Athenians, but praising the 
Athenians to that he may speak ill of all the others, for how can one be 
outraged that he always bitterly and intemperately recriminates the 
Thebans and Phocians, when he condemns the treason of those who put 
themselves in danger’s way for Greece, which never actually happened, 
but, he suspects, could have happened? (864a–b) 
                                                
60 Perhaps specifically Corinthians, see ACT 3:53 for a summary of the views. 
61 Plutarch reports a story from the Theban historian Aristophanes (= FGrH 379 F 5) that the Thebans 
had refused to buy Herodotus’ goodwill (864d), unlike the Athenians (862b). Bowen (1992), 130, 
suggests that Aristophanes’ story is a product of the same kind of malice which Plutarch bemoans in 
Herodotus. See De Hdt. mal. 864d–65f, for a more extensive critique of Herodotus’ treatment of 
Theban Medism. 
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Many of his specific accusations are demonstrably unreasonable; scholars have 
suggested therefore that the work is a rhetorical exercise rather than a serious 
critique of historiography.62 It does not necessarily follow that there was absolutely 
no substance to Plutarch’s suggestion that Herodotus did not always fairly represent 
Boeotian history.63 Some of the historical information against which Plutarch 
compares Herodotus’ narrative is genuine.64 
In general Plutarch compares Herodotus’ historiographical style unfavourably to that 
of Thucydides (e.g. 855c, f). Thucydides, however, does not seem to have followed 
Boeotian sources in his history. His few statements on Boeotia’s internal affairs 
seem to take their lead from the general Athenian disparagement of Boeotia. The 
same accusation of anti-Boeotian bias, and especially anti-Theban bias has 
frequently been brought against Xenophon, in particular because parallel sources for 
his period sometimes demonstrate very different accounts (for example, on the 
causes of the Corinthian War).65 It is easy to construct rationalisations for 
Xenophon’s dislike of Thebes, given his personal relationship with King Agesilaus 
of Sparta and the death of his son Gryllus at the Battle of Mantinea.66 However, 
Cawkwell has argued that Xenophon gives credit where due, while Gray argues that 
Epameinondas is one of Xenophon’s exemplary leaders.67 His bias seems to result in 
omission rather than deception.68 On the whole, Xenophon’s Thebans must be 
approached with only due caution. 
This thesis relies largely on historiographical sources, often produced by non-
Boeotian authors employing (if any) Boeotian sources which were not likely to be 
favourable to Thebes. Not only is it difficult therefore to prove an imperialist attitude 
                                                
62 Mossman (1995), 227. Russell (1973), 60–62, and Bowen (1992), 2, argue for the sincerity of 
Plutarch’s argument. Pelling (2011), 150–51, observes that Plutarch does not always follow his own 
advice, whether it was meant or not. 
63 Baragwanath (2008), 9–20, offers a very positive view of  Plutarch’s critical ability. 
64 For example, the Battle of Ceressus (see pp. 58–60) is attested only in Plutarch and Pausanias, but 
Pausanias’ source is clearly not Plutarch, and perhaps not even the same source as Plutarch’s. The 
historical validity of the comparandum does not prove Plutarch’s argument that the Boeotians and 
Thessalians were at odds.  
65 Finley (1959), 382; Buck (1994), xvi. Buck (1993) argues that in the case of the start of the 
Corinthian (or Boeotian) War Xenophon’s account is still best, although the story that the Theban 
Ismenias took Persian bribes to start the war should be discarded as Spartan propaganda. 
66 Sordi (1951), 303–4; Westlake (1985), 123. 
67 Cawkwell (1972); Gray (1989), 170–75. 
68 Buck (1994), xvi. 
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in Theban policies, but it is also possible that the reality of individual Theban actions 
as a whole has been distorted. 
 
What follows is in four parts, covering distinct aspects of Thebes’ imperialism 
within Boeotia: Boeotian ethnic identity, Boeotian military actions, and Boeotian 
internal politics, and Boeotian coinage. Generally speaking, the first three of these 
aspects each represents a more developed stage of Theban imperialism, and therefore 
they are covered in broadly chronological order. 
In the first chapter, I discuss the matter of Boeotian ethnic identity, which is essential 
to any discussion of Boeotian history. I argue that Thebes in particular relied on the 
ethnic identity which it shared with its neighbours as a form of control. Signs of the 
construction of this identity can be seen in Archaic cultural artefacts such as the 
Iliad; the pre-historical construction of Boeotian identity in other sources also 
emphasises the unitary origin of the splintered Boeotian poleis. Cultural artefacts 
from within Boeotian demonstrate a change in Boeotian awareness of their identity 
from the early Archaic Period (in Hesiod) to the end of the Archaic Period (in Pindar 
and Corinna). Moreover, I argue that Thebes encouraged construction and 
reconstruction of nascent Boeotian ethnic identity out of the shared cultural features 
of the Boeotians in the late Archaic Period, promoting cooperation and its own 
position as the natural leader of Boeotia. The evidence points towards a date 
around 525 for the culmination of Theban manipulation of Boeotian identity. This 
discussion will form the background to the discussion of Thebes’ politicisation of 
Boeotian ethnic identity which follows. 
In the second chapter, I identify a period (ca. 525–447) in which Boeotia’s ethnic 
unity was exercised on the battlefield. Scattered historical records from the sixth 
century onwards attest to the military deeds of “the Boeotians”: I will demonstrate 
that in many of these cases, Thebes was the only (or most important) identifiable 
state involved; it is significant therefore that these deeds were attributed to the wider 
community. These early and often vaguely-attested efforts have been misinterpreted 
as evidence that the Boeotian Confederation was already operating in the late 
Archaic Period. By the time of the Persian Wars, it is clear that military cooperation 
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was the norm in Boeotia, and that Thebes was the acknowledged military leader of 
the region. It is not clear that this was substantially challenged by Boeotian defeats 
in the Persian Wars, and I will argue that Thebes took the lead in further developing 
Boeotian military cooperation into a full, political community after overthrowing 
Athenian domination of the region in the mid-fifth century (457–447), contrary to 
the arguments put forward by Fowler and Larsen that Tanagra and Orchomenus were 
the regional hegemons before and after the Athenian hegemony.69 
In the third chapter, I argue that the constitution of the Boeotian Confederation gave 
the balance of decision-making power within the confederation to Thebes. This was 
a central and persistent aspect of the proportional division of representation to the 
Boeotian League. Thebes also imposed oligarchic constitutions on the Boeotian 
poleis: Thebes therefore held effective control over the whole of Boeotia. Perhaps 
most importantly, Thebes was able to draw on the Confederation’s required military 
contributions to advance its own policies. During the Corinthian War the Spartans 
singled out Thebes’ position within Boeotia as interfering with the αὐτονοµία of the 
other Boeotian poleis. Thus the Boeotian Confederation should clearly be classified 
as an imperialist structure. 
A fourth chapter independently considers the evidence of Boeotian coinage, which 
has often been used problematically to inform historical analysis of Boeotian 
relations. Hansen has argued that we cannot reliably use this coinage to elucidate 
specific historic developments in Boeotia.70 Moreover, Mackill and van Alfen argue 
that monetary unions are not necessarily subordinate to the political situation and 
must therefore be approached with caution.71 I will argue, based largely on the 
iconographic interpretation of the evidence (which is less problematic), that 
Boeotia’s shared monetary iconography reflects Theban control, and that Boeotian 
monetisation may have taken place under Thebes’ direction and to its benefit. 
Boeotian coinage shows from very early on signs of a monetary union controlled by 
Thebes. 
                                                
69 Fowler (1957); Larsen (1950).  
70 See p. 4, n. 13. 
71 Mackil and van Alfen (2006). 
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Overall, I argue that it is appropriate to define Thebes’ relationship with Boeotia as 
imperialist. From the late sixth century Thebes asserted its position over other 
Boeotian states. This control originally constituted cultural, military, and economic 
spheres of influence. However, in the second half of the period considered here 
Thebes exercised control over Boeotia both through direct domination of the 
common resources of the Boeotian Confederation, and indirectly through 
interference in the Boeotian poleis’ local governments. Most significant here is the 
degree of force: Thebes’ consistent aggression places its treatment of Boeotia on the 
imperialist spectrum. 
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1 
BOEOTIAN SWINE: THEBES AND THE 
FORMATION OF BOEOTIAN ETHNIC IDENTITY 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the formation of Boeotian identity. 
Systematic interaction between Boeotian poleis relied, at the most basic level, on an 
inclusive group identity. Although Boeotia was divided into a number of smaller 
political communities, and had been so from very early in the historical period, its 
inhabitants shared cultural and religious practices.72 However, cultural affinity and 
political organisation are two very separate things.73 I argue that Thebes relied on 
Boeotian identity as an essential part of its imperialism throughout the Archaic and 
Classical Periods; it is therefore important to consider the substance of Boeotian 
identity throughout these periods. This discussion will form the background in 
particular to the discussion in chapter two of Thebes’ politicisation of Boeotian 
identity. I discuss Boeotian ethnicity here in the context of recent work on ethnic 
identity in Ancient Greece, which suggests that ethnic identity was not a primitive 
aspect of Greek culture, but a tool which could be subject to ongoing manipulation 
by various agents for their own purposes; a preliminary section will discuss the 
analysis of ethnic identity which is relevant to this thesis.74 
I show here that Theban imperialist rhetoric relied upon the belief that Boeotia was 
more than a geographic unit. The cooperation of Boeotian states which developed 
under Theban leadership was consistently referred to not without recognition of the 
individual poleis with their individual civic identities, nor as a collective centred on 
Thebes, but with reference to the region as a whole. Thebes’ appeals to “shared” or 
“common ancestral customs” (τὰ κοινὰ πάτρια) in Thucydidean speeches 
demonstrates that ethnic identity was part of Thebes’ domineering vocabulary for its 
interactions with other Boeotian poleis. 
                                                
72 Schachter (1994), gives a thorough overview of Boeotian “national” sanctuaries and deities. 
Kowalzig (2007), 328–91, discusses Archaic Boeotian religious practices; Larson (2007) discusses 
the general discourse of Archaic Boeotian ethnic identity. 
73 See Morgan (2001), for critique of the widely-held idea that ethnic groups (ἔθνη) in Greece 
reflected a consistent political arrangement. 
74 In particular, the work of Smith (1986), Hall (1997, 2002); Morgan (2003). 
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I go on to examine the extant evidence for a Boeotian identity in Boeotia itself, 
looking at the works of Hesiod, Pindar and Corinna. I argue that the development of 
a discourse around Boeotian identity did not arise until the late sixth century. 
Finally, I explore the ways in which the discourse of Boeotian identity encouraged 
unity and cooperation within the region. As established in the preliminary section, 
the discourse of identity is malleable, and in the case of Boeotia some evidence 
suggests that Thebes encouraged reconstruction of Boeotian identity to encompass 
northern Boeotian states. 
REGIONAL ETHNICITY IN ANCIENT GREECE 
It is now widely recognised that although cultural practices may be inherited and 
shared between separate communities, any identity is a matter of discourse, i.e. the 
result of discussion which draws together cultural elements into an identity by 
talking about them as things held in common.75 This discussion could be directed.  
Group identities in Greece had to be constructed at many levels, for the Greeks were 
not a unified or homogeneous people at any level.76 Political discourse emphasised 
the household (οἶκος), a small group of individuals united by personal ties of blood, 
marriage and property ownership. Households were grouped into formal states 
(πόλεις) but individual poleis often  groupings within the state (such as φυλαί 
“tribes”, γένη “clans”, φρατραί “brotherhoods”, δῆµοι “villages”).77 There were also 
groupings which stretched beyond the borders of an individual polis: ethnic grouping 
was one of the broad means by which an individual Greek might distinguish himself 
or herself from the Greeks of other poleis. The Greek terms for these super-
municipal groups vary. 
                                                
75 Morgan (2003), 23. 
76 Hall (2003); Morgan (2003), 14. 
77 The translation of these terms is necessarily very loose; Greek group-identity types do not 
necessarily have straightforward equivalences to modern Anglophone categories. Boeotia does not 
seem to have had the φυλαί and φρατραί that were so important in other Greek poleis; Buck argues 
(1979), 90, very unconvincingly that the seven Homeric commanders of Boeotia reflect seven early 
Boeotian φυλαί. Some divisions may have been multi-valent: for example, Doric poleis had φυλαί-
divisions which often shared their name with φυλαί in other Doric poleis; but it is not clear that the 
Spartan Hylleis had any relationship with the Sicyonian, Megaran, Argive, Epidauran, Troezene, 
Theran, etc., Hylleis: see Hall (2007b), 54–56. 
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It is important to note that the concept of “ethnicity” is extremely modern. Although 
“ethnicity” derives from the Greek term ἔθνος, in its earliest uses the Greek word 
denoted any group; some have argued that the Homeric “Catalogue of Ships” may 
have been instrumental in transforming the word from “collective” to “people”.78 
Nevertheless, the exact meaning even in the Classical Period was less than clear: the 
usage of ἔθνος in both Herodotus and Thucydides seems only to serve as a term of 
contrast with the more marked γένος, “descent-group”,79 but the reference to the 
ἔθνη of the Boeotians and Chalcidieans in an official Athenian epigram (ML 15) 
should denote something more specific.80 Konstan states, “ethnicity arises when a 
collective identity is asserted on the basis of shared characteristics”.81 Shared 
characteristics are, of course, the basis of any communal identity. However, the 
characteristics which assemble an ethnicity are usually subjective, not objective: for 
example, a member of the Athenian political community had to meet certain 
objective descent criteria which could be defined by law (e.g. Pericles’ citizenship 
law of 451/50 BCE, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 26.3) and could be tested in court ([Dem.] 59). 
Membership within ethnic groups was only contestable on subjective grounds.82 
Smith assembles six characteristics for ethnic groups: a collective name, a common 
myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive culture, an association with a specific 
territory, and a sense of solidarity.83 Smith notes that although some shared 
characteristics only need to be highlighted in discourse, others will be augmented 
“along those of the six dimensions they appear to be deficient in”.84 Hall suggests 
that a shared myth of descent and an association with a specific territory are 
particularly important for the development of ethnicity in Greece.85 These 
dimensions are a matter of subjective consideration; they relate not to factual 
descent, history, cultural practice, territorial possessions, but to the presentation of 
                                                
78 Bakhuizen (1989), 66–67; McInerney (2001), 55–57; cf. LSJ s.v. ἔθνος, I. 
79 C. Jones (1996), esp. 319–20. 
80 Hall (2007b), 50. 
81 Konstan (2001), 30. 
82 The locus classicus is Cleomenes’ assertion that he is not Dorian but Achaean (Hdt. 5.72.3). His 
assertion is accepted by the Athenian priestess, but Herodotus implies in his ensuing discussion that 
the following problems may have been a consequence of impiety resulting from Cleomenes’ claim. 
83 Smith (1986), 22–30. 
84 Smith (1986), 31. 
85 Hall (1997), 25. 
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these factors as a means of distinguishing in-groups from out-groups, as a matter of 
discourse.  
Scholarship has rejected the belief that ethnic identity is itself innate, or based on 
innate characteristics which naturally create identity (the primordialist model). The 
fulfilment of ethnic characteristics in any particular case is not necessarily organic; 
characteristics can be constructed or reconstructed to serve the process of 
ethnogenesis. The instrumentalist school argues that characteristics are not simply 
selectively collated into a cohesive identity, but that ethnogenesis can serve a wider 
purpose, as opposed to the primordialist view of ethnogenesis as a directionless 
development of cultural similarities. Hall states that  
there is nothing inevitable or primordial about ethnicity... Biological 
features, language, religious professions, or cultural traits, far from 
defining ethnic groups, are variously harnessed to serve as visible 
markers for identities that are constructed discursively.86 
In the instrumentalist model, features are attached to the discourse of identity, rather 
than features engendering the discourse. It is worth noting Konstan’s assertion that 
“such discursive processes occur as a result precisely of ‘changing social contexts,’ 
that is, of events to which the formation of an imagined identity is a response”: the 
instrumentalist model of ethnic identity encompasses primordialist models.87 
Discussion of Boeotian identity has tended to take a primordialist approach to ethnic 
identity, although the Boeotians were only unequivocally unified during their 
mythical prehistory: there is no extant account for their division into separate poleis. 
This can be compared with the Dorian invasion, which includes a narrative of 
division (cf. Paus. 4.3.3). 
Hall suggests another heuristic for discussing ethnicity, opposing ethnogenesis 
focusing on differences between the in-group and out-groups (“oppositional” 
identity) against ethnogenesis which focuses on similarities within the in-group 
(“aggregative” identity).88 Oppositional identity has been considered particularly 
important in the formulation of Greek ethnic identity: the waves of Greek 
                                                
86 Hall (2007), 53; see also Hall (1997), 21–24. 
87 Konstan (2001), 30. 
88 Hall (1997), 47–8. 
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colonisation in the early Archaic Period and the united struggle against the Persian 
Empire at the end of the Archaic Period in particular may have encouraged Greek 
contrastive ethnogenesis by bringing Greeks into contact with non-Greek peoples.89 
At the same time, the rise of Panhellenism may itself have been essential to the 
contrastive ethnogenesis of groups within Greek culture as Panhellenic festivals and 
sanctuaries (such as Olympia and Delphi) brought Greeks in contact with other 
Greeks. This differentiation relies on an instrumentalist (or, at least, non-
primordialist) analysis, as the distinction lies not in the traits used for ethnogenesis 
themselves, but the focalisation of these traits in the discursive representation of 
ethnic characteristics. Contrastive ethnic construction infers, rather than overtly 
identifies, commonalities within the in-group. 
Morgan notes that the six characteristics which Smith identifies have also been used, 
problematically, as characteristics in the construction of Greek poleis.90 In part (as 
Morgan suggests) this is a matter of terminological slippage between ethnic and 
political identities, but the mechanisms of identity can work equally well in 
constructing both political communities and ethnic identities (a point in favour of the 
instrumentalist model). Morgan is cautious about associating ethnic identity with 
civic communities; but Boeotia stands on the traditional border between the poleis of 
southern Greece and the ἔθνη of northern Greece.91 In Boeotia, therefore, civic and 
ethnic identity operated at the same time. An individual Boeotian could validly refer 
to himself as both Θηβαῖος/Ὀρχοµένιος/Ταναγραῖος… and Βοιωτός in addition to 
the broad Panhellenic identities (for the Boeotians, Αἰολεύς). 
The formation of separate ethnic identities within Greek culture was, to some extent, 
a prehistoric phenomenon.92 Recent scholarship on the linguistic evidence has 
demonstrated that although the extant corpus of Mycenaean Greek Linear B tablets 
demonstrates remarkable linguistic unity, the everyday speech of Bronze-Age 
Greece varied substantially across the southern Balkan Peninsula and Aegean 
                                                
89 Hall (1997), 47–8; 
90 Morgan (2003), 79. 
91 Hall (2007), 59. 
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Islands.93 Finkelberg’s reconstruction of a Greek dialect continuum based on the 
evidence of later isoglosses is predicated on identity-based groups: when the dialects 
moved into the non-continuous arrangement which is attested by the historical 
evidence, each must have moved with large groups. Without more detailed evidence 
on Bronze-Age isoglosses, we cannot determine whether the dialects contained one 
linguistically-unified isogloss group each, or multiple isogloss groups which were 
unified under a non-linguistic criterion. In either case, the dialect movements in 
Finkelberg’s reconstruction, which she links to the late Bronze-Age (Sub-
Mycenaean) population movements, demonstrate indicia of early ethnic identity 
within Greece. Likewise, the Homeric epics depict various subgroups within the 
Greek and Trojan forces: although these divisions seem to be solely political within 
the epics, as the Achaeans seem to belong to a monolithic culture and language, it 
seems likely that Greeks even from the Archaic Period would have understood (or 
perhaps retrojected) their own cultural and linguistic diversity onto the Homeric 
depiction. 
Some Boeotian identity probably dates back to Bronze Age. It seems likely that the 
Boeotians were defined in part by their dialect.94 Dialectal distinction was both an 
aggregative and constrastive characteristic, one which joined the Boeotians and 
contrasted them with other Greeks. The historical area of Boeotian dialect (a mixture 
of Aeolic and North-Western Greek) was bordered by Attic, Ionian and Doric 
linguistic areas. The linguistic community of Boeotia is undeniable and may have 
been a substantial contributor to Boeotian identity.95 However, Finkelberg 
reconstructs Boeotian dialect as part of a Greek language continuum in the Bronze 
Age period, with the Boeotians placed approximately in the area of Thesprotia which 
the Greeks considered to have been the Boeotian homeland.96 It is probable, given 
the language continuum, that Boeotian dialect was not the sole aggregative feature of 
Boeotian ethnic identity: when they moved it must have been on some greater 
identity. 
                                                
93 Finkelberg (2005), ch. 6. 
94 See C. Buck (1955), 152–54, on the features of Boeotian dialect, which was highly distinctive. 
95 See Larson (2007), ch. 4, on Boeotian dialect as an indicium of ethnic identity. Language was very 
highly privileged in Greek ethnic discourse: Anson (2009). 
96 Finkelberg (2005), ch. 6. 
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ETHNICITY AND THE CONFEDERATION 
The term “Boeotian Confederation” is a result of the modern historiographic 
tradition: although the residents of Boeotia cooperated politically, religiously and 
militarily with each other within increasingly formal structures from the Archaic 
Period onwards, it was not until the late fourth century that the Boeotians began to 
use a term for their collective political actions which could strictly be translated as a 
“confederation” (τὸ [τῶν Βοιωτῶν] κοινόν: SEG 27 60, 32 476).97 Before this, 
justifications of the cooperative nature of Boeotia referred solely to “the ancestral 
customs of the Boeotians” (τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια, e.g. Thuc. 2.2.4), while 
cooperative acts were carried out by “the Boeotians” (οἱ Βοιωτοί: SEG 41 506).98 
Even the highly structured federal bodies of the later fifth century and early fourth 
century are identified only as τὰ πράγµατα … κα[τὰ τὴ]ν Βοιωτίαν, “politics in 
Boeotia” (Hell. Oxy. 16). The cohesion of Boeotia was dependent then on the ethnic 
identity of the participating states, represented by the ethnic term “Boeotians” 
(Βοιωτοί), not on the memory of an agreement (cf. the so-called Delian League) nor 
on geographic proximity (cf. the so-called Peloponnesian League). The continuing 
use of the ethnic, whether to refer to mythological and prehistorical Boeotians, the 
inhabitants of the region in the Archaic Period, or the citizens of the fifth-century 
confederation, erases the development of the term; but this does not indicate per se 
that Boeotia had always had a degree of political unity. It is important to consider 
                                                
97 SEG 27 60: Θιός· Ὀλυµπίχω ἄρχοντος | ἔδοξε τõι κοινõι Βοιωτῶν | Καλλιππίδαν Θεόκλειον | 
Ἀθανῆον πρόξενον εἶµεν | κὴ εὐεργέταν τῶ κοινῶ | Βοιωτῶν κὴ αὐτὸν κὴ ἐκγό- | νως, κὴ εἶµεν αὐτ[õι 
γᾶς κὴ] | Ἀθανῆον πρόξενον εἶµεν | [ϝοικίας ἔππασιν - - - - -], “God: when Olympichos was archon 
the Boeotian confederation decided that Callippidas [son of Theocles?] of Athens should be proxenus 
and euergetes of the Boeotian confederation, both himself and his decendants to be proxenus of this 
land and to have the right to hold such territory.” 
SEG 32 476: Ἔδοξε τõι κοινõι Βοιω- | τῶν, ⟦Πιστολάω⟧ ἄρχοντος, | Ὀϊκλῆν Ἀντιφάταο Πελ- | λανῆα 
πρόξενον κὴ εὐ- | εργέταν ἦµεν Βοιωτῶν, | αὐτὸν καὶ ἐσγόνους, καὶ | ἦµεν {ν} οἷ ἀτέλειαν καὶ ἀ- | 
συλίαν καὶ ἐν ἰράναι καὶ | ἐν πολέµωι καὶ γᾶς καὶ οἰ- | κίας ἔνπασιν καί τὰ ἄλλα | καθάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις 
προ- | ξένοις ἅπαντα, Βοιωταρχε- | όντων ⟦Κλέωνος⟧ Θεσπιῆος … “The Boeotian confederation 
decided, when Pistolaus was archon, that Oicles son of Antiphatas from Pellana should be proxenus 
and euergetes of the Boeotians, both himself and his decendants, and that he will go without taxation 
or harm in peace and in war and have the right of territory and residence and such other things as the 
other proxeni, when the Boeotarchs were Cleon the Thespian …”  
Both inscriptions dated to after 338: Rhodes and Lewis (1997), 121. 
98 SEG 41 506: Βοιοτõν | Λοϙρõν, “Boeotians … Locrians”, a fragmentary stele of a sixth or fifth 
century agreement between Boeotians and Locrians found at Delphi. Boeotian proxeny decrees from 
the early fourth century (perhaps relating to the Theban navy, cf. Fossey [1994], 35–36) appoint 
πρόξενοι Βοιωτῶν by the will of the δᾶµος: IG vii 2407, 2408. 
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what exactly “Boeotian” meant, whom it denoted, and how it was used in the 
Archaic Period. 
Although the Boeotian Confederation, like the Peloponnesian League, had an 
obvious geographical unity, two points need to be observed: firstly, the 
Peloponnesian League encompassed political units which identified with several 
different groups and for whom geography was the only in-group characteristic: 
Dorian Spartans, Achaean Messenians, Aetolian Eleans, Arcadians;99 while the 
Boeotian Confederation incorporated a geographic and ethnic unity. The 
Peloponnesian League was apparently bound by individual treaty to Sparta. No sign 
of formal agreements exists for Boeotia until the late fifth century. Secondly, while 
the Peloponnesians (Πελοποννήσιοι) derived their name from the territory, the 
Boeotians gave their name to the territory (ἡ Βοιωτία γῆ, cf. Thuc. 1.12.3):100 the 
territory was defined, at least in discourse, by the extent of its inhabitants and not 
vice versa. In both cases the expansion of an otherwise unmarked collective noun 
with political ideology presumes the participation of the pre-existing group, perhaps 
beyond the true subscription to the ideology, and reforms the identity of the group 
around a new focus. 
The use of the ethnic alone for the cooperation relies on the fellow-feeling of the 
Boeotians; rhetorical appeals to τὰ πάτρια, “ancestral ways”, emphasise the religious 
and cultural background to the present political super-community. The Boeotians 
were occasionally referred to as an ἔθνος (cf. Pind. fr. 83.1; Hdt. 5.77; Hell. Oxy. 
16.4). An ἔθνος was not an “ethnic group” per se, but a broad term for identity 
groups, including but not limited to the inhabitants of a single polis (e.g. Athens, 
Hdt. 1.57.3), of multiple poleis in a region (e.g. Boeotia), or even of much larger and 
even non-Greek groups (e.g. Scythians, Hdt. 4.5).101 In northern Greece, the 
urbanised political structures of the polis were not favoured; the term for these 
collections of settlements likewise seems to have been ἔθνη. German scholarship in 
particular has suggested that ἔθνη which formed a collective political stucture 
                                                
99 And in fact included Aeolian Boeotians until the end of the Peloponnesian War, who were not 
Peloponnesian in any sense. 
100 Hansen (2004), 431, is mistaken to identify Hesiod fr. 181 as a reference to the territory; it is 
simply the feminine of the variant ethnic Βοιώτιος (cf. Pind. Ol. 6.90). 
101 Hall (1997), 34. 
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(Stammesbund) were a distinct political structure from the polis-based federations, 
κοινά (Stadtsbund).102 Boeotia’s marginality between the northern system of ἔθνη 
and the southern system of poleis (and its close cultural ties with Thessaly in 
particular) reinforces the view that cooperation was a pre-historical phenomenon 
amongst Boeotians, of which confederation was only a more developed form. 
However, as Morgan points out, ἔθνος is not a consistent term for any political 
structure, and there is very little evidence to suggest that the political structure of 
Boeotian poleis was less developed than those in southern and eastern poleis.103 
Considerations of Boeotian unity cannot, therefore, be founded upon generalised 
assumptions about the character of Greek ἔθνη. Ethnic identity was nevertheless an 
essential part of the pre-Hellenistic relationship between Boeotian poleis, though it 
must be considered in its own right. 
The political associations possible in the originally ethnic term “Boeotian” are clear 
in Herodotus’ report of the Corinthian settlement of the sixth-century dispute at 
Plataea:104 
ἐᾶν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς µὴ βουλοµένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. 
[the Corinthians decided] that the Thebans were to leave alone those of 
the Boeotians who did not wish to be considered amongst the Boeotians. 
(6.108.5) 
The two uses of Βοιωτοί here are distinct and cannot be reconciled to a single 
meaning: the first must mean the ethnic group, the second the political collective. 
However, Herodotus offers no distinction between the general ethnic and a more 
significant category: the use of these terms side-by-side, in this context, suggests an 
ongoing politicisation of the ethnic into a technical term. This can be compared with 
the expanding use of Λακεδαιµόνιοι to include Spartan perioecic communities in the 
late Archaic Period.105 
Other events reflect the substantial weight which Thebes placed on Boeotian ethnic 
identity in its negotiations with the Boeotian poleis. The historiographical record 
offers limited views of the discourse between Thebes and the other Boeotian poleis 
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about their relationships. The recurrence of conflict between Thebes and Plataea at 
the start of the Peloponnesian War, however, offers a rare glimpse into such 
discussions, albeit largely through the genre of the Thucydidean speech, which is 
sometimes dubious as a historical source. The phrase τὰ κοινὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων 
Βοιωτῶν, “the common ancestral customs of all the Boeotians” recurs so frequently 
in Theban speech as to suggest a catchphrase: 
καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κῆρυξ, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων 
Βοιωτῶν ξυµµαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὑτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα... 
The herald proclaimed that anyone who wished to fight with them, 
according to the ancestral customs of all the Boeotians, should pile their 
arms with theirs. (2.2.4) 
‘Ἡµεῖς δὲ αὐτοῖς διάφοροι ἐγενόµεθα πρῶτον ὅτι ἡµῶν κτισάντων 
Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία µετ' αὐτῆς, ἃ 
ξυµµείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχοµεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ 
ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεµονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡµῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν 
παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια...’ 
We first came to disagreement because we had founded Plataea after the 
rest of Boeotia, and other areas with it, which we had gained by driving 
out the previous mixed population; these men did not accept our 
leadership as had been originally arranged, but stood apart from the other 
Boeotians and rejected the ancestral customs. (3.61.2) 
‘βουλόµενοι τῆς µὲν ἔξω ξυµµαχίας ὑµᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν 
πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια καταστῆσαι…’ 
wishing to stop you from being outside the symmachy and to bring you 
into the common ancestral customs of all the Boeotians. (3.65.2) 
προείποµέν τε τὸν βουλόµενον κατὰ τὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια 
πολιτεύειν ἰέναι πρὸς ἡµᾶς 
…and we announced that he who was willing to participate according to 
the ancestral customs of all the Boeotians should come over to us. 
(3.66.1) 
These passages are from Thucydides’ description of the Theban invasion of Plataea 
in 431 and the subsequent debate between Plataea and Thebes in 427; we may note 
that Plataea was at the time the most recalcitrant Boeotian state towards Theban 
hegemony of Boeotia. All of the instances of the phrase belong to Theban speeches 
(sometimes indirectly reported): in discussing its attempts to bring Plataea into its 
sphere of influence, some of them forcible, Thebes did not appeal to a particular 
political structure or agreement, but simply to Plataea’s Boeotian identity. Thebes 
even establishes itself as a pseudo-metropolis of Boeotia, claiming to have “settled” 
Boeotia (as at 3.61.2, κτισάντων). The Thebans use several verbs with the 
catchphrase: ξυµµάχειν, πολιτεύειν, and most importantly, ἡγεµονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡµῶν. 
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The presence of πολιτεύειν, “participate in the polis”, makes it clear that this is no 
simple reference to military leadership: Thebes claimed a consistent right to lead the 
Boeotians, perhaps as metropolis. 
The ethnic identity of the Boeotians was clearly important to Thebes’ ways of 
dealing with the other Boeotians. The political leveraging of the ethnonym in 
particular to create a new political community which included all Boeotians under 
Theban domination did not necessarily rely on a fundamental or primitive Boeotian 
understanding of their own identity. This politicised ethnic identity was used 
continuously from the sixth century as the label for cooperation between Boeotian 
poleis. 
THE FORMATION OF BOEOTIAN IDENTITY 
The development of a significant ethnic identity in Boeotia seems to have been a 
late-occuring process. The Early Boeotian author Hesiod shows little awareness of 
any regional ethnic identity. By the first years of the Classical Period, however, 
Pindar and Corinna demonstrate marked awareness of their Boeotian-ness. 
Unlike Homer, whose identity could not be ascertained from his poetry, Hesiod was 
held to have been both poet and major character in the Theogony and Works and 
Days.106 The Theogony describes Hesiod as Ἡσίοδον … | ἄρνας ποιµαίνονθ’ 
Ἑλικῶνος ὑπὸ ζαθέοιο, “Hesiod … sheep-tending below holy Helicon” (Th. 22–23); 
in the Works and Days, his father νάσσατο δ’ ἄγχ’ Ἑλικῶνος ὀιζυρῇ ἐνὶ κώµῃ, | 
Ἄσκρῃ, “settled in a woeful village near Helicon, Ascra” (WD 639–40). Based on 
these brief pieces of information and the strong association of the poet(s) of both 
poems with the character Hesiod, the ancient Greeks described the poet Hesiod as 
Boeotian.107 
Hesiod never uses the term “Boeotian” in his poetry. The poems are not unaware of 
ethnically-charged terms: the Sphinx is a Καδµείοισιν ὄλεθρον “destruction to 
Cadmeans” (Th. 326); Cyme is Αἰολίδα “Aeolian” (WD 636); the sun shines 
                                                
106 Ready (2007), 130. 
107 E.g. Bacchyl. 5.191–92; Hermesianax fr. 7.21–26; some sources restrict themselves to “Ascran”, 
e.g. V. Georg. 2.176; Prop. 2.34.77; the Suda, surprisingly, refers to him as Κυµαῖος, “Cymaean” (s.v. 
Ἡσίοδος). 
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sluggishly in summer on Πανελλήνεσσι, “all the Greeks” (WD 528).108 Hesiod 
traveled to Euboea (presumably from Ascra): unless he sailed from the south-
western coast of Boeotia around the Peloponnese and Attica to Euboea, he must have 
traveled across southern Boeotia at least once and come into contact with the 
occupants (WD 650–55). Despite a consciousness for ethnicity, Hesiod uses no word 
for himself or his neighbours as a distinct group from the wider Panhellenic culture 
which he depicts. 
Hesiod also eschews the local Boeotian dialect for the Ionian epic literary dialect. 
Even the Aeolian substratum in Hesiod’s Ionic poetry employs only those 
Aeolicisms which may also be found in Homer. Cassio notes that these features 
nevertheless have a higher rate of occurrence in Hesiod, but also that Hesiodic 
language often has clearly Ionic features contrary to Boeotian dialect: particularly 
the neglect of initial [w] (digamma, ϝ) in Hesiod against the preserved [w] of the 
Boeotian dialect down to the Hellenistic period.109 The only undoubtedly Boeotian 
element in the language of the Theogony or Works and Days is the Boeotian form of 
the Sphinx’s name (Φῖκ᾽, Th. 326).110 On the basis of this evidence, we cannot even 
state with certainty that Hesiod spoke Boeotian dialect normally: he presents his 
father as native of Aeolia (WD 636).111 Hesiod is unique amongst Archaic poets for 
describing local issues (notably the dispute of his own inheritance with his brother 
Perses) from a Panhellenic perspective: Homer takes a broadly Panhellenic stance as 
well, while the lyric poets describe local and personal problems (such as the 
βασιλῆας δωροφάγους “gift-eating kings” of Thespiae: WD 38–39) from local and 
personal perspectives.112 Nagy notes that this Panhellenising movement is 
internalised in the Theogony, with the Muses relocated to Olympus from Helicon 
(Th. 52–79).113 
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On these grounds, and accepting the modern consensus of an early to mid-seventh-
century date for Hesiod’s work,114 we might conclude that either Boeotian identity in 
the early Archaic period was not significant enough to find expression in Hesiod’s 
poetry, or Hesiod himself (of recent Aeolian descent) was not assimilated to the 
culture of his locality. This second possibility is no less evidence of the 
insignificance of Boeotian identity, for it is clear that ethnic assimilation is not a 
concern of the world of the Works and Days. 
The very earliest historical attestation of Boeotian cooperation in the religious sphere 
comes from two dedications to Athena Pronaea at the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoeus 
near Acraephnium. One, securely dated to the early sixth century, reads simply 
Βοιοτοί Προναίαι, “from the Boeotians to Pronaea”; the second is not much longer, 
and the middle part of the inscription (including the plural ending of Bοιοτοὶ) 
requires reconstruction.115  
By the early Classical Period, however, Boeotian ethnic identity was clearly 
operative and a significant aspect of personal identity for the residents of Boeotia. 
The Theban poet Pindar shows particular concern for the wider Greek perception of 
Boeotian character in two poems: 
ἦν ὅτε σύας Βοιώτιον ἔθνος ἔνεπον 
There was a time when they called the Boeotian race pigs… (fr. 83.1) 
ὄτρυνον νῦν ἑταίρους, 
Αἰνέα, πρῶτον µὲν Ἥραν 
Παρθενίαν κελαδῆσαι, 
γνῶναί τ' ἔπειτ', ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος ἀλαθέσιν 
λόγοις εἰ φεύγοµεν, Βοιωτίαν ὗν. 
Rouse now your companions, Aeneas, first to praise Parthenian Hera, 
then to know if we have escaped the old reproach of unforgettable 
speeches, Boeotian pig. (Ol. 6.89–90) 
Boeotian identity for Pindar, of course, existed in tandem with his identity as a 
Theban. Although Pindar does seem to be the first historical Boeotian author 
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(compared with Hesiod’s semi-mythical status even within his own poetry), we 
cannot always be sure that his “I” and “we” are sincere representations of himself. I 
will take a largely optimistic view. Despite the obvious hostility of many mainland 
Greeks to Thebes for its role in the Persian Wars, Bakhuizen suggests, based on 
these two references, that the low opinions of Boeotians expressed in fifth-century 
Attic voices had a much older origin.116 This could have been a significant feature of 
oppositional ethnogenesis for the Boeotians.117 Pindar remains the earliest attestation 
of this reproach; there is therefore little evidence to suggest that the phrase “Boeotian 
pigs” is “ancient” rather than simply “old”. The term could easily have its basis in 
the disputes between Athens and Boeotia at the end of the sixth century, perhaps 
reinforced by Boeotian Medism during the Persian Wars at the end of the Archaic 
Period, only shortly before Pindar’s own floruit. 
Nor was the expansion of active Boeotian identity limited to Thebes in Pindar’s 
time. The Tanagran poet Corinna, active at the same time as Pindar,118 claims that 
she is going to expand upon Boeotian tales for her audience of local maidens: 
ἐπί µε Τερψιχόρα [ 
καλὰ ϝεροῖ' ἀισοµ[έναν 
Ταναγρίδεσσι λε[υκοπέπλυς 
µέγα δ' ἐµῆς γέγ[αθε πόλις 
λιγουροκω[τί]λυ[ς ἐνοπῆς. 
Terpsichore [inspires?] me 
to sing wonderful heroes’ deeds 
for Tanagran women in white peploi 
rejoice greatly, city, for my 
sweet-chattering song. (fr. 2.1–5) 
As Skinner points out, not just the use of Boeotian dialect in general but the specific 
Boeotian term ϝεροῖα, “heroic tales”, places Corinna firmly in a broad Boeotian 
tradition.119 The surviving fragments of her poems suggest a broad engagement with 
                                                
116 Bakhuizen (1989), 68. 
117 Bakhuizen (1989), 69. 
118 Biographical tradition, although untrustworthy, widely reports Corinna as a contemporary of 
Pindar (Suda, s.v. Κόριννα, Plut. De glor. Ath. 4.347f–348a, Ael. V.H. 13.25, Paus. 9.22.3). The 
linguistic evidence of Corinna’s Boeotian dialect shows her to either be genuinely early Classical or 
rigorously archaising. In the absence of clear evidence from the poems themselves, it is not entirely 
wrong to take an optimistic view of the consistent biographical tradition: see Larson (2007), 19 n. 12, 
for a summary of the arguments for an early or late date. An early date is so far impossible to 
disprove. 
119 Skinner (1983), 11. 
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various Boeotian myths, including the Seven Against Thebes and the Boeotian 
eponym Boeotus (frr. 5, 6). It is clear and significant that Corinna saw herself as a 
resident of Boeotia. 
What is noticeable then is that Boeotian identity underwent a remarkable change 
between Hesiod’s mid-seventh century writings and the end of the Archaic Period. 
While Hesiod expresses no concern for his own ethnic identity, it is a significant and 
confirmed part of Pindar’s and Corinna’s identity. The earliest use of the ethnic from 
within Boeotia occurs only in the early sixth century, with a religious aspect. I 
therefore suggest that the mid-sixth century is a good terminus ante quem for the 
discursive politicisation of Boeotian identity. This would place the phenomenon at a 
time roughly contemporary with traditional dates for the formation of the Boeotian 
Confederation. 
“PROJECT BOEOTIA”: IDENTITY AND BOEOTIAN UNITY 
Smith highlights a sense of solidarity as one of the fundamental aspects of the 
construction of ethnic identity. This is especially important for explaining the 
emergent cooperation within Boeotia, where ethnic identity came to replace parts of 
the political aspects of identity of individual poleis; Kowalzig refers to the 
development of cooperative Boeotian identity as “Project Boeotia”.120 The 
assumption that Boeotia consisted of states whose cooperation was prehistorical is 
insufficient to explain this. As discussed in chapter two, Boeotian political 
cooperation did not really occur until the mid-fifth century, and military cooperation 
only predated this by about half a century. It is important to consider how the 
discourse of Boeotian identity encouraged cooperation. 
a. The Coming of the Boeotians 
It is widely accepted that the Boeotians moved, more or less en masse, into Boeotia 
shortly after the Trojan War, according to mythological accounts, as a result of a 
conflict with the Thessalian neighbours of their original territory in Thesprotia; 
historically this migration may have been part of the upheavals which followed the 
                                                
120 Kowalzig (2007), 355. 
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Mycenaean collapse.121 The accounts of migration vary wildly; Buck has attempted 
to synthesise the stories.122 The migration narrative is very important for our 
understanding of Boeotian ethnic identity: it implies that by the end of the Archaic 
Period, the Boeotians had been a cohesive group arranged on an operational ethnic 
identity for at least five hundred years. The war with the Thessalians would have 
been a major event in the shared history of the Boeotians, one which explained both 
their cultural affinities with the Thessalians and their association with central Greek 
territory. However, the sources describe a rather more complicated narrative than the 
(perhaps excessively) rationalised story given in modern accounts. 
Thucydides alone fully develops the narrative which Buck uses as the basis for his 
account. In the “Archaeology” of Book One, Thucydides includes the Boeotian 
invasion alongside the Dorian invasion in a description of the aftermath of the 
Trojan War: 
ἐπεὶ καὶ µετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἔτι µετανίστατό τε καὶ κατῳκίζετο, 
ὥστε µὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι. ἥ τε γὰρ ἀναχώρησις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐξ 
Ἰλίου χρονία γενοµένη πολλὰ ἐνεόχµωσε, καὶ στάσεις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὡς 
ἐπὶ πολὺ ἐγίγνοντο, ἀφ' ὧν ἐκπίπτοντες τὰς πόλεις ἔκτιζον. Βοιωτοί τε 
γὰρ οἱ νῦν ἑξηκοστῷ ἔτει µετὰ Ἰλίου ἅλωσιν ἐξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ 
Θεσσαλῶν τὴν νῦν µὲν Βοιωτίαν, πρότερον δὲ Καδµηίδα γῆν 
καλουµένην ᾤκισαν (ἦν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀποδασµὸς πρότερον ἐν τῇ γῇ 
ταύτῃ, ἀφ' ὧν καὶ ἐς Ἴλιον ἐστράτευσαν), Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει 
ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον. 
Even after the Trojan War, Greece was still being uprooted and resettled, 
so that it had no respite to grow. For the late-occurring return of the 
Greeks from Ilium caused many changes, and strife arose in almost every 
state, the exiles from which established the states. For the modern 
Boeotians were expelled from Arne by the Thessalians in the sixtieth 
year after the capture of Ilium and settled the modern Boeotia, previously 
called the Cadmean land (but there was also a section of them in that land 
earlier, some of whom also waged war at Ilium), and the Dorians with 
the Heracleidae took the Peloponnese in the eightieth year. (1.12.1–3) 
The two events stand out in the narrative of the “Archaeology” for the vivid and 
clear descriptions.123 In fact, rather more detail is given regarding the Boeotian 
migration than the (perhaps better-known) Dorian invasion. Thucydides explicitly 
dates the Boeotian and Dorian migrations relative to the Trojan War, while an earlier 
                                                
121 N. Hammond (1976), 135. 
122 Buck (1979), ch. 5 (whence the title of this section), but see now also Larson (2007), 52–64, for a 
careful consideration of Thucydides. 
123 Finley (1972), 17. 
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Boeotian migration has only the terminus ante quem of the Trojan War. The two 
stages of immigration is a theme of depictions of the “Coming of the Boeotians”,124 
but it is only in Thucydides, the earliest surviving depiction, that the earlier 
immigration is linked to the Trojan War. It seems that the aside is largely an attempt 
to rationalise the tradition known to Thucydides with the depiction of Boeotians at 
Troy in the Iliad.125 However, the term ἀποδασµός seems insufficient to fully 
explain the fact that a large band of Boeotians and no Cadmeans participate in the 
Achaean force at Troy. The Boeotian tradition does appear earlier, briefly, in 
Herodotus’ examination of the Boeotian origins of the Athenian tyrant-slayers 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton: 
ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ Καδµείων πρότερον ἐξαναστάντων ὑπ᾽ Ἀργείων, οἱ 
Γεφυραῖοι οὗτοι δεύτερα ὑπὸ Βοιωτῶν ἐξαναστάντες ἐτράποντο ἐπ᾽ 
Ἀθηνέων. 
After the Cadmeans had first been expelled from there [Tanagra] by the 
Argives, these Gephyrians were expelled second by the Boeotians and 
came to Athens. (5.57) 
Although Herodotus seems to imply that the Boeotians arrived in a land from which 
the Cadmeans had already been ejected, there is no mention here of a two-stage 
Boeotian immigration. Herodotus is careful to note that the name “Boeotia” was the 
modern term (γῆν τὴν νῦν Βοιωτίην καλεοµένην, “the land now called Boeotia”, 
5.57), consistent with the statement in Thucydides.The source for both Herodotus’ 
and Thucydides’ accounts is quite probably Hellanicus’ Troica: we might therefore 
conclude that the differing detail of the earlier stage of invasion (ἀποδασµός) is 
Thucydides’ own theory of the Coming of the Boeotians. Given Thucydides’ general 
tendency to respond to the Iliad in the “Archaeology”, we should take Thucydides’ 
ἀποδασµός as an attempt to reconcile Hellanicus’ tradition of Boeotian migration 
after the Trojan War with the Iliad itself, which (as Thucydides knew it) placed the 
Boeotians in his contemporary Boeotia at the time of the Trojan War. 
Polyaenus (1.12, 8.44) gives two different stories regarding conflicts between 
Boeotians and Thessalians, while a great many different versions detail the advance 
of the Boeotians southwards. For example, Plutarch, in the Life of Cimon: 
                                                
124 Buck (1979), 77–78. 
125 HCT 1:118. 
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Περιπόλτας ὁ µάντις ἐκ Θεσσαλίας εἰς Βοιωτίαν Ὀφέλταν τὸν βασιλέα 
καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῷ λαοὺς καταγαγών, γένος εὐδοκιµῆσαν ἐπὶ πολλοὺς 
χρόνους κατέλιπεν, οὗ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ κατῴκησεν, ἣν πρώτην 
πόλιν ἔσχον ἐξελάσαντες τοὺς βαρβάρους. 
When Peripoltas, the seer, had led his king Opheltas and the hosts 
beneath him from Thessaly to Boeotia, he left his well-reputed race for a 
long time: the most part settled in Chaeronea, which polis they first 
occupied after they drove out the barbarians. (Cim. 1) 
Plutarch continues to describe the Boeotians as φύσει µάχιµοι, “warlike by 
nature”;126 the depiction of the arriving Boeotians as λαούς, “(military) hosts”, and 
their ejected opponents as βαρβάρους, “(enemy) foreigners”, leaves little doubt that 
what Plutarch describes is a unified invasion.127 Buck’s synthesis concludes that the 
invasion, only semi-mythical, of Boeotia was conducted in three stages, each several 
generations apart, “in an organized manner under one king … not convincingly 
linked to any other royal house.”128 The stories are attractive but largely unverifiable, 
though there is archaeological evidence to support disruption consistent with an 
invasion in the Sub-Myceanean Period.129 
The myth of the Boeotian migration is an aetiology. It explains the cultural links 
between Boeotia and Thessaly. The degree to which it reflects a historical migration 
is dubious, but the most important thing is that it depicts the Boeotians as a unified 
migrant body. Other sources imply the progress of the Boeotians across the central 
Greek basins which became their home, but as Kowalzig notes, the invasive force 
largely dissipates south of the Copaïs.130 There is no explanation offered in any 
source for how the Boeotians came to be politically divided; the myths of Boeotian 
migration create a shared origin myth. Most noticeably, the classical forms of the 
migration myth focus on the collective, οἱ Βοιωτοί, and not on any individual leader. 
The migration is therefore presented in the discourse as the history of the same group 
which cooperated in the Classical Period. 
                                                
126 See Rockwell (2008), 10, on the Boeotian military reputation, with a list of references in Classical 
authors (n. 26). 
127 The βαρβάρους are perhaps Pelasgians: see Buck (1979), 79. 
128 Buck (1979), 75–84, esp. 81. 
129 Buck (1979), 80; Fossey (1988, 424–27), places the arrival of the Boeotians earlier, by LHIIIB 
(before the Trojan War), with archaeological evidence for a small influx of new population at Thebes 
(cf. Desborough [1964], 121–22), although not enough to reverse the downwards trend of habitation 
sites; Schachter (1996), 8–12. Andreiomenou (1989), 253, argues that the decline seen in Boeotia in 
the Sub-Mycenaean is one of evidence known to modern scholars, and not of ancient production.  
130 Kowalzig (2007), 358. 
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b. The Boeotians in the Iliad 
While the Homeric epics should constitute the earliest texts which appeal to 
Boeotian ethnic identity, the matters of dating, composition and transmission are so 
problematic as to make it impossible to securely employ the Iliad’s depiction of 
Boeotians as evidence of Boeotians in the Bronze Age or at the time of composition. 
Homer and Hellanicus contradict each other on the basic point of the Boeotians’ 
homeland at the time of the Trojan War. I focus here on how the depiction in the 
Iliad contributes to the discourse of united Boeotian identity. The Boeotians are 
thoroughly unimportant in the Homeric epics. But they are present in the Iliad, 
though they provide no major characters and their military efforts are contained to a 
few brief scenes in the fighting before Patroclus’ return to battle. They do not appear 
at all in the Odyssey.131 The Iliad’s Boeotians are generally depicted as a monolithic 
group. 
The earliest and most substantial mention of the Boeotians in the Iliad is in the 
“Catalogue of Ships” (2.484–759).132 The Boeotians are the very first contingent 
described; Homer lists five generals, twenty-nine locales and assigns 50 ships × 120 
men (6000 in total):133 
Βοιωτῶν µὲν Πηνέλεως καὶ Λήϊτος ἦρχον  
Ἀρκεσίλαός τε Προθοήνωρ τε Κλονίος τε, 
οἵ θ' Ὑρίην ἐνέµοντο καὶ Αὐλίδα πετρήεσσαν 
Σχοῖνόν τε Σκῶλόν τε πολύκνηµόν τ' Ἐτεωνόν, 
Θέσπειαν Γραῖάν τε καὶ εὐρύχορον Μυκαλησσόν, 
οἵ τ' ἀµφ' Ἅρµ' ἐνέµοντο καὶ Εἰλέσιον καὶ Ἐρυθράς, 
οἵ τ' Ἐλεῶν' εἶχον ἠδ' Ὕλην καὶ Πετεῶνα, 
Ὠκαλέην Μεδεῶνά τ' ἐϋκτίµενον πτολίεθρον, 
Κώπας Εὔτρησίν τε πολυτρήρωνά τε Θίσβην, 
οἵ τε Κορώνειαν καὶ ποιήενθ' Ἁλίαρτον, 
οἵ τε Πλάταιαν ἔχον ἠδ' οἳ Γλισᾶντ' ἐνέµοντο, 
οἵ θ' Ὑποθήβας εἶχον ἐϋκτίµενον πτολίεθρον,  
Ὀγχηστόν θ' ἱερὸν Ποσιδήϊον ἀγλαὸν ἄλσος, 
                                                
131 A few Cadmean Thebans appear, notably Epicasta (= Jocasta, Oedipus’ wife, Od. 11.276) and 
Teiresias (Od. 10–12 passim). 
132 The prime position of the Boeotians in the “Catalogue” is incongruous but not strictly relevant 
here. The “Catalogue” may be adapted from an earlier, independent work which described the 
assembly of the Greek fleet at Aulis in Boeotia, which would provide a motive for Boeotian 
prominence; the Catalogue may also be a Boeotian genre: Kirk (1985), 178–79 (or epic as a whole: 
Pavese [1998], 82), although the arguments for this are largely circular. West (1988), 168–69, 
attributes the “Catalogue” to Euboean poetic tradition. 
133 Hansen (1995b), 30, counts thirty-two locales without explanation; he has perhaps haphazardly 
included the three generals of 2.495 as locales. 
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οἵ τε πολυστάφυλον Ἄρνην ἔχον, οἵ τε Μίδειαν 
Νῖσάν τε ζαθέην Ἀνθηδόνα τ' ἐσχατόωσαν· 
τῶν µὲν πεντήκοντα νέες κίον, ἐν δὲ ἑκάστῃ 
κοῦροι Βοιωτῶν ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι βαῖνον. 
Peneleos and Leïtus led the Boeotians, Arcesilaus and Prothoënor and 
Clonius too: those who dwelt in Hyria and rocky Aulis, and Schoenus 
and Scholus and many-ridged Eteonus, Thespeia and Graea and spacious 
Mycalessus, and those who dwelt around Harma and Eilesius and 
Erythrae, and those who held Eleon and Hyle and Peteon, Ocalea, and 
Medeon the well-built city, Copae and Eutresis and Thisbe abounding in 
doves, and those two held Coronea and grassy Haliartus and those who 
held Plataea and those who dwelt in Glisas and those who held 
Hypothebae the well-built city and holy Onchestus the bright grove of 
Poseidon, and those who held many-vined Arne and those who held 
Mideia and holy Nisa and Anthedon on the edges – from these came fifty 
ships, and in each one, one hundred and twenty sons of Boeotians rode. 
(2.494–510) 
There is no expansion on the names of the generals, except for the implication that 
Peneleos and Leïtus are perhaps more important that the other three, listed first and 
with the conjunction καὶ, which is perhaps more forceful than the repeated τε of 
2.495. The lack of epithets, geneology or more specific local associations for the 
generals is unusual in the “Catalogue”: most other entries give substantial 
information on the generals. By comparison the list of locales is much more 
prominent: nine of the twenty-nine locales receive epithets, while Onchestus and 
Hypothebae (“Lower Thebes”) alone receive full-line descriptions (2.505–6).134 
Larson suggests that the depiction of the Boeotians in the Iliad focuses more on the 
massed body than individuals:135 here at least the focus is on the home locales of the 
Boeotians.136 The “Catalogue”, although lacking some prominent examples of 
Boeotian settlement, defines a wide group of settlements. This large number 
acknowledges the fractured state of Boeotia. However, the five leaders seem to 
                                                
134 Thebes itself is absent from the present-day of the Trojan War. The name Ὑποθῆβαι is explained 
as a reference to the lower city; it is assumed that the Iliad is alluding here to the destruction of 
Thebes by the Epigoni before the Trojan War (referenced explicitly in Diomedes’ genealogy, Il. 
14.113–114). Ebbott (2010) argues that all the references to Thebes and Tydeus in the Iliad are 
intertextual references to the “Thebaid” tradition (if not the actual Thebaid), and therefore give a 
rather more substantial presence to Thebes than generally recognised. 
135 Larson (2007), 32. 
136 Pace Hall (2007b), 52, who suggests that the Boeotians do not have a fixed territoriality in Homer 
because the name Βοιωτία does not occur in early Greek epic. Metrical problems (Βοιωτία = – – ⏑ –) 
may in fact be to blame.  
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command the Boeotians together,137 and Boeotian collective is the emphasis of the 
Iliad’s depiction. The “Little Catalogue” of Book Thirteen (13.685–700) repeats the 
unity of the Boeotian force, which is listed among a small contingent of Achaeans 
from the northern areas.138 
Individual Boeotians do appear occasionally throughout the Iliad. Peneleos is the 
most prominent character by far, and the only Boeotian to speak.139 In Book 
Fourteen, the Trojan Acamas kills the Boeotian Promachus, for which the Boeotian 
general Peneleos kills Ilioneus and makes a threatening speech to the Trojans (475–
505); in Book Fifteen, Hector kills Arcesilaus, τὸν µὲν Βοιωτῶν ἡγήτορα 
χαλκοχιτώνων “that general of the bronze-armoured Boeotians” (15.330) and 
Clonius (340); in Book Seventeen, Boeotian generals Peneleos and Leïtus fight with 
Hector (597–606). In these three episodes, the generals rather than the wider 
Boeotian host are the focus. They are not developed either as characters, and the 
only details given, if any, link them to the wider Boeotian contribution. The 
Boeotian generals are the only Boeotian characters mentioned, with two exceptions: 
Promachus, mentioned above, and Oresbius, who appears nowhere else in any 
tradition. In Book Five, Hektor kills a handful of Achaeans, including: 
   Ὀρέσβιον αἰολοµίτρην, 
ὅς ῥ' ἐν Ὕλῃ ναίεσκε µέγα πλούτοιο µεµηλώς,  
λίµνῃ κεκλιµένος Κηφισίδι· πὰρ δέ οἱ ἄλλοι 
ναῖον Βοιωτοὶ µάλα πίονα δῆµον ἔχοντες. 
bright-mitred Oresbius, who lived in Hyle, tending his wealth carefully, 
on the edge of the Cephisian lake, and by him the other Boeotians dwelt, 
with a very rich land. (5.707–10) 
The scholia on 708 suggest that he was a farmer, but his association here is clearly 
with Lake Copais (the “Cephisian Lake”, i.e. the lake fed by the river Cephisus). The 
                                                
137 Buck (1979), 64, notes later associations of the individual generals with particular Boeotian sites, 
but these are very late (in Pausanias and Hyginus), and not always consistent. There is no sign of 
them as a conscious part of Archaic or Classical myth, and likewise no sign of divisions of the 
Boeotian body in the Iliad. 
138 Buck (1979), 65–66, argues that the arrangement of the forces in the “Little Catalogue” reflects 
pre-migration territories, i.e. that this part of the Iliad sees the Boeotians as still living in Thessaly. 
The order of the contingents, unlike the “Catalogue of Ships”, does not seem ordered enough to 
clearly be interpreted as a geographic source, and the text perhaps slips between “Ionians” and 
“Athenians”, which would leave Boeotia unoccupied. 
139 Peneleos, the first mentioned in the Catalogue and most prominent, appears in four episodes but is 
only once specifically called Βοιώτιος (17.597); in Book 16 (335, 340) he is not associated with any 
other Boeotian.  
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toponym Hyle is mentioned as a Boeotian town in the “Catalogue of Ships” 
(2.500).140 However, Oresbius is not independent: like all the other Boeotians in the 
Iliad he is heavily associated with his fellow citizens, who have a πίονα δῆµον. 
The depiction of Boeotians in the Iliad is inconsistent with later traditions on the 
occupation of Boeotia (except Thucydides, which, as I have dicsussed above, seems 
to be a reaction to the Iliad itself); it therefore should not be taken as an accurate 
description of the Boeotians before the Archaic Period. The only explanation which 
can sufficiently explain conflicting depictions is the possibility of homeostatic 
transformation: at some point, perhaps during the consolidation of the text of the 
Iliad at the end of the Archaic Age, but certainly during the Archaic Period, the text 
of the Boeotian entry was updated to reflect the current state of Boeotian occupation.  
There is good evidence to suggest that this occurred elsewhere in the “Catalogue”. 
The Athenian entry in particular presumes the synoecism of Attica (2.546–56), 
depicting Athens as the only city in the area.141 Although Greek mythology tended to 
place the unification of the nine Attic cities under Athens in the time of Theseus 
(perhaps a generation before the Trojan War),142 archaeological evidence suggests 
that synoecism did not occur in Attica until the early Archaic Period.143 If the 
“Catalogue” is based on a Bronze-Age model, it has been homeostatically 
transformed to reflect, if not the myth of Theseus (the leaders of the Athenian 
contingent are noteably not the sons of Theseus), then the unified state of Attica 
from the Archaic Period onwards. The Athenian entry emphasises the unified and 
unitary nature of the Athenian state. Likewise, the Boeotian entry seems to have 
been updated to reflect later political realities in terms of the area and occupation 
sites. Its depiction of the Boeotians as unified body who cooperated military should 
not be taken as evidence of Bronze Age ethnic identity, but it does clearly encourage 
the Archaic sense of solidarity.  
                                                
140 Zenodotus read Ὕδῃ rather than Ὕλῃ, and Eustathius (ad loc.) suggested, based largely on the 
construction of Oresbius’ name (ὀρεσ- + -βιος, ‘mountain-dweller’), that the text should be read as 
ὕλῃ rather than Ὕλῃ: “in a wood”, and line 709 as a whole may be suspect. The location of Oresbius’ 
home is therefore somewhat dubious. 
141 Hope Simpson and Lazenby (1970), 56. 
142 E.g. Thuc. 2.15.1–2, Plut. Thes. 24. 
143 See Diamant (1982). 
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c. Minyans in the Iliad and Other Traditions 
The region of Boeotia is to some extent a natural area, delineated by high mountains 
to the south-east, west and north-west and by the sea to the north-east and south-
west. Both Pausanias and Strabo dedicate discrete chapters to Boeotia in their 
geographies (Paus. 9; Strab. 9.2).144 It seems that the regional borders of Boeotia 
were well-defined; a few settlements did fall at various times on different sides of 
the border, but these were generally small and permanent shifts in the border. Oropus 
was the most wavering polis, either Boeotian or independent, depending (it seems) 
largely on the primacy of pro-Boeotian or pro-Athenian factions; but the city is not 
described as part of Attica.145 On the whole, then, the region defined the scope of the 
people as much as the people defined the region. 
However, the “Catalogue of Ships” does not present a fully merged Boeotia: the 
Boeotians in the Iliad included, it seems, only the cities of the southern Boeotian 
basin, while two cities identified with sites in northern Boeotia receive a separate 
entry. It has generally been felt to preserve a depiction of prehistorical Boeotia 
which maintains recognises the separate ethnic identity of a group called Minyans 
who occupied the basin north of Lake Copaïs. 
Directly after the Boeotian entry, the “Catalogue” moves on to a separate force, 
listing two contingents, two generals, and thirty ships: 
οἳ δ᾽ Ἀσπληδόνα ναῖον ἰδ᾽ Ὀρχοµενὸν Μινύειον, 
τῶν ἦρχ᾽ Ἀσκάλαφος καὶ Ἰάλµενος υἷες Ἄρηος 
οὓς τέκεν Ἀστυόχη δόµῳ Ἄκτορος Ἀζεΐδαο, 
παρθένος αἰδοίη ὑπερώϊον εἰσαναβᾶσα 
Ἄρηϊ κρατερῷ· ὃ δέ οἱ παρελέξατο λάθρῃ· 
τοῖς δὲ τριήκοντα γλαφυραὶ νέες ἐστιχόωντο. 
Those who dwelt in Aspledon and Minyan Orchomenus, Ascalaphus and 
Ialmenus led them, sons of Ares, whom Astyoche bore in the house of 
Actor the Azeid, the honoured maiden, after going into the upper house 
with mighty Ares, who lay with her in secret. With these thirty hollow 
ships sailed out. (2.511-16) 
The separation of Orchomenus and Aspledon from the rest of later Boeotia has been 
read varyingly as a preservation of the Mycenaean glory of Orchomenus (perhaps 
                                                
144 Strabo does acknowledge (9.3.1) Orchomenus as a previously independent region. 
145 Part of Boeotia: Paus. 1.34.1; Attic dependency: Hdt. 6.101.1, Thuc. 2.23.3; independent region: 
Thuc. 4.99.1, 8.60.1; synoecised with Thebes in the early fourth century: Diod. 14.17.1–3. 
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even diminished here),146 or as an affirmation of Orchomenian independence from 
the rest of Boeotia in the Archaic Period.147 The approach depends in no small part 
on positions regarding the composition of the “Catalogue”, and is as insolvable as 
that problem. However, it should not be assumed that the independent Minyan cities 
are the natural sequel to the entry for the southern Boeotian basin. The “Catalogue” 
also describes regions to the east (Euboea) and south-west (Attica) of Boeotia, not to 
mention the diagonally neighbouring regions of Phocis and Locris. The poet had 
other options which would not necessarily have destroyed the internal narrative logic 
of the “Catalogue”, and so it is significant that northern Boeotia is grouped tightly 
with southern Boeotia, and perhaps also that the distinct ethnonym Minyan is 
subsumed to (one of) the cities in question and not allowed to stand apart.148 The 
poem as it stands acknowledges the tradition of the Minyan cities’ independence 
from Boeotia, but does little to assert it. The Minyans have even less presence in the 
Iliad than the Boeotians, but they are briefly mentioned in the Odyssey.149 
Another minor myth seems to reflect Minyan independence from Boeotia, in which 
Heracles (or sometimes Oedipus) conducted a war with King Erginus of 
Orchomenus (Apoll. 2.4.11).150 Heracles freed Thebes from the domination of 
Erginus. The Theban victory resulted in Thebes imposing a tribute of two hundred 
oxen annually on Orchomenus, double the tribute which Erginus had imposed on 
Thebes originally. If this is a reflection of early disputes between Minyans and 
Boeotians, it is significant that Orchomenus and Thebes are the two cities at war. 
The earliest coins assigned to Orchomenus also followed an independent track, using 
local iconography rather than the regional iconography initially used on all other 
Boeotian coinage.151 
                                                
146 Kirk (1985), 198, although he notes that Il. 9.381 asserts the wealth of Orchomenus. 
147 Buck (1979), 97. 
148 Metrically, neither Μινυεῖοι nor Μινυείων is more problematic than Μινυεῖον. 
149 Only in the “Catalogue of Ships” in the Iliad; Od. 11.284, as part of Nestor’s genealogy. The 
Minyan general Ascalaphus recurs (9.82, 13.478, 518, 526f., 15.112); Ialmenus only once, alongside 
Ascalaphus (9.82), but neither one is related to the Minyans outside the “Catalogue”. 
150 Oedipus: Pherecydes, FGrH 3 F 95; Heracles: Diodorus 4.10; Strabo 9.414; Eustath. Ad Hom. 
272; Theocritus 16.105. Buck (1979), 59, calls the fuller story, with Heracles rather than Oedipus, 
late, but it is referred to as early as Euripides (Her. 219–21). 
151 Kraay (1976), 110. 
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The final, curious mention of the Boeotians within the Homeric “Catalogue of 
Ships” does seem to reflect part of the process of Boeotian unification, by involving 
the Minyans with Boeotians in the forces at Troy. At the end of the Phocian entry 
(the third in the poem, directly following the Boeotians and Minyans), there is a 
comment on the battle arrangements of the Phocians and Boeotians: 
οἳ µὲν Φωκήων στίχας ἵστασαν ἀµφιέποντες, 
Βοιωτῶν δ᾽ ἔµπλην ἐπ᾽ ἀριστερὰ θωρήσσοντο 
And the leaders marshalled the ranks of the Phocians, and they were 
armed along the left of the Boeotians. (2.517-526) 
Kirk suggests only that the “Catalogue” is emphasising the connection of the 
Phocians and Boeotians as neighbours,152 but the political geography of the 
“Catalogue” placed the Minyans between the two contingents. There are very few 
mentions of battle order in the “Catalogue”: three refer to the prominence of 
Agamemnon, Menelaus and Achilleus. The other notes that  
Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαµῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας, 
στῆσε δ' ἄγων ἵν' Ἀθηναίων ἵσταντο φάλαγγες.  
Out of Salamis Aias brought twelve ships and placed them next to where 
the Athenian battalions were drawn up. (2.557–58) 
These lines have widely been suspected, since antiquity, of being an Athenian 
interpolation to establish their claims to Salamis as part of Attic territory.153 These 
lines featured heavily in the well-known dispute between Athens and Megara over 
the island of Salamis (Arist. Rhet. 1375b; Plut. Sol. 8–9): the Spartan judges chose 
this couplet over a pro-Megarian couplet to establish the rightful owner. Wickersham 
notes that the case is not a simple matter of textual criticism.154 The Spartan judges 
had no standard recension of Homer against which to compare the variants (a point 
rather telescoped in Aristotle’s post-recension perspective); the judgment was not in 
fact on two lines but on two whole epichoric versions.155 The case does not depict 
the power of an appeal to the authority of Homer, but rather indicates the means of 
legitimising expansion through cultural expression. However, if one excursus on 
                                                
152 Kirk (1985), 200–1. 
153 Since Aristarchus, see Kirk (1985), 207–9. 
154 Wickersham (1991), 30. 
155 Why exactly the Spartans preferred Athens’ claim is unknown; Kirk (1985), 208–9, dismisses the 
Megarian lines on the grounds that they do not structurally resemble the other entries in the 
Catalogue. 
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battle arrangements is suspect, this casts suspicions on the other. Martin West has 
observed that the two lines at the end of the Phocian entry are easily read as an early 
interpolation for political statement on the part of the Boeotians, stretching beyond 
the usual conclusion of a contingent with the number of ships. 156 West suggests that 
the propagandic material relates to the First Sacred War, although he offers no 
further explanation. Although the earliest mention of the First Sacred War is in 
Isocrates’ invective Plataecus against Thebes,157 there is little reference to Boeotia’s 
role in the War,158 and West offers no explanation for why the Boeotian-Phocian 
alliance should be enshrined in the “Catalogue”. The statement closes a ring, 
however, around the first three entries of the “Catalogue”, creating a section which is 
undoubtedly intended to be considered involved in “Project Boeotia”. This section 
contains not only Boeotia and Phocis but the independently-minded Orchomenians. 
The section makes no overt claim to Orchomenus and Aspledon as members of the 
Boeotians, but the two northern cities are now implied to belong to a natural 
grouping. This brief interpolation undoes the effect of separating Minyans from 
Boeotians within the text. 
Thebes was not necessarily responsible for the interjection on battle order. Indeed, 
this section does little to assert Thebes’ position in Boeotia. But Thebes alone of the 
Boeotian poleis seems to have had the means to interfere with the text of the Iliad. 
No Boeotian polis seems to play any part in the city-texts of the Iliad. However, 
Herodotus reports a relationship between Thebes and the Peisistratid tyranny, 
roughly contemporary with other developments of a politicised ethnic identity in 
Boeotia,159 the same time at which Peisistratus (perhaps) was the patron of a new 
text of the Iliad. Larson has suggested that the Theban–Peisistratid relationship 
explains the prominence of Theban women in the Odyssey’s “Catalogue of 
                                                
156 West (1999); see also West (2001), 178–79. West (2001), 11–13, suggests seven categories for 
minor early interpolations; Il. 2.525–26 falls into the first category: “[v]erses reflecting local or 
political interests that do not seem to be those of the original poet.” 
157 Barring two allusions in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo (540–44) and the Shield of Heracles (478–
90): see Lehmann (1980), 245–56, Davies (1994). 
158 Isocrates associates the proposed destruction of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War 
(supported by Thebes) with the destruction of Crisa [sic: Cirrha] (Isoc. 14.31). This highly allusive 
reference is the only statement which highlights a Boeotian role in the war. 
159 Hdt. 1.61; cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2. 
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Heroines”.160 Nagy has argued persuasively that the stories of the Peisistratid 
involvement with the Homeric epics demonstrate that Peisistratus and his sons used 
the epics as political tools, drawing parallels between Peisistratus and the law-givers 
Lycurgus and Solon.161 It is possible that the Peisistratean Athenian city-text 
reflected Theban imperialist interests in the northern Boeotian basin which survived 
Hellenistic revisions of the text. 
d. The Eponymous Hero Boeotus 
The shared name is perhaps the most important constitutive element of an ethnic 
identity. For Greek ethnic identities this was embodied in the eponymous hero, who 
not only provided an aetiology for the collective name but also represented a shared 
history and, to some extent, a shared descent. In the case of the Boeotian eponymous 
hero Boeotus, the connection may have been more strongly felt because there was no 
distinction between the eponym and the resulting ethnic: both were Βοιωτός, such 
that any Boeotian referring to himself as Boeotian referred to Boeotus to do so.  
Unfortunately, Boeotus is an entirely obscure character, and there does not ever 
seem to have been a canonical version of his myth. The profusion of variations is so 
great that it seems possible that there were multiple mythological characters named 
Boeotus, but no source acknowledges the possibility of multiple Boeotuses.162 The 
four sources which explicitly refer to him as the eponym of Boeotia or the Boeotian 
ἔθνος each offer a different version: in Hellanicus (FGrH 4 F 51) Boeotus is the son 
of Poseidon and Arne, and Boeotus the eponym of the territory Boeotia (previously 
called Aonia); in Diodorus Siculus (4.67.2–7) he is again son of Poseidon and Arne, 
and the eponym of the Boeotian ἔθνος (τοὺς µεθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ Βοιωτοὺς ὠνόµασε, “he 
named his followers Boeotians”, 4.67.2). Here, Diodorus makes it clear that he gave 
his name only to the people, and did so before the migration to Boeotia proper: 
Βοιωτὸς δὲ πλεύσας πρὸς Αἰόλον τὸν τῆς Ἄρνης πατέρα, καὶ τεκνωθεὶς 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, παρέλαβε τῆς Αἰολίδος τὴν βασιλείαν· καὶ τὴν µὲν χώραν ἀπὸ 
τῆς µητὸς Ἄρνην, τοὺς δὲ λαοὺς ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ Βοιωτοὺς ὠνόµασε. 
                                                
160 Larson (2000), 218–21. 
161 Nagy (1996), 73–75. 
162 Diodorus Siculus’ account at 4.67 manages to encompass most of the characters associated with 
Boeotus in a single account by including three different Aeoluses: Boeotus’ brother, grandfather and 
great-great-great grandfather. 
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Boeotus sailed to Aeolus, father of Arne, and was adopted by him. He 
took the rule of Aeolis [later renamed Thessaly], and he named the land 
Arne, after his mother, and the people Boeotians after himself. (4.67.6) 
The name Arne for the Boeotian homeland matches Thucydides’ account of the 
migration. Moreover, Diodorus carries on to link Boeotus to the five Boeotian 
leaders of the Iliad, his great-grandsons (4.67.6). At no point does he make reference 
to the Boeotian migration. However, in a much later chapter Diodorus describes an 
entirely different version, in which Boeotus is the eponym and even ruler of Boeotia 
proper: 
ἑξῆς δὲ τῶν ἀπογόνων τούτου βασιλευόντων καὶ τῆς ὅλης χώρας ἤδη 
Βοιωτίας καλουµένης ἀπὸ Βοιωτοῦ τοῦ Μελανίππης µὲν καὶ 
Ποσειδῶνος υἱοῦ, δυναστεύσαντος δὲ τῶν τόπων, τὸ τρίτον ἐκπίπτουσιν 
οἱ Θηβαῖοι τῶν ἐξ Ἄργους ἐπιγόνων ἐκπολιορκήσαντων τὴν πόλιν.  
Thereafter, when the descendants of Polydorus [son of Cadmus] were 
kings and the whole land had already been called Boeotia after Boeotus, 
son of Melanippe and Poseidon, who was the ruler of the region, the 
Thebans were exiled for the third time when the “Epigonoi” from Argos 
took the city by siege. (19.53.6) 
Pausanias presents a still different version, in which Boeotus is the eponym of the 
ἔθνος. This version makes him the son of Itonus (who is named as Boeotus’ son in 
Diodorus, 4.67), who is associated with Thessaly; his name is nevertheless 
prominent as an (aetiological) etymology of Athenia Itonia, worshipped in a 
Panboeotian sactuary near Coronea: 
Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τὸ µὲν πᾶν ἔθνος ἀπὸ Βοιωτοῦ τὸ ὄνοµα ἔσχηκεν, ὃν Ἰτώνου 
παῖδα καὶ νύµφης δὴ Μελανίππης, Ἴτωνον δὲ Ἀµφικτύονος εἶναι 
λέγουσι... 
As for the Boeotians, the entire ἔθνος got their name from Boeotus, 
whom they say was the son of Itonus and the nymph Melanippe, and that 
Itonus was the son of Amphictyon. (9.1.1) 
In general, there is very little that can be concluded from the four divergent 
traditions. In all but the second account in Diodorus Siculus, Boeotus’ eponymy is 
related to the ἔθνος rather than the territory of Boeotia proper; in all three cases the 
Boeotians seem to receive their name while still residing in their Thessalian ancestral 
homeland. The accounts here once again focus on the origins of the Boeotians as a 
unified people: even in Diodorus’ unusual account at 19.53, the rule of the Cadmean 
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line at Thebes is largely ignored; although it represents a quite distinct heritage for 
Thebes against all the other Boeotians, it is never problematised.163 
It is worth considering how prevalent the tradition of Boeotus was in the Archaic 
period, at the apparent time of Boeotian ethnogenesis. The evidence for his existence 
within the pantheon of Greek heroes before the late fifth century is meagre. He is 
referred to only briefly in two short fragments assigned to the great Hesiodic 
genealogical work, the Catalogue of Women, with somewhat dubious authority, and 
two fragments of Corinna. A testimonium to Hesiod in Stephanus (Hes. fr. 219 = 
Steph. Byz. 483.3) makes him the father of Onchestus, eponymous founder of the 
sanctuary of Poseidon: κεῖται δὲ ἐν τῆι Ἁλιαρτίων χώραι, ἱδρυθὲν ὑπὸ Ὀγχηστοῦ τοῦ 
Βοιωτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ἡσίοδος, “Onchestus lies in the territory of the Haliartians, and 
was founded by Onchestus, the son of Boeotus, as Hesiod says.” A second 
testimonium of Hesiod makes Boeotus the colonist of Arne in Boeotia:164 
ὁ γὰρ τοῦ Μενεσθίου πατὴρ ἀρηίθοος Βοιωτὸς ἦν κατοικῶν Ἄρνην· ἔστι 
δὲ αὕτη Βοιωτίας, ὡς καὶ Ἡσίοδός φησιν. 
The father of Menesthius was war-swift Boeotus who colonised Arne: 
this is the Arne in Boeotus, as Hesiod also says. (fr. 218 = Σ Hom. Il. 7.9) 
These two references seem to associate Boeotus with two central Boeotian sites. The 
first testimonium is an exegesis of the Panboeotian sanctuary of Onchestus, 
mentioned in the Boeotian entry in the “Catalogue of Ships”, which was to become 
the capital of the Boeotian Confederation in 338. Arne was one of the many 
Boeotian sites mentioned in the “Catalogue of Ships”; its name clearly recalls the 
name of the Boeotian homeland referred to in both Thucydides and Diodorus. 
Bakhuizen has contended that the Boeotian site was a mythological grounding-point 
for the Boeotians, and that there was never actually an Arne in Boeotia.165 
Although these two testimonia are presumed to refer to the Catalogue of Women, 
there is very little evidence by which we can clearly position it in that poem: most 
                                                
163 A very little evidence suggests that the Thebans considered themselves to be different from other 
Boeotians due to their Cadmean history. Pindar (fr. 118) draws a link between himself, Cadmus and 
Theron, but compare this with Theban insistence upon the “common ancestral traditions of the 
Boeotians” in Thucydides. 
164 The interpretation here follows Larson (2007), 41–48, who reinterprets the traditional 
understanding of the phrase ἀρηίθοος βοιωτός from “Areithous the Boeotian” to “war-swift Boeotus”. 
165 Bakhuizen (1989), 65–66. 
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notably, although many traditions of Boeotus’ parentage makes him the son of 
Poseidon and a mortal woman, and therefore a suitable subject for the Catalogue of 
Women’s enumeration of demigods, he is entirely absent from Apollodorus’ Library, 
which often follows the Catalogue of Women’s arrangement of genealogies, 
although perhaps not directly.166 
One Corinna fragment draws the parental link between Boeotus and Poseidon: τοὺ 
δὲ µάκαρ Κρονίδη, τοὺ Ποτειδάωνι ϝάναξ Βοιωτέ, “You, blessed descendant of 
Cronus, you lord Boeotus, son of Poseidon” (fr. 5); this links Boeotus perhaps to the 
sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus. Boeotus reappears in two plays of Euripides, 
both centred around the myth of his birth, which here too is linked to Poseidon, 
although the fragments of Wise Melanippe and Melanippe Bound (frr. 480–513) 
suggest quite divergent myths.167 Most significantly, these stories make Boeotus 
twin brother to an Aeolus: placing the Boeotians within the Aeolian ethnic group, 
rather than providing a nucleus for shared Boeotian identity, may be part of the 
underlying focus of this myth. 168 
The sketchy remains of the Boeotus story suggest that he predated the Boeotian 
migration to Boeotia, although in another Corinna fragment he is reportedly 
identified as the father of Ogygus, the mythical first king of Thebes (Σ Apoll. Rhod. 
3, 1077/87a).169 Perhaps most importantly, Boeotus was a unifying figure with no 
particular political associations (the relationship to Ogygus, so little attested, seems 
to be his only tie to a major Boeotian town); his relationships, in as much as they are 
identifiable in the Archaic and Classical Period, played up relationships between 
Boeotia and Thessaly. He is intimately linked with the sanctuary of Poseidon at 
Onchestus, one which was not tied to any particular Boeotian polis and later became 
the capital of the Boeotian confederation. 
                                                
166 West (1985), 32–35. 
167 Collard and Cropp (2008), 569–70. 
168 The brothers do not seem to have been the focus of the plays, and they are certainly not focused on 
the Boeotians; Mellanippe Bound is set in Metapontus, not Boeotia. Boeotus is mentioned by name 
only once in the surviving fragments and testimonia, in Melanippe Bound, fr. 489. 
169 BNJ 328 F 91; see Buck (1979), 56 n. 12, on Pherecydes as a source for this tradition. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sources such as the Iliad provide an exemplar for regional cooperation in its use of 
ethnic names to describe cooperating groups. This cooperative aspect seems to have 
been a substantial feature of Archaic Boeotian ethnic discourse, in which the only 
noteable character was Boeotus, the eponym who was closely associated with 
Boeotian religion, but not with any particular Boeotian polis. Although the data-set 
is limited, it seems that Boeotian identity developed substantially in terms of the 
sense of solidarity over the course of the late Archaic Period, and was a highly 
functional feature of Boeotian society by the end of the Archaic Period, given the 
display of Boeotian identity in the works of Pindar and Corinna. This coincides, 
roughly, with the dates of the first known cooperative Boeotian acts (discussed in 
chapter two). On the whole the discourse lacks an aggressive assertion of leadership, 
but the discourse of unity in Homer can be linked to Thebes. Thebes’ own discourse 
of its relationship to Boeotian states focused heavily on the ethnic identity which 
they shared. The construction of Boeotian identity is particularly important to 
remember in light of Hammond’s assertion that relations between states should not 
be subject to the same standards of imperialism where there is a kinship relationship. 
This should not hold true if the discourse of kinship itself is a result of imperialist 
discourse. 
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2 
ACCORDING TO ANCIENT CUSTOM: 
THEBAN HEGEMONY AND BOEOTIAN 
SYMMACHY 
The earliest demonstrably cooperative efforts of the Boeotians were military 
endeavours, which perhaps constituted a συµµαχία. On a number of occasions 
beginning in the late sixth century the Boeotians worked together both to repel 
attacks against Boeotian territory and to attack other territories, including Plataea 
and Attica. Larsen and Buck have suggested that these cooperative efforts show that 
the Classically-attested Boeotian Confederation had its roots in the Archaic Period, 
but agreeing with Larson I argue that there is insufficient evidence of true 
confederate structures behind the military cooperation.170 Instead, I show that many 
of these expeditions were led by Thebes and resulted in the creation of a regional 
state system which recognised Thebes as the major power within Boeotia by the end 
of the Archaic Period. I argue that the state system, if not effective Theban 
dominance, persisted after the Persian War, and that after the Athenian occupation of 
Boeotia between 457 and 447, Thebes was able to use its hegemony to fill the space 
left by Athens, creating a Confederation based on the earlier συµµαχία. 
A confederation is, at its most basic form, a kind of super-state.171 The participating 
states ceded some part of their own sovereignty to the wider community (a practice 
which in some polemics is linked to a loss of autonomy). As a result each member-
polis of the confederation participated in two simultaneous governments, one local 
and one regional. Confederate government generally evolves from the local 
governments and balances the powers of the smaller and larger government. 
“Confederation” is therefore generally the more appropriate term for Classical Greek 
history than “federation”, whereby smaller government devolves from the larger 
                                                
170 Larsen (1968); Buck (1979); contra, Larson (2007). 
171 The term “super-state” is not often used for Classical Greek history (except Cartledge [2000]); it is 
apt. 
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government and the larger government is more powerful.172 The practical result of a 
confederation in the Greek world is therefore two co-existing πολιτεῖαι of 
overlapping scopes, which comes within the scope of συµπολιτεία, shared political 
life.173 It is on this ground, of a clearly developped pan-Boeotian πολιτεία, that we 
cannot talk about the Boeotian Confederation until after the Battle of Coronea in 
447. 
There are a number of instances of cooperation between Boeotian poleis in the late 
Archaic period. Thebes was at the forefront of these cooperative actions. However, 
there is little evidence from the Archaic Period to suggest that any Boeotian states 
ceded autonomy to the wider group, except in the case of Plataea. But, as I will 
argue, in the case of Plataea its autonomy was directly attacked, rather than ceded. 
However, a normalised system of relations between Boeotian states developed. Bull 
defines such a state system: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of 
states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations to one another, and share in the 
working of common institutions.174 
The existence of state systems in the ancient world has been doubted,175 but is 
reaching growing acceptance.176 The rules of state system need not be formalised, 
and indeed the Greeks alluded to ἄγραφοι νόµοι, “unwritten laws”, which governed 
interstate relations.177 Attention has focused overwhelmingly on Panhellenic forms 
of state interaction, but regional systems must have developed too, and were 
essential to the formation of regional cooperations such as federations. Bauslaugh 
notes that the rules of a state system are rooted in “mutual respect born of shared 
culture”:178 this must have been especially pertinent for small regions with cultural 
affinities such as Boeotia. 
                                                
172 Sordi (1994), 3, observes that this distinction is entirely modern. 
173 Sordi (1994), 4. Συµπολιτεία can also describe merger of πολιτείαι. Giovannini (2003), 244–45, 
distinguishes συµπολιτεία as a feature of ἔθνη, as opposed to the full merger of poleis. 
174 Bull (1977), 13. 
175 E.g. Wight (1977), 50; Eckstein (2006), 37–78; see also discussion in Bederman (2001), 12, and 
the bibliography there. 
176 Low (2007), Bederman (2001). 
177 See Bederman (2001), 38–40, on the ἄγραφοι νόµοι. 
178 Bauslaugh (1991), 36. 
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A state system is not necessarily a peaceful one. In fact, one of the features of the 
Panhellenic state system was a tendency towards conflict. Even in the early sixth 
century dedications at Olympia suggest that Boeotian states were still often in 
conflict with each other: one Theban dedication seems to record a victory over 
Hyettus, in northern Boeotia, another Orchomenus’ victory over Coronea, another 
two record disputes between unknown opponents and Tanagra (one loss, one win).179 
This is not an insignificant number of conflicts for a period when Boeotian history is 
largely unknown, and all date to the last half of sixth century. However, by the end 
of the Archaic Period, not long afterwards, it seems the Boeotian poleis tended to 
fight together against external enemies, and acknowledged the leadership of Thebes 
in doing so. 
EARLY COOPERATIVE (AND UNCOOPERATIVE) EFFORTS 
The Boeotians frequently fought on the same side. Without doubt, in the Classical 
Period, the most prominent aspect of the Boeotian Confederation was the combined 
Boeotian army. Other evidence shows that unity existed beyond military alliances. 
The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia refers to other aspects (τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέλαυνον, “they 
drew on the common resources”, 16.4), which generally are not of interest to our 
militarily-focused historical narratives. This use of combined military forces dates 
back to at least the late sixth century. Such a form of military cooperation might 
normally be referred to as a loose league. However, in comparison with such 
cooperations as the Peloponnesian League, there was no formal written agreement in 
Boeotia to parallel the treaties between Sparta and its allies. Four separate conflicts 
of the late Archaic Period (between ca. 519 and 479, though the evidence does not 
provide exact dating), discussed in this section, involved a group of combatants 
referred to in our sources as “Boeotians”. As the records of these cooperative actions 
show, the relationship between Boeotian states was a matter of an unwritten code of 
international relations. 
                                                
179 SEG 28 427; see Schachter (1989), 80 and n. 31; (1996), 17. 
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The Boeotian participation in the Trojan War was of course a military action, and 
apparently a cooperative one as well.180 Even the myths of Boeotian migration to 
their historical territory directly address the conflicts which Thucydides and 
Herodotus imply in the “ejection” of Boeotians from Thessaly and their arrival in 
Boeotia. Whether true or aetiological of later military cooperation, such stories attest 
the concept of a traditional cooperation of Boeotian military forces. The stories, in 
their focus on territorial conquest, are tied up with the ethnogenesis of the Boeotians, 
and do not recognise divisions of Boeotia except as they are subsumed within the 
expansion of the ἔθνος. In avoiding the idea of Boeotian society as divided, they 
avoid likewise any discussion of hegemony. 
The earliest textual assertion of Theban leadership in Boeotia does occur within the 
epic tradition, though it is a later example. The Shield of Heracles depicts a Boeotian 
force participating in a military campaign under the command of Heracles’ step-
father Amphitryon: 
τῷ δ᾽ ἅµα ἱέµενοι πολέµοιό τε φυλόπιδός τε 
Βοιωτοὶ πλήξιπποι, ὑπὲρ σακέων πνείοντες, 
Λοκροί τ᾽ ἀγχέµαχοι καὶ Φωκῆες µεγάθυµοι 
ἕσποντ᾽· ἦρχε δὲ τοῖσιν ἐὺς πάις Ἀλκαίοιο 
κυδιόων λαοῖσι. 
And along with him, bringing war and battle-din were the horse-driving 
Boeotians, panting over their shields, and the close-fighting Locrians and 
great-hearted Phocians followed: the noble son of Alcaeus [Amphitryon] 
led them, exulting in his host.” ([Hes.] Asp. 23-27) 
As in the Iliad, Boeotian forces are associated with the Phocians, although the 
Locrians are now added to this northern Greek alliance. As in the Iliad, the 
inhabitants of Thebes are referred to as Cadmeians: ἐς Θήβας ἱκέτευσε φερεσσακέας 
Καδµείους, “In Thebes he [Amphitryon] supplicated the shield-bearing Cadmeians.” 
(Asp. 13). However, there is no clear distinction here between the two ethnics, 
although they are used only briefly. Nevertheless it is significant that the leader of 
the united Boeotians (and Locrians and Phocians) is depicted as an adoptive 
Theban.181 This expedition comes from the very early section of the poem, which we 
                                                
180 Cf. Hom. Il. 2.494–510; etc.: see pp. 32–40. 
181 For the Theban-ness of this all see Guillon (1963). 
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are told was in fact a repurposed extract from the Catalogue of Women,182 and 
therefore from the seventh century, but the repurposing in the sixth century renders 
the entire section into a work which focuses on Boeotia.183  
 
In this section, I will argue that Boeotia began to form a militarily-aligned in the late 
sixth century. Without any signs of formal agreements between Boeotian states, we 
must examine the attested cases in which the Boeotians fought together to ascertain 
the nature of the alliance. In each case, as I will show, the Thebans were clearly and 
prominently involved. 
a. Plataea, 519 
Several scholars have held that the earliest clear act of the Boeotian Confederation 
appears in the dispute between Plataea and Thebes in 519,184 which resulted in the 
long-lasting alliance between Plataea and Athens.185 However, although both 
Herodotus and Thucydides give digressive accounts of the dispute (Herodotus in 
discussing the origins of the Plataean–Athenian alliance before the Battle of 
Marathon, 6.108; Thucydides in the debate between Thebans and Plataeans which 
followed the capitulation of Plataea in 427, 3.52–68),186 neither one contains any 
overt reference to the Boeotian Confederation. Herodotus’ narrative perhaps has the 
Boeotians intervene for Thebes against Athens at the end of the dispute, but it is 
                                                
182 West (1985), 136. 
183 The Boeotian origins of the Shield are not uncontroversial: Guillon (1963) argues for a specifically 
Theban origin of the poem; combined with the rest of the Hesiodic corpus, the Shield has been used 
as evidence for a generally Boeotian substratum to the epic tradition (Page [1959]); Janko (1985), 
182, argues for a Boeotian or even Theban origin; West (1985), 136–37, and Schachter (1989), 74, 
against.  
184 The date for this conflict is a point of minor contention: Thucydides (3.68.5) puts the date at 519, 
“93 years before” Plataea’s surrender to the Thebans and Spartans in 427, but scholars after Grote 
(1907), 82 n. 4, have suggested 509 to be slightly more appropriate in our sketchy knowledge of 
Theban–Athenian relations of the period and to explain the presence of Cleomenes on the border 
between Boeotia and Attica: Moretti (1962), 105–7; Amit (1973), 71–73; Ducat (1973), 67–68; 
Badian (1989), 103 and n. 16. Shrimpton (1984) gives a thorough examination of the question 
(though he fails to discuss that the proposed corruption of Thucydides was not the unlikely 
ὀγδοηκοστῷ to ἐνενηκοστῷ, but of the numeral representation; Develin [1990] argues that such 
corruption is on the whole uncommon) and suggests 506 for this incident instead. HCT ad 3.68.5; 
Cloché (1952), 30; and Schachter (1989), 83, have preferred to maintain the reading of the MSS. 
185 Larsen (1968), 29; Amit (1973), 64, 66: “coinage is the sole evidence we possess that the League 
in fact existed prior to the episode”; Buck (1979), 107. 
186 Hammond (2000), 82, argues that Herodotus’ account is based on Lacedaemonian eyewitnesses’ 
reports. Thucydides perhaps follows Herodotus’ account: Ducat (1973), 68. 
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more likely that this is a rhetorical technique and that the conflict, if historical at all, 
reflects not the early stages of the Confederation, but of Theban construction of 
hegemony. 
Herodotus begins his explanation with the aggression of Thebes which prompted 
Plataea to seek Spartan and then (on the advice, perhaps malicious, of the Spartan 
king Cleomenes) Athenian aid. An attempt at external arbitration was ultimately 
unsuccessful, and the Athenians finally defeated the Thebans in battle: 
πιεζεύµενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων οἱ Πλαταιέες ἐδίδοσαν πρῶτα παρατυχοῦσι 
Κλεοµένεΐ τε τῷ Ἀναξανδρίδεω καὶ Λακεδαιµονίοισι σφέας αὐτούς. οἳ 
δὲ οὐ δεκόµενοι ἔλεγόν σφι τάδε. “ἡµεῖς µὲν ἑκαστέρω τε οἰκέοµεν, καὶ 
ὑµῖν τοιήδε τις γίνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐπικουρίη ψυχρή· φθαίητε γὰρ ἂν πολλάκις 
ἐξανδραποδισθέντες ἤ τινα πυθέσθαι ἡµέων. συµβουλεύοµεν δὲ ὑµῖν 
δοῦναι ὑµέας αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίοισι, πλησιοχώροισι τε ἀνδράσι καὶ 
τιµωρέειν ἐοῦσι οὐ κακοῖσι.” ταῦτα συνεβούλευον οἱ Λακεδαιµόνιοι οὐ 
κατὰ τὴν εὐνοίηνοὕτω τῶν Πλαταιέων ὡς βουλόµενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους 
ἔχειν πόνους συνεστεῶτας Βοιωτοῖσι. Λακεδαιµόνιοι µέν νυν 
Πλαταιεῦσι ταῦτα συνεβούλευον, οἳ δὲ οὐκ ἠπίστησαν, ἀλλ᾽ Ἀθηναίων 
ἱρὰ ποιεύντων τοῖσι δυώδεκα θεοῖσι ἱκέται ἱζόµενοι ἐπὶ τὸν βωµὸν 
ἐδίδοσανσφέας αὐτούς. Θηβαῖοι δὲ πυθόµενοι ταῦτα ἐστρατεύοντο ἐπὶ 
τοὺς Πλαταιέας, Ἀθηναῖοι δέ σφι ἐβοήθεον. µελλόντων δὲ συνάπτειν 
µάχην Κορίνθιοι οὐ περιεῖδον, παρατυχόντες δὲ καὶ καταλλάξαντες 
ἐπιτρεψάντων ἀµφοτέρων οὔρισαν τὴν χώρην ἐπὶ τοῖσιδε, ἐᾶν Θηβαίους 
Βοιωτῶν τοὺς µὴ βουλοµένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν. Κορίνθιοι µὲν δὴ 
ταῦτα γνόντες ἀπαλλάσσοντο, Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ ἀπιοῦσι ἐπεθήκαντο 
Βοιωτοί, ἐπιθέµενοι δὲ ἑσσώθησαν τῇ µάχῃ. ὑπερβάντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι 
τοὺς οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔθηκαν Πλαταιεῦσι εἶναι οὔρους, τούτους ὑπερβάντες 
τὸν Ἀσωπὸν αὐτὸν ἐποιήσαντο οὖρον Θηβαίοισι πρὸς Πλαταιέας εἶναι 
καὶ Ὑσιάς. 
Under pressure from the Thebans, the Plataeans gave themselves up first 
to Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides, and the Spartans, who happened to 
be near. They did not receive the Plataeans but told them this: “We live 
farther away, and to you any aid would be pointless; you might be 
enslaved many times in advance of us being informed of anything. We 
advise you to give yourselves up to the Athenians, men who live nearby 
and not bad for help.” The Spartans advised this not out of good-will 
towards the Plataeans as much as in order that the Athenians have 
troubles stirred up with Boeotians. The Spartans advised as such to the 
Plataeans, and they did not mistrust them, but while the Athenians were 
worshipping the twelve gods they came as suppliant to the altar, giving 
themselves up. When the Thebans heard this they marched against the 
Plataeans, but the Athenians came to their aid. As they were about to 
engage in battle, the Corinthians did not stand aside: since they were 
there, they mediated between the two sides at their request, and decided 
their boundaries, allowing that the Thebans would suffer the unwilling 
Boeotians to not belong to the Boeotians. Once the Corinthians had 
decided this they set off, but the Boeotians attacked the Athenians as they 
were leaving, but were defeated in battle. Crossing the Asopus, the 
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Athenians made it the border between the Thebans and Plataea and 
Hysiae. (6.108.2-6) 
The only Boeotian states mentioned are Thebes and Plataea: the references in the 
discussion of Spartan motivations and Corinthian arbitration are generalisations and 
do not imply other Boeotians’ involvement here. The only narrative reference to 
Boeotians therefore is in the Athenian retreat. It is difficult, therefore, to justify the 
claim that the conflict related to Plataean membership of an early Boeotian 
Confederation. Note that the Corinthian decision singles out the Thebans, and not the 
Boeotians as a whole.187 
The substance of Thebes’ aggression, which induced the Plataeans to seek outside 
aid, is unclear. As Amit rightly points out, the loss of some autonomy was not a 
point of concern given that the Plataeans offered themselves willingly to the 
Spartans and Athenians.188 Amit surveys the possible objections (ethnic, economic, 
or constitutional) and concludes that internal politics was at the heart of the 
matter.189 However, the suggestion that a group of pro-Theban Plataean aristocrats 
(like those who gave the city to Thebes in 431: Thuc. 2.2.2) aroused fears of 
oligarchic conspiracy in the general populace is not convincing:190 neither Herodotus 
nor Thucydides implies factionalism in Plataea at the time, nor suggests that the 
Thebans offered any enticement to the Plataeans.191 Moreover, the nature of the 
relationship between Athens and Plataea afterwards, which Badian identifies as 
effectively δουλεία, “slavery”, speaks quite clearly to what the Plataeans were 
rejecting in fleeing Thebes: in Badian’s words, “the Plataeans chose to become 
subjects of the Athenians, on whatever precise terms, in order to avoid becoming 
subjects of the Thebans, which at the time was the only real alternative.”192 
                                                
187 Hammond (2000), 80. 
188 Amit (1973), 64. 
189 Amit (1973), 64–70. 
190 Amit (1973), 70. 
191 Cf. the conflict at the start of the Peloponnesian War (see pp. 78–93), which involved both 
Plataean cooperation and several attempts on Thebes’ part to persuade the Plataeans to their view. 
Debnar (1996), 102, argues that the Thebans conceded at Thuc. 3.63.2 that the origins of the conflict 
were in their own aggression. 
192 Badian (1989), 104; he goes on to argue (106–7) that Pausanias’ famous oath to the Plataeans in 
479 that they would “live autonomously” ever after in fact liberated the Plataeans from Athens, 
though they obviously maintained friendly relations. Hammond (1992), 144, argues for a gentler 
interpretation of the relationship, and refers to Thucydides’ use of ξυµµαχία for it (3.55.1; 2.73.3). 
Ducat (1973), 67, notes that it was not unusual for a small city to “submit itself” to a more distant 
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Herodotus’ other uses of πιέζω make it clear that the pressure the Thebans placed 
upon the Plataeans was more likely a claim upon their territory: the action of πιέζω is 
not simply to put political pressure on an opponent, but to tie up and claim resources, 
whether that is an important section of the opposing army (9.61, 63), cash and crop 
resources (5.35, 6.139, 7.120, 8.142), or land (4.11, 4.13, 4.105, 4.118, 6.34).193 In 
many of the cases Herodotus describes, πιεζόµενοι are specifically those who face 
losing their land to expansionist encroachments. The fact that the Corinthians in their 
arbitration of the dispute set the boundaries of the territories (οὔρισαν τὴν χώρην) 
confirms that Thebes had occupied some of the territory of its neighbour.194 Finally 
the Athenians seem to have redefined the border to the Asopus, in a passage which 
clearly implies that this was favourable to the Plataeans.195 The implication that 
Athens went against the Corinthian arbitration suggests that Corinth was not 
completely unfavourable to Thebes in its original decision. 
The Corinthian arbitration concludes that “the Thebans would suffer the unwilling 
Boeotians to not belong to the Boeotians”. This is the only sentence in Herodotus’ 
account which might refer to the Boeotian Confederation. However, τελέειν εἰς is 
ambiguous: its literal meaning, “pay (tax) into”, would indicate a formal 
participation in the Boeotian Confederation (and explain an economic connotation of 
πιεζόµενοι); its metaphorical sense, however, is “be reckoned among”.196 It is not 
certain which sense Herodotus is using: his two other uses of the idiom (6.53, 2.51) 
are both metaphorical references to Hellenic ethnicity, not to formal participation, 
although it seems from his use of τελέω elsewhere to mean “pay tax” that Herodotus 
                                                                                                                                     
power, rather than suffer the domination of a nearby power, but Athens was not that distant, 
especially in comparison to Plataea’s first choice, Sparta. 
193 The Nile runs low (πιέζεται) in winter due to evaporation (2.25), the Scythians were forced 
(πιεσθέντας) into Cimmeria by Massagetae (4.11), and then the Cimmerians were forced 
(πιεζοµένους) from their territory by Scythians (4.13), the Neuri from their land to that of the Budini 
(4.105), the Scythian envoys to the tribes complain that they are pressed (πιεζόµενοι) by Darius’ 
imperial ambitions (4.118), the cost of paying for his army prevented (ἐπίεζε) Aristagoras from 
keeping his promise to Artaphernes (5.35), the Dolonci were being pillaged (πιεσθέντες) by the 
Apsinthi (6.34), the Lemnians suffered (πιεζόµενοι) famine and barrenness for killing Pelasgian 
settlers (6.139), the Abderans were pressed by the expense of hosting Xerxes (7.120), the Persian 
pillagings of Attica gain the Athenians Spartan sympathy as πιεζόµενοι (8.142), the Spartans were 
heavily pressed (πιεζοµένην, πιεζοµένων) by Persian assaults (9.60, 61) and the Greeks pressed the 
Persian forces hardest (µάλιστα … ἐπίεσαν) around Mardonius (9.63). 
194 Bonner and Smith (1945), 14, argue that Herodotus is mistaken in making the boundaries the 
material concern by which “the political question” was settled. 
195 Amit (1973), 78; Hammond (1992), 144. 
196 McQueen (2000), ad 53.1. 
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could have been using the literal sense from which the metaphor developed. On the 
whole there is insufficient attestation of the Boeotian confederation in this period to 
support the assumption of a formal idea of membership. 
Thucydides’ Theban speaker likewise narrates the dispute with reference to a 
Boeotian nation, but not a formal Boeotian Confederation: 
ἡµῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας καὶ ἄλλα χωρία 
µετ᾽ αὐτῆς, ἃ ξυµµείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες ἔσχοµεν, οὐκ ἠξίουν 
οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεµονεύεσθαι ὑφ᾽ ἡµῶν, ἔξω δὲ τῶν 
ἄλλων Βοιωτῶν παραβαίνοντες τὰ πάτρια, ἐπειδὴ προσηναγκάζοντο… 
We occupied Plataea later than the rest of Boeotia … but they did not 
acknowledge, as had been arranged earlier, that they were under our 
leadership, and they set themselves outside of the ancestral customs of 
the other Boeotians: then they were put under compulsion… (3.61.2) 
The parenthetical ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον does imply a structure, but it is one of 
Theban hegemony (ἡγεµονεύειν) rather than a confederate structure. While the 
Theban speaker does associate the Plataean resistance to Thebes with a betrayal of 
Boeotian customs, it is important to note that he has already established a narrative 
in which Thebes is the founder of all Boeotian cities (κτισάντων … ἡµῶν), which 
both justifies Thebes’ general leadership of Boeotia and gives it an implicit right to 
control Plataea through a sort of metropolis–colony relationship. The speaker is quite 
insistent that Plataea and the Plataeans belong to Boeotia (ἄλλης Βοιωτίας, ἄλλων 
Βοιωτῶν), but he does not phrase this within an enrolment metaphor like Herodotus. 
The major concern of the dispute is not one of membership in the Boeotian 
Confederation, voluntary or involuntary: scholars have too willingly read Herodotus’ 
τελέειν εἰς as a technical term for involvement in a formally constituted 
Confederation. 
However, after the Corinthian arbitration, the arbitrators left,197 and according to 
Herodotus, the Athenian retreat was interrupted: Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ ἀπιοῦσι ἐπεθήκαντο 
Βοιωτοί, “the Boeotians set upon the Athenians as they left” (6.108.5). The only 
Boeotians mentioned in the preceding passage are the Thebans and the Plataeans 
themselves, the latter of whom cannot have attacked their benefactors (if nothing 
                                                
197 Or began to leave: Shrimpton (1984), 298. 
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else, this would run contrary to the point of Herodotus’ story, the ongoing alliance 
between Plataea and Athens). Buck explains the change of term by suggesting that a 
Boeotian cooperative army had been responsible for the pressuring of Plataea,198 but 
Herodotus earlier refers only to the Thebans, both as those pressuring Plataea and 
those who confronted the Athenians. Thucydides too focuses solely on a Theban–
Plataean conflict. The reference to “Boeotians” must be to the discontented Thebans, 
perhaps as the leaders of an otherwise silent Boeotian force.199 By the late fifth 
century this was clearly felt to have been a Theban action, such as both Herodotus 
and Thucydides’ Plataean and Theban speakers depict it. We might alternatively see 
this not as a reference to a wider Boeotian force but as an epithet for the Thebans. 
The use of the broader term has a rhetorical point, recalling the Βοιωτοῖσι in 
Herodotus’ asserted motive for Cleomenes’ advice and thus highlighting that 
Cleomenes has successfully manipulated the Athenians into a conflict with some 
(not the!) Boeotians, i.e. the Thebans.200 Herodotus’ discussion achieves the overall 
point of explaining why the Plataeans stood with Athens in the battles of the Persian 
Wars, while the Boeotians (especially Thebes) stood on the Persian side. 
The meaning of τελέειν ἐς Βοιωτούς is thus even vaguer. Amit posits that the 
wording of the Corinthian decision demonstrates “that political grouping was still in 
the making”.201 Note, by comparison, however, the use of συντελεῖν in the Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia’s description of Thebes’ dependent states under the Classical 
constitution (16.3).202 How and Wells gloss Herodotus’ phrase as “to belong to the 
Boeotian league under Theban hegemony”;203 the Boeotian Confederation did not 
exist, nor was there any greater Boeotian force present here. We are left only with 
“to belong under Theban hegemony, as Boeotians did”. The attack on Plataea, 
                                                
198 Buck (1979), 112; likewise Larsen (1968), 29, cautiously. 
199 Hammond’s discussion (2000, 81). 
200 Plutarch attributes the reasoning to Herodotus’ malicious imagination, for “if Herodotus is not 
malicious, then the Lacedaemonians are deceitful and malicious, and the Athenians foolish for being 
imposed upon, while the Plataeans were drawn into the middle not out of good will or respect, but as 
an excuse for war” (εἰ µὴ κακοήθης Ἡρόδοτος, ἐπίβουλοι µὲν Λακεδαιµόνιοι καὶ κακοήθεις, 
ἀναίσθητοι δ' Ἀθηναῖοι παρακρουσθέντες, Πλαταιεῖς δ' οὐ κατ' εὔνοιαν οὐδὲ τιµὴν ἀλλὰ πολέµου 
πρόφασις εἰς µέσον ἐρρίφησαν, de Hdt. mal. 861e). The apodosis should perhaps be taken more 
seriously than the protasis (see the introduction on Plut. de Hdt. mal.), in which case Plutarch is even 
more explicit about Cleomenes’ manipulation as a πρόφασις.  
201 Amit (1971), 58. 
202 Hammond (2000), 85 and n. 20.  
203 CH 2:110. 
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probably in 519, was the first historical instance of a recurring dispute between 
Thebes and Plataea; all of our sources acknowledge Thebes (and Thebes alone) as 
the aggressor. Herodotus’ use of “Boeotians” to refer to the force which attacked the 
retreating Athenians is a rhetorical point and not a historical one; there is therefore 
no real indication of Boeotian military cooperation here. Thebes’ goal or goals for 
the attack are unclear. Substantial weight has been given to the Corinthian 
arbitration’s statement regarding the Boeotians, but Herodotus also seems to refer to 
a disputed border between Thebes and Plataea, which may have been the more 
pressing concern. 
b. The Battle of Ceressus, c. 500 
Two late sources, Plutarch and Pausanias, know of a battle between Boeotians and 
Thessalians at Ceressus (near Thespiae) which is not elsewhere attested in Greek 
historiography: 
τοῦτο µὲν τοίνυν Βοιωτοῖς Ἱπποδροµίου µηνός, ὡς δ᾽ Ἀθηναῖοι καλοῦσιν 
Ἑκατοµβαιῶνος, ἱσταµένου πέµπτῃ δύο λαβεῖν συνέβη νίκας 
ἐπιφανεστάτας, αἷς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἡλευθέρωσαν, τήν τε περὶ Λεῦκτρα 
καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ Κερησσῷ, ταῦτης πρότερον ἔτεσι πλείοσιν ἢ διακοσίοις, ὅτε 
Λατταµύαν καὶ Θεσσαλοὺς ἐνίκησαν. 
Similarly it happened that on the fifth day of the month Hippodromium, 
which the Athenians call Hecatombaeon, the Boeotians accomplished 
two victories by which they freed the Greeks: the one near Leuctra and 
the one at Ceressus, more than two hundred years earlier, when they 
defeated Lattamyas and the Thessalians. (Plut. Cam. 19.4) 
ὅτι τῆς Ἑλλάδος αὐτοὺς κρατοῦντας ἄχρι Θεσπιέων ἐναγκος ἐξήλασαν 
µάχῃ περιγενόµενοι καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα Λατταµύας ἀποκτείναντες, ταῦτα 
γὰρ ὑπῆρχε Βοιωτοῖς τότε καὶ Θεσσαλοῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιεικὲς δὲ καὶ 
φιλάνθρωπον οὐδέν. 
…because the Thebans had just recently driven them [the Thessalians] 
off in a battle as they were conquering Greece, and killed their leader 
Lattamyas, for thus were the Boeotians and Thessalians disposed to each 
other then: with no good-will or friendship. (Plut. De Hdt. mal. 866e–f) 
ἔστι δὲ ἐχυρὸν χωρίον ὁ Κερησσὸς ἐν τῇ Θεσπιέων, ἐς ὅ καὶ πάλαι ποτὲ 
ἀνεσκευάσαντο κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστρατείαν τὴν Θεσσαλῶν· οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ 
τότε, ὡς ἑλεῖν τὸν Κερησσόν σφισι πειρωµένοις ἐφαίνετο ἐλπίδος 
κρεῖσσον, ἀφίκοντο ἐς Δελφοὺς παρὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ αὐτοῖς γίνεται 
µάντευµα τοιόνδε· 
There is a secure spot, Ceressus, in the Thespians’ land, in which they 
once arranged to meet the invasion of the Thessalians. On that occasion 
the Thessalians, when there seemed to be little hope of them managing to 
seize Ceressus, consulted the god at Delphi, and they received this 
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prophecy: [that Ceressus would be impregnable until after Leuctra]. 
(Paus. 9.14.2–3) 
The three versions vary substantially in their details: Plutarch dates the battle “more 
than two hundred years” before Leuctra (i.e. before 571: Cam.) or “soon before” 
Thermopylae (479: De Hdt. mal.), while Pausanias does not seem to have an exact 
date at all (“long ago”).204 Moreover, while Plutarch considers the battle enormously 
important, comparable to Leuctra, Pausanias’ only point of interest is that the 
Thebans would later besiege the Thespians at Ceressus after Leuctra. 
The Thessalians fought the Boeotians as a whole (Plut. Cam.), the Thebans (De Hdt. 
Mal.), or the Thespians (Paus.).205 Sordi argues that “a resistere ai Tessali a Ceresso, 
non sono i Beoti, nè tanto meno i Tebani, ma i Tespiesi.”206 We can infer, however, 
that Pausanias was appealing to irony, contrasting Theban and Thespian cooperation 
at the first Battle of Ceressus with the Theban siege of Thespians at the second 
Battle. The forces which Plutarch describes as “Boeotian” consist most of all of the 
Thebans, and perhaps Thespians: On the Malice of Herodotus implies that it was a 
largely Theban effort; the comparisons with Leuctra in both Plutarch and Pausanias 
suggest likewise.207 
Buck hangs his earliest date for the creation of the Boeotian Confederation on this 
battle.208 However, there is no clear evidence to be found here of a pan-Boeotian 
effort, nor of any lasting effect on the Boeotian poleis (apart from their continued 
freedom, as Plutarch emphasises in the Camillus). 
The Battle of Ceressus provides the first example of a defensive action by “the 
Boeotians”, against a Thessalian incursion. The late tradition gives an imprecise 
                                                
204 Schachter (1989), 81–82, suggests that Plutarch is following different sources in each work. 
Plutarch’s source is perhaps Callisthenes’ Hellenica, which in particular may have been Plutarch’s 
main source on the Theban point-of-view of Leuctra: see Georgiádou (1996), esp. 79–81. A more 
simple solution for the dates revises the manuscript of Plut. Cam. from “two hundred years” to “one 
hundred years”, which puts the terminus ante quem agreeably in the 470s in both of Plutarch’s 
versions: see Buck (1979), 107–11, and Sordi (1993). Sordi (1993), 30–31, suggests a date much 
closer to Thermopylae, perhaps 484. The manuscripts of Plut. Cam. must also be corrected from 
Γεραιστω to Κερησσω: Sordi (1993), 25. 
205 It was certainly not the Thessalians with the Boeotians against the Thespians, pace Larsen (1968), 
113: see Ducat (1973), 70. 
206 Sordi (1993), 27. 
207 Buck (1979), 110. 
208 Buck (1979), 107. 
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date, but it seems likely that the conflict was close to or even between the Persian 
Wars. The degree of military cooperation is dubious; aside from Plutarch’s 
ascription of the victory to the Boeotians, only Thespiae and Thebes are named, and 
not in the same sources. Pausanias may imply cooperation, but only very obliquely. 
Although Plutarch sees the Battle as enormously important, perhaps 
anachronistically, there is little sign of anything more than an ad hoc force. 
c. Attica, 506 
An unidentified force of Boeotians, working in cooperation with the forces of 
Chalcis, attempted to contribute to Cleomenes’ third intervention into Attica (which, 
according to Herodotus, was more of an invasion than an intervention: cf. 5.76). An 
Athenian victory inscription, quoted by Herodotus (5.77) in his narrative of events 
and referred to by Pausanias (1.28.2), confirmed by the discovery of the inscription 
itself (IG i2 394), refers to the “Boeotian and [Euboean] Chalcidean races”, ἔθνεα 
Βοιωτῶν καὶ Χαλκιδέων:209  
ἔθνεα Βοιωτῶν καὶ Χαλκιδέων δαµάσαντες 
 παῖδες Ἀθηναίων ἔργµασιν ἐν πολέµου 
δεσµῷ ἐν ἀχλυόεντι σιδηρέῳ ἔσβεσαν ὕβριν· 
 τῶν ἵππους δεκάτην Παλλάδι τάσδ’ ἔθεσαν. 
The children of the Athenians bound the Boeotian and Chalcidean races 
in grievous iron bonds by their deeds in war, and extinguished their 
outrage [ὕβρις]; this chariot they set up as a tithe from them to Pallas. 
The Athenian inscription depicts their enemy in terms that undoubtedly exaggerate 
the scale of the conflict: whatever might be said of the Boeotians, the Chalcideans 
were hardly an ἔθνος in themselves. We can likewise perhaps doubt the 
comprehensive representation of the Boeotians which the inscription claims.210 This 
inscription perhaps influenced Herodotus (for he claims to have seen it himself) to 
describe the combatants as Βοιωτοί. But the text he quotes is that of a mid-fifth 
century copy, perhaps set up by Pericles to celebrate Athenian victory at 
Oenophyta.211 The copy switched the two hexameter lines, emphasing the identity of 
                                                
209 ML 15B, the text of a mid-fifth century copy (seen by Herodotus); this copy transposed the first 
and third lines of the original (15A).  
210 Pace Ducat (1973), 68–69. 
211 CH 2:43. 
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the conquered (which rendered the old epigram more relevant to the fifth century) 
over the particular circumstances of Athenian revenge for the invasion.212 
Hall finds a difficulty in the inscription in that, while the Boeotians are frequently 
referred to as an ἔθνος, the Chalcideans should properly be a polis:213 the elegiac 
inscription should not be taken as a source of precise information, but the composer 
could easily have written the metrically equivalent Θηβαίων for Βοιωτῶν if that was 
all that was meant: some larger contingent was involved, of which Thebes is the only 
identifiable member.214 
Although Herodotus throughout the narrative of the war invasion refers to the 
Boeotians, his description of the aftermath of the invasion discusses only the Theban 
reaction: they consulted the Delphic Oracle in their desire for τίσις and received the 
advice that they needed support: 
ἐς πολύφηµον δὲ ἐξενείκαντας ἐκέλευε τῶν ἄγχιστα δέεσθαι. 
ἀπελθόντων ὦν τῶν θεοπρόπων ἐξέφερον τὸ χρηστήριον ἁλίην 
ποιησάµενοι· ὡς ἐπυνθάνοντο δὲ λεγόντων αὐτῶν τῶν ἄγχιστα δέεσθαι, 
εἶπαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἀκούσαντες τούτων. “οὐκ ὦν ἄγχιστα ἡµέων οἰκέουσι 
Ταναγραῖοί τε καὶ Κορωναῖοι καὶ Θεσπιέες; καὶ οὗτοί γε ἅµα ἡµῖν αἰεὶ 
µαχόµενοι προθύµως συνδιαφέρουσι τὸν πόλεµον. τί δεῖ τούτων γε 
δέεσθαι;” 
[The Pythia] bid them to take it to the many-voiced and entreat their 
nearest. When the envoys had returned they called an assembly and 
announced the oracle. When the Thebans heard them say they should ask 
the nearest, they said, ‘Do not the Tanagrans and Coroneans and 
Thespians live nearest to us? And they always fight eagerly alongside us 
when they go to war. Why do we need to ask them?’ (5.79) 
This passage has often been interpreted out-of-context as depicting a standing 
alliance amongst the southern Boeotian poleis Thebes, Tanagra, Thespiae, and 
Coronea.215 In the context, however, it is curious to note that the Thebans clearly 
interpret ἄγχιστα only in a spatial and not a temporal sense (those who fought with 
us “most recently”, also a valid meaning of the word): notice οἰκέουσι in the Theban 
comment. Nor do they suggest that these cities might have their own interest in 
                                                
212 See discussion in ML, 15B. 
213 Hall (2007b), 50. 
214 The alliance of Chalcis and Boeotia has left perhaps another, rather controversial, piece of 
evidence in the form of two coins (one from the Taranto Hoard) which bear, on one side the wheel 
symbol of Chalcidean coins and on the other the shield of Boeotians coins, cf. MacDonald (1987–88). 
215 Amit (1971), 58. 
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taking τίσις against Athens, though Tanagra at least may have observed some of the 
fighting between Boeotians, Chalcideans and Athenians at the Euripus. Amit notes 
as well that the oracle is reported only to an assembly [ἁλίην], probably the general 
assembly of the Thebans, and not a federal council or magistrate.216 Here is good 
evidence to suggest, then, that these poleis were not involved in the original conflict; 
no Boeotian polis other than Thebes participated in the original invasion.217  
The recent discovery at Thebes of a column with a partially-surviving inscription 
confirms the Thebans’ participation. The inscription reads:218 
]ος Fοινόας καὶ Φυλᾶς 
]hελόντες κἒλυσῖνα 
]αι Χαλκίδα, λυσαµενοι 
]µοι ἀνέθειαν 
] Oenoe and Phylae 
] having taken Eleusis, too, 
] Chalcis, they having ransomed 
] set up for me(?)… 
The column was found within the probable sanctuary zone of Thebes, north-west of 
the Cadmea. With its references to Oenoe, Eleusis and Chalcis, the inscription is 
most clearly read as a dedication following the conflicts of 507/6 BCE, although the 
surviving text has a reference to Phylae, unattested elsewhere, while not mentioning 
Herodotus’ Hysiae (5.74.2). The Boeotian dialect evident in the digamma (line 1) 
and closed eta (for [h], line 2) indicates that this was most probably set up by 
Boeotians, but it is difficult to prove Aravantinos’ assertion that it was established 
“more likely [by] Boeotoi” than Thebans alone.219 Λυσαµενοι (line 3) is quite vague 
and the inscription provides little enough context to interpret it. Herodotus, however, 
states that 700 Boeotians and a substantial number of Chalcideans were captured in 
the course of the conflict and later ransomed back (whereby the δεσµῷ of the 
Athenian inscription). The inscription found outside Thebes may then commemorate 
                                                
216 Amit (1971), 58. Buck (1985), 27, argues ex silentio that this was a federal assembly, perhaps even 
the institution which was divided into four councils in the Classical constitution (see below). 
217 Schachter (1989), 81, suggests that a funerary epigram (IG vii 2247) from Thisbe of ca. 500 for a 
warrior who fell ἐν προµάχοις “in the front lines” could refer to this battle, though there is not enough 
evidence to prove the association, nor a lack of other possible contexts. 
218 SEG 54 518 = Aravantinos (2006). I have corrected Aravantinos’ printing αὶ [sic] Φυλᾶς; the κ is 
clear in the original inscription, and (as mentioned in the SEG) seems to be missing only through 
typographical error. 
219 Aravantinos (2006), 376.  
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the act of ransom, perhaps as a thanks-offering from the returned soldiers. The 
location of the memorial, not in common Boeotian sanctuaries but at Thebes, speaks 
to the identity of the soldiers who offered it. 
Cleomenes’ failed expedition into Attica in 506 and the consequent Athenian 
reprisal against Boeotia and Chalcis are the first clear indications of Boeotian 
military cooperation in the Archaic Period. Epigraphic sources refer to the force as 
“Boeotians”, but only the Thebans can be identified as a major participant. However, 
in the course of the aftermath the Thebans assert that their neighbours in Tanagra, 
Coronea and Thespiae did not need to be asked, for they would fight προθύµως, 
“eagerly”, should the Thebans go to war. This is the earliest historical explanation of 
Boeotian cooperation.  
d. Herodotus’ βοιωτάάρχαι and the Battle of Plataea 
There are clear references to Boeotian military cooperation in the course of the 
Plataea campaign of the Second Persian War. Larsen suggested that although all the 
Boeotian poleis except Plataea and Thespiae Medised during the Persian invasions, 
each state did so on their own terms.220 I argue that this was not the case, and that the 
references to Thebes separate from the collective Boeotian states highlight Theban 
hegemony amongst the Boeotians. Herodotus frequently refers to the Boeotians 
collectively, particularly in his discussion of the Battle of Plataea, and even makes a 
singular reference to the formal title of Boeotian federal magistrates (βοιωτάρχαι), 
otherwise unattested before the Peloponnesian War. I argue that this is an 
anachronism. 
Herodotus gives the position of the Boeotians in the line at Plataea as a single group 
(9.31; excepting the Thespians and Plataeans who were on the opposing side), but he 
also admits that the description of the line was painted in broad strokes: ταῦτα µὲν 
τῶν ἐθνέων τὰ µέγιστα ὠνόµασται τῶν ὑπὸ Μαρδονίου ταχθέντων, “The greatest of 
those nations commanded by Mardonius have been named” (9.32).221 Likewise, the 
                                                
220 Larsen (1968), 52; Amit (1971), 58–59, though he (incorrectly) asserts that “boeotarchs are never 
mentioned” during the Persian Wars. 
221 Ἔθνεα certainly does not have to be limited to the nations of the Persian Empire; the Medising 
Greeks quite validly divide into ἔθνη. 
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Spartans describe themselves as “experienced against the Boeotians and 
Thessalians” (Βοιωτῶν καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἔµπειροί, 9.46), and the Boeotians noticed en 
bloc that the Spartans and Athenians had switched their places on the wings of the 
Greek line (9.47).222 In the list of Greeks to give water and earth to the Persians, 
however, Thebes was separated from the Boeotians: 
τῶν δὲ δόντων ταῦτα ἐγένοντο οἵδε, Θεσσαλοὶ Δόλοπες Ἐνιῆνες 
Περραιβοὶ Λοκροὶ Μάγνητες Μηλιέες Ἀχαιοὶ οἱ Φθιῶται καὶ Θηβαῖοι 
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Βοιωτοὶ πλὴν Θεσπιέων τε καὶ Πλαταιέων. 
These were those who gave in: Thessalians, Dolopes, Enienes, 
Perrhaebians, Locrians, Magnetes, Melians, Achaeans, the Phthiotes and 
the Thebans and other Boeotians except Thespians and Plataeans. 
(7.132.1) 
There is no clear reason why Thebes was the only polis singled out from the rest of 
the Boeotians. This might be ascribed to Herodotus’ supposed bias against Thebes, 
but it seems equally possible that Thebes’ Medism was in fact exceptional. It might 
equally suggest that the Boeotians followed the Thebans in giving earth and water. 
Thebans are twice mentioned as advisors to Mardonius at Plataea, and as leaders (en 
bloc) of the Greek cavalry.223 Herodotus even implies that the Medising Thebans 
(here, as claimed in Thuc. 3.62.3–4, only a subset of the Thebans and not the entire 
polis) were the only Boeotians to fight: 
Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν µετὰ βασιλέος ἐθελοκακεόντων Βοιωτοὶ 
Ἀθηναίοισι ἐµαχέσαντο χρόνον ἐπὶ συχνόν· οἱ γὰρ µηδίζοντες τῶν 
Θηβαίων, οὗτοι εἶχον προθυµίην οὐκ ὀλίγην µαχόµενοί τε καὶ οὐκ 
ἐθελοκακέοντες, οὕτω ὥστε τριηκόσιοι αὐτῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ ἄριστοι 
ἐνθαῦτα ἔπεσον ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων· ὡς δὲ ἐτράποντο καὶ οὗτοι, ἔφευγον ἐς 
τὰς Θήβας… 
Although the other Greeks fighting for the King were deliberately 
fighting badly, the Boeotians fought for a very long time against the 
Athenians; for the Medisers amongst the Thebans had no small desire to 
fight and not deliberately fight badly, so therefore three hundred of the 
most prominent and best men fell there at the Athenians’ hands. The rest 
turned and fled to Thebes… (9.67) 
                                                
222 How and Wells (CH 2:308) are sceptical of the reality of this episode; it may have been an 
invention by Herodotus. We do not in fact know of any conflict between Boeotians and Spartans 
before the fourth century, although they had fought for the same cause in Cleomenes’ expedition 
against Athens in 506, although on different fronts. 
223 Anonymously, 9.31, 9.41; Timagenidas, 9.38 (here only an ἀνὴρ Θηβαῖος, perhaps suggesting a 
citizen in private capacity; at 9.68 where he is singled out as one of the most prominent Theban 
Medisers he is called an ἀρχηγετής ἀνὰ πρώτους), 9.40. 
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At the very least, the Theban contingent seems to have prevented other Boeotian 
contingents from leaving the battle, but Herodotus does nothing to distinguish the 
µηδίζοντες τῶν Θηβαίων from the Βοιωτοί in general. Throughout Herodotus’ 
narrative of Plataea, only Theban or general Boeotian forces are mentioned (indeed, 
to the exclusion of all other Medising Greeks). 
In fact there does not seem to be a distinction between Thebes and Boeotia as a 
whole during this campaign. This is made more clear in Timagenidas’ speech during 
the siege of Thebes after Plataea. He proposes that Thebes should meet Athenian 
terms, νῦν ὦν ἡµέων εἵνεκα γῆ ἡ Βοιωτίη πλέω µὴ ἀναπλήσῃ, “lest the land of 
Boeotia suffer more now on our account.” (9.86) The speech began with direct 
address to the ἄνδρες Θηβαῖοι. It is clear then that the Theban oligarchy was in 
charge of its own contribution to the Persian invasion, but also held themselves 
responsible for Boeotia as a whole. 
The only clear reference to a formal Boeotian federal constitution before the 
Peloponnesian War occurs here, in Book Nine of Herodotus. In describing the 
Persian retreat from Attica before the Battle of Plataea, he mentions that Mardonius 
was guided by locals sent by the Boeotarchs (βοιωτάρχαι): 
οὕτω δὴ ὄπίσω ἐπορεύετο διὰ Δεκελέης· οἱ γὰρ βοιωτάρχαι 
µετεπέµψαντο τοὺς προσχώρους τῶν Ἀσωπίων, οὗτοι δὲ αὐτῷ τὴν ὁδὸν 
ἡγέοντο ἐς Σφενδαλεάς, ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἐς Τάναγραν. ἐν Τανάγρῃ δὲ νύκτα 
ἐναυλισάµενος καὶ τραπόµενος τῇ ὑστεραίῃ ἐς Σκῶλον ἐν γῆ τῇ 
Θηβαίων ἦν. 
So he went back through Decelea; for the Boeotarchs had sent for their 
Asopian neighbours, and these men led him [Mardonius] along the way 
to Sphendaleae, and from there to Tanagra. He camped the night in 
Tanagra and on the next day turned to Scolus and was in Theban land. 
(9.15)  
Herodotus makes no other mention of Boeotarchs specifically nor of any other 
Boeotian archon who represents more than one polis. In light of the dearth of any 
other information for a pan-Boeotian magistrate at the time of the Persian Wars, 
scholars have previously attempted to fill in the gaps with information about the 
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later, Classical Boeotarch.224 More recently this has been superseded by doubts 
about Herodotus’ use of the term here.225 
It is worth considering what information the Herodotean passage and its context does 
provide. The route described takes the eastern path northward into Boeotia, circling 
around Mount Parnes: this significantly avoided a potential meeting with the 
amassed Greek forces marching north from the Isthmus (Hdt. 9.12, 9.15) The path 
taken was strategic (cf. Hdt. 9.13), and therefore not necessarily an indication that 
the guides or “Boeotarchs” involved were from the local poleis, Tanagra or Thebes. 
It was, however, the Thebans alone whom Herodotus depicted as encouraging 
Mardonius to make his stand in Boeotia in the first place (Hdt. 9.2), and after 
meeting resistance in Attica and Megara, he choose Thebes “in order to join battle 
near a friendly city” (συµβαλεῖν πρὸς πόλι τε φιλίῃ, 9.13): the Thebans may also 
have offered to arrange the logistics of the retreat.  
The somewhat curious term προσχώρους (“neighbouring people”) is used only here 
in Herodotus. It cannot truly be said that the residents of the Asopus valley were 
neighbours to all possible Boeotarchs. It is a more common term amongst Hellenistic 
authors, but in two Classical authors it is used in a Boeotian context: P uses it 
specifically of the un-walled towns dependent on Thebes (Hell. Oxy. 17.4).226 It may 
therefore be used to direct our identification of the Boeotarchs towards Thebes. 
The office of Boeotarch is clearly a significant feature of the later Boeotian 
Confederation: the Hellenica Oxyrhynica uses this office as the starting-point for its 
discussion of the representative nature of the constitution of the Confederation in the 
early fourth century, and Buck is almost certainly correct to suggest that the role 
needed no explanation for Herodotus’ fifth-century audience.227 However, as Larson 
points out, it does not necessarily follow that Herodotus’ mention of Boeotarchs here 
means that the office actually existed at the time of the Persian Wars.228 
                                                
224 See e.g. Flower and Marincola (2002), 125; Buck (1979), 124–25, 156–57; Larsen (1968, 31–32); 
ACT 1:239 (ad Thuc. 2.2.1). 
225 Morgan (2003), 22–23; Larson (2007), 172–73; contra: Roesch (1965), 95; Ducat (1973), 71, with 
little discussion; Salmon (1976), 18. 
226 Also in Sophocles, OT 1127; OC 493. 
227 Buck (1979), 124. 
228 Larson (2007), 173. 
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Nevertheless, many scholars including Buck have presumed to fill in the large gaps 
in Herodotus’ use of the term here with details from the Constitution as described in 
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 16.229 However, the events here pre-date any information 
regarding what the office entailed or how it was filled by 84 years, information 
which we might hope to receive from Herodotus if the role was actually developed 
during the Archaic Period. Herodotus’ reliability here suffers from his tendency (in 
which he is hardly alone amongst Greeks) to treat constitutional matters as 
synchronistic.  
There are other issues with the use of βοιωτάρχαι here, even if Herodotus has not 
committed an anachronism. Under the constitution of 395, the non-Medising poleis 
Thespiae and Plataea were both responsible for electing Boeotarchs.230 These should 
presumably therefore be excluded from the college of Boeotarchs at this time, but 
Herodotus makes no such clarification. It seems more likely that the Boeotarchs 
mentioned were not all the chief magistrates of Boeotia, but magistrates from Thebes 
and/or Tanagra, as the term προσχῶροι suggests the rural communities of southern 
Boeotia. It is possible that Herodotus was not clear which city had provisioned the 
guides from the Asοpus, and settled on Boeotarch as a compromise, albeit 
anachronistic. He would then mean here “magistrate from Boeotia” (or lower-case 
boeotarch), rather than a defined office. 
Larson suggests that the office might denote an ad hoc role for the purposes of 
supporting the Persian retreat, or of organising defence of Boeotia against Greek 
forces during the Persian retreat.231 However, while there is clearly some cooperation 
between Medising Boeotian states at this time, it seems unlikely that any scrabbled-
together coordination resulted in the formal creation of an archon.232 It is possible 
that in the Archaic Period, as in 379,233 Thebes created a magistracy which indicated 
its desire to expand control within Boeotia, but this requires a retrojection even 
further than that from the constitution of 395 to the Persian retreat. 
                                                
229 Roesch (1965), 95; Buck (1979), 123–138. Larsen (1968), 31, is more cautious. 
230 Plataea probably did not elect Boeotarchs in its own right: see pp. 83–84. 
231 Larson (2007), 173. 
232 Morgan’s (2003), 202–5, suggestion of spontaneous armies arising in early ἔθνη works against, not 
for the reality of Persian War Boeotarchs. 
233 Larsen (1968), 176, allows for four Theban Boeotarchs in 379; Rzepka (2010), 115, argues that the 
seven conspirators of the Theban uprising of 379 (Xen. Hell. 5.4.2) may have been the Boeotarchs. 
 69 
Overall, the lack of evidence at this time for any of the federal structures which later 
accompanied the Boeotian Confederation along with the lack of evidence for the 
Boeotarch itself must reasonably lead to the conclusion that Herodotus is being 
anachronistic or imprecise, although perhaps for good reasons. However, on the 
whole it seems that Thebes was the state responsible, and that Thebes was the leader 
of Boeotia’s policy of Medism in the Persian Wars.  
 
I have argued here that the development of the Boeotian state system was led by 
Thebes. In the course of four major conflicts at the end of the Archaic Period, it is 
clear that Thebes was the major participant — in the cases of Plataea and 
Cleomenes’ Attic campaign, perhaps the only identifiable participant. And yet these 
were all described at some point as efforts of the “Boeotians”. This suggests a 
broader scope, in which Thebes used the term “Boeotian” increasingly to describe its 
own actions. Modern authors consistently under-emphasise Theban imperialism in 
the sixth century. Thus, Ducat acknowledges the existence of Archaic Theban 
imperialism, but sees this tempered by the comparative willingness of the other 
Boeotian poleis to form a union.234 Willingness is seldom clearly attested by the 
sources: Theban aggression clearly is, and it is Thebes’ interaction with other 
Boeotian states which has left its strongest mark on the historiographic record. This 
attests most clearly to the forceful development of Theban hegemony within Boeotia 
by the time of the Persian Wars. 
Schachter suggests that in fact Thucydides’ “ancestral commonwealth of all the 
Boeotians” (3.65.2) referred specifically to the military unification of the Boeotians, 
an early stage which led to the formation of the Boeotian Confederation, and 
Schachter suggests that the Confederation functioned best militarily when under the 
leadership of Thebes.235 Military cooperation required, necessarily, a fairly high 
degree of coordination and/or leadership, and was a natural first step in the direction 
of the formalised inter-state system of a confederation. Ducat acknowledges that 
what he identifies as the Boeotian confederation at this time is “peut-être avant tout 
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une symmachie”, but agrees that military cooperation leads to other relationships.236 
Thebes seems to have placed itself at the forefront of this military cooperation. It 
clearly asserted that it could call on several Boeotian poleis to fight for it so 
consistently that they did not need to be consulted, but there is equally no indication 
that this was a formal relationship of συµµαχία. This systematic cooperation was a 
forerunner to the prominent military aspect of the Classical Boeotian Confederation, 
which I will now discuss. 
THE FOUNDATION OF THE BOEOTIAN CONFEDERATION 
In the following section, I argue that it was the military leadership of Thebes within 
Boeotia which resulted in the development of a true Boeotian constitution, after the 
Battle of Coronea in 447. Larsen and Fowler, within the belief that the Boeotian 
Confederation dated to the sixth century, suggested that Tanagra replaced Thebes as 
leader of the Boeotians after the Persian War; this leadership was disrupted by 
Sparta’s defeat of Athens at the Battle of Tanagra (457).237 The supposedly 
resumptive Theban hegemony, however, was interrupted by Athenian hegemony 
after the Battle of Oenophyta (also 457), and Buck has contended that Orchomenus, 
not Thebes, led the revolt against Athens which culminated in the Battle of Coronea 
(447) and therefore took the leading role the resultant Boeotian federal constitution. 
However, there is no evidence for the traditional 447 foundation date of the best-
attested, Classical form of the Boeotian Confederation.238 This is the date of the 
Battle of Coronea, at which the Boeotians defeated the Athenians and therefore 
ended the Athenian hegemony which had been imposed on Boeotia after the Battle 
of Oenophyta (457).239 While it is true that the broadly oligarchic principle which 
seems to have been fundamental to the constitution described in Hellenica 
Oxyrhynchia would have been inconsistent with the democracies established in most 
                                                
236 Ducat (1973), 71. 
237 Fowler (1957); Larsen (1960). 
238 As N. Hammond (2000), 83, notes, the Confederation “is likely to have been [operative] from 446 
B.C.” (emphasis mine).  
239 “Hegemony” is the usual term for Athenian presence in Boeotia at this time: as Amit puts it (1971, 
63), “Athens undertook to ensure the means of retaining her power without being obliged to occupy 
the country”. Some sources refer, apparently with the same meaning, to the Battle of Lebadea. 
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of Boeotia under Athenian hegemony,240 there is nothing to suggest that the 
Boeotian Confederation came into existence immediately after the Battle of 
Coronea.241 Moreover, this was not the re-foundation of a structure which had 
existed before the Athenian hegemony, as some scholars have assumed. The 
evidence which Buck employed to suggest that Orchomenus led the revolt relies not 
only on these assumptions but a narrow reading of the historiographical evidence of 
the revolt. Buck’s argument requires the reconstruction, ex silentio, of the rise of 
Thebes between 447 and 431, for as I discuss in the third chapter, Thebes was clearly 
in charge of Boeotia by the attack on Plataea.  
a. Sparta, Tanagra and Thebes, 457 
It is generally supposed that Thebes’ power diminished in the aftermath of Boeotian 
Medism. Thebes was perhaps the most prominent Mediser in Greek memory of the 
Persian Wars,242 but this reputation is not entirely borne out by the facts of the 
Persian War, in which Thebes’ most prominent acts of Medism were the surrender 
shortly before Thermopylae, and its participation (with almost all other Central and 
Northern Greek states) on the Persian side on the field at Plataea.243  
The impression of a disgraced Thebes is perhaps greater than the reality. Diodorus is 
the first author to give a true impression of Thebes’ misfortunes in 457: 
Θηβαῖοι µὲν τεταπεινωµένοι διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ξέρξην αὐτοῖς γενοµένην 
συµµαχίαν, ἐζήτουν δι᾽ οὗ τρόπου δύναιντ᾽ ἂν ἀναλαβεῖν τὴν πάτριον 
ἰσχύν τε καὶ δόξαν. διὸ καὶ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἁπάντων καταφρονούντων καὶ 
µηκέτι προσεχόντων τοῖς Θηβαίοις, ἠξίουν τοὺς Λακεδαιµονίους τῇ 
πόλει συµπεριποιῆσαι τὴν ὅλην ἡγεµονίαν τῆς Βοιωτίας. 
The Thebans were humbled by the alliance which they made with 
Xerxes, and the sought the means by which they might be able to reclaim 
their ancestral power and glory. Because of which, both because all the 
Boeotians looked down on them and no longer obeyed the Thebans, they 
asked the Lacedaemonians to help their city obtain the complete 
hegemony over Boeotia. (11.81.1–2) 
                                                
240 Buck (1985). 
241 Amit (1971), 53–54; pace ACT 1:184 (ad 1.113.3–4). On the Athenian-imposed democracies of 
the hegemony, see HCT 1:318; Larsen (1960), 17 n. 2; and discussion and bibliography in Amit 
(1971), 51–53. 
242 Demand (1982), 25–27. 
243 Hdt. 7.233; Thuc. 3.62.4. 
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It should be noted firstly that Diodorus separates the disgrace of Medism from its 
problems in Boeotia, balancing the two issues with paired καὶ. The Boeotian states 
were in general not in a position to condescend on the basis of Medism. Amit’s 
discussion of the period concludes that there is no evidence for the reconstitution of 
the Boeotian Confederation before or after the Athenian hegemony, but this is 
founded on the presumption that the Confederation had existed in the sixth and early 
fifth century.244 Diodorus only refers to Thebes’ desire to reassert its hegemony over 
Boeotia in the fifth century, a rare reference to Thebes’ intent to control the rest of 
the region. 
Larsen contends that the Spartans, aiming to help the Thebes reassert their 
dominance, were on their way from Phocis to attack Tanagra when they encountered 
and defeated an Athenian force. This relies on the assumption that Sparta had no 
other reason to be in southeastern Boeotia, for this was clearly not the natural route 
home from Phocis to the Peloponnese. It must be noted, however, that all other 
natural ways home through Boeotia, via the Isthmus, were likewise closed by the 
bloc of Athens, Plataea and Megara. Any number of reasons may have induced 
Sparta to seek a longer route home; Diodorus alone gives an indication of Spartan 
intentions at the time, and he does not relate these in any way to Tanagra. 
Moreover, the Battle of Tanagra did not in fact involve any Boeotian states, although 
it seems to have concerned the matter of hegemony in Boeotia in the context of the 
First Peloponnesian War. The decisive battle here, however, was Oenophyta, only 
two months after the Battle of Tanagra. Thucydides says that the Athenians defeated 
the Boeotians (1.108.3). Tanagra was apparently singled out in the aftermath 
(according to Thucydides, its walls were torn down), but Diodorus Siculus seems to 
qualify this as only one of many aggressive actions which the Athenians undertook 
afterwards (11.82.5). 
This is the only literary evidence to suggest Tanagran ambitions at this time, and the 
interpretation is founded on many presumptions: that Thebes’ power had declined 
sharply after the Persian Wars, and that this decline left a power vacuum in Boeotia. 
                                                
244 Amit (1971). He finds no evidence for the dissolution of the Confederation after the Persian Wars 
either. 
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Fowler has employed numismatic evidence in an attempt to support this discussion; 
in keeping with my own caution about numismatic evidence I discuss this 
interpretation separately, in chapter four. 
b. The Boeotian Revolt, 447 
It is not entirely clear that the circumstances of the Boeotian revolt of 447 provide 
evidence towards the circumstances of the foundation of the Confederation.245 
Larsen contends that Orchomenus, and not Thebes, took the primary role in the 
revolt, and therefore was the major power involved in the foundation (or re-
foundation, as he would suggest) of the Confederation. The only detailed source is 
Thucydides:246  
καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενοµένου µετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων 
ἐχόντων Ὀρχοµενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλ᾽ ἄττα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, 
ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν µὲν χιλίοις ὁπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ξυµµάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις 
ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέµια ὄντα, Τολµίδου τοῦ Τολµαίου 
στρατηγοῦντος. καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἑλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες 
ἀπεχώρουν φυλακήν καταστήσαντες. πορευοµένοις δ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐν 
Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οἵ τε ἐκ τῆς Ορχοµενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ 
Λοκροὶ µετ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώµης 
ἦσαν, καὶ µάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς µὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ 
ζῶντας ἔλαβον, καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Αθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς 
ποιησάµενοι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κοµιοῦνται. καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν 
κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνοµοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο. 
And sometime after that, with the Boeotians in exile holding 
Orchomenus and Chaeronea and some other regions of Boeotia, the 
Athenians attacked the regions which were hostile with a thousand of 
their own hoplites, with contingents from the allies, under the command 
of Tolmides son of Tolmaeus. They took Chaeronea, enslaved the 
population, established a garrison and left. As they were marching, the 
Boeotian exiles out of Orchomenus, and the Locrians and Euboean exiles 
and whoever was likewise inclined, attacked them at Coronea. They won 
the battle, killing some of the Athenians and taking others alive, and the 
Athenians left Boeotia completely after they made treaties for the return 
of their men. After that the Boeotians who were in exile returned and 
along with the others were all autonomous again. (1.113) 
It should be noted first of all that later sources on the Battle of Coronea remember a 
substantial conflict: Xenophon’s Pericles remembers it as one of the two battles 
which changed the Boeotians’ attitude towards Athens (along with Delium, 424: 
                                                
245 Cartledge (2000), 403. 
246 Diodorus (12.6) adds nothing to Thucydides’ account; Plutarch (Pel. 18) only a brief anecdote 
which highlights Pericles’ prudence in comparison with Tolmides. 
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Xen. Mem. 3.5.4), while Plutarch suggests that the Athenian force was unusually 
large due to Tolmides’ enthusiasm, but still suffered a substantial defeat (Plut. Per. 
18.2–3). Attica and Boeotia were approximately equal in population; the citizens of 
one Boeotian city, even with some exiles, would not have been a substantial force 
compared to Athens. Even before Leuctra and the floruit of Epaminondas’ 
generalship at Thebes, its independence from the Boeotian Confederation was 
secured by a Spartan garrison and not home forces. It seems unlikely that 
Orchomenus could have defeated Tolmides’ force so aggressively on its own. 
Larsen contends that the lack of explicit mention here suggests that the Thebans did 
not aid their fellow Boeotians in the revolt, although they were already free from 
Athenian domination.247 According to Aristotle, the Thebans rejected the democratic 
constitution imposed by the Athenians: 
διὰ καταφρόνησιν δὲ καὶ στασίαζουσι καὶ ἐπιτίθενται, οἷον … ἐν ταῖς 
δηµοκρατίαις οἱ εὔποροι καταφρονήσαντες τῆς ἀταξίας καὶ ἀναρχίας, 
οἷον καὶ ἐν Θήβαις µετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις µάχην κακῶς πολιτευοµένων 
ἡ δηµοκρατία δεφθάρη. 
Out of contempt result civil conflicts and even attacks, such as … when 
in democracies the well-to-do become contemptful of the disorganisation 
and anarchy, like when in Thebes after the Battle of Oenophyta the 
democracy was destroyed because it was ill-governed. (Pol. 1302b) 
“After” of course does not mean “soon after”, and it is clear that Aristotle did see a 
period long enough for the aristocrat element at Thebes to grow discontented with 
the democracy. This is at odds with Diodorus’ claim that the Thebans escaped 
Athenian domination entirely (11.83.1); Buck suggests that Diodorus’ source 
Ephorus anachronistically applied the standards of his own period to assume that the 
defeat of “the Boeotians” in 457 excluded their hegemon, Thebes.248 It seems 
overwhelmingly unlikely that Thebes was independent for almost ten years while 
surrounded by Athenian-dominated Boeotian states. Aristotle seems to describe the 
overthrow as a form of στάσις, and not related to foreign politics, but it is clear that 
the Thebans actively overthrew the democratic constitution asserted by Athens and 
                                                
247 Bonner and Smith (1945), 15, suggest that the city of Thebes was also a centre for the revolution. 
They cite no evidence for this, because there is none. 
248 Buck (1979), 147. 
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did not simply benefit from the general revolt. They may therefore have been the 
first polis in Boeotia to reestablish the oligarchic constitution. 
The lack of direct reference to the Thebans in Thucydides’ narrative is not sufficient 
to exclude them. The Thebans did claim responsibility for the victory in their speech 
at Plataea in 427:  
µαχόµενοι ἐν Κορωνείᾳ καὶ νικήσαντες αὐτοὺς ἠλευθερώσαµεν τὴν 
Βοιωτίαν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νῦν προθύµως ξυνελευθεροῦµεν, ἵππους τε 
παρέχοντες καὶ παρασκευὴν ὅσην οὐκ ἄλλοι τῶν ξυµµάχων. 
When we fought at Coronea and defeated them, we freed them then and 
we free now Boeotia and others eagerly, providing cavalry and gear 
beyond any other of the allies. (Thuc. 3.62.5) 
Pagondas, in a speech to the collected Boeotian forces before the Battle of Delium, 
implies that Thebes was involved in defeating the Athenians, in rather less dubious 
rhetorical circumstances (Thuc. 4.92). Nor can it be clearly demonstrated that the 
Boeotians who rebelled were Orchomenians, or even led by Orchomenus. 
Thucydides does not anywhere refer to Athens’ opponents as Orchomenians, but 
only as ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχοµένου φυγάδες, while Hellanicus (FGrH 4 F 81) seems to refer 
to them as Ὁρχοµενίζοντες, “those siding with the Orchomenians”, Diodorus as “the 
rallied Boeotians” (τῶν Βοιωτῶν συστραφέντων, Diod. 12.6). Given that our sources 
universally avoid the term Ὀρχοµένιοι, we should not be so confident that the 
revolters were men of Orchomenus:249 the “Boeotian exiles” used Orchomenus as a 
base. At no point are the Boeotian forces in the revolt referred to simply as 
Orchomenians (Ὀρχοµένιοι); instead the phrases ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχοµένου and 
Ὀρχοµενίζοντες are used. ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχοµένου should be taken as a simple indication 
of their motion, not one of origin.250 Orchomenus is consistently masculine when 
referring to the polis; this phrase must therefore stand for ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχοµενοῦ [χώρας] 
(vel sim.), “out of Orchomenian territory”.251 Orchomenus was the base of the 
Boeotian revolt, but not its leader. Thebes, on the other hand, was clearly actively 
involved in the revolt; a synthesis of the accounts would suggest that it did in fact 
lead the Boeotians.252 
                                                
249 Buck (1979), 150. 
250 Cf. LSJ, s.v. ἐκ, I (“Motion: out of, forth from”) vs. III (“Place of Origin or Birth”). 
251 Hansen (2004), 447, on the gender of the toponym. 
252 Buck (1979), 150, notes that Sparton (Plut. Ages. 19) is a markedly Theban name. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thebes was the primary participant in four military expeditions in the final years of 
the Archaic Period. All of these are referred to in historiographical sources as acts of 
“the Boeotians”, and therefore presented as cooperative acts, but the details of these 
expeditions clarifies who was in fact involved: at Plataea (ca. 519), only Thebes; at 
Ceressus (late sixth century), Thebes and/or Thespiae; in Attica (506), mainly 
Thebes; at the Battle of Plataea (479), all of Boeotia, with the two exceptions are 
carefully noted. The aftermath of the failed expedition to Attica, however, saw 
Thebes claim to lead Thespiae, Tanagra and Coronea. By the time of the Battle of 
Plataea, the Theban oligarchs were concerned for the entire region. 
Clearly, inter-state unity was most useful when there was an external threat:253 Buck 
argues that the pressure-point of Boeotian federal unity was the Thessalian attack 
which culminated in the Battle of Ceressus.254 There is overwhelmingly little 
evidence to suggest that this event resulted in a regional political structure. But the 
events between 520 and 480 clearly did encourage unification. The Battle of 
Coronea (447) seems a more likely breaking point, and one whose aftermath more 
clearly demonstrates the development of a Boeotian confederation. Once again 
Thebes seems to have led the Boeotians against an external threat, this time from 
Athens; Thebes’ leadership, although doubted, seems clear. This leadership allowed 
it to establish a Confederate constitution which favoured it heavily, as discussed in 
the following chapter. 
In the period between 506 and 447, therefore, we can see that Thebes was 
increasingly able to command military service from other Boeotian poleis. In the 
case of Plataea, at least, Thebes seems to have attacked a reticent state and 
confiscated some of its land for itself. The evidence of the Persian Wars suggests 
that Thebes led, and may perhaps have controlled Boeotia’s relations with the 
Persians. These three aspects of the Theban relationship with Boeotia meet Finley’s 
first, third and fifth criteria of imperialism. 
                                                
253 Schachter (1996), 24. 
254 Buck (1979), 107. 
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3  
POLEIS AND CONFEDERATION: THEBES AND THE 
BOEOTIAN CONSTITUTIONS 
This chapter considers the position of Thebes within the fully constituted Boeotian 
Confederation, after 447 until 387, when the Confederation was forcibly dissolved 
according to the Spartan interpretation of the Peace of Antalcidas. I argue below that 
the Boeotian constitution gave the balance of decision-making power in the 
Confederation to Thebes. I will also argue that there are some indications that the 
power imbalance in the federal constitution was not a result of Theban manoeuvring 
after the foundation of Confederation, but rather that the constitution was one of the 
original mechanisms by which Thebes took power. In fact, the actions of the 
Confederation in practice suggest an even stronger position for Thebes than the 
constitutional dominance, as I will demonstrate. 
It seems that in addition to the super-civic constitution of the Confederation, all the 
poleis of Boeotia conducted their local affairs through identical oligarchic 
constitutions, which I suggest were a Theban imposition. Thebes was, therefore, 
directly in control of some aspects of other Boeotian states’ government through its 
plurality in the Confederation’s councils and the college of Boeotarchs, in particular 
military affairs but also financial and judicial affairs. It held effective control of 
other aspects of local governments through the imposed oligarchic constitutions. 
Finally, the circumstances of the Confederation’s dissolution in 386 makes it clear 
that the Boeotian Confederation was not a free association (by that time) but a tool 
of Theban imperialism in Boeotia which gave Thebes control over the other poleis. 
Thus, Theban imperialism in Boeotia, I will argue, resulted in control over the rest of 
Boeotia from the Archidamian War. 
This chapter relies extensively on the imperfect constitutional summary of the 
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia (16.2–4) and the testimony of the historiographers. Larsen 
argued that the Boeotian constitutions were an important example of Classical 
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oligarchic political theory,255 but this significance is not reflected in ancient political 
writers: the Aristotelian school of constitutional scholars produced works on federal 
constitutions of Thessaly, Achaea and Lycia, at least, amongst their extensive 
constitutional studies (Πολιτείαι: Photius, Bibliotheca 104b–5a = FrGH II:166), but 
only the famous Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία survives in full, and we have no mention even 
of a Federal Constitution of the Boeotians.256 There are no surviving inscriptions 
which relate to the Boeotian Confederation before its revival, in defiance of the 
Peace of Antalcidas, in 374.257 Much better documentation is available for the 
Hellenistic form of the League, but this was not a direct continuation of the Archaic 
and/or Classical League.258 Therefore we rely on ancient historiographical resources.  
THE BOEOTIAN CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION 
Thebes is widely recognised as a prominent member of the Boeotian Confederation. 
It held the largest delegation in the representative Confederate government, 
providing two out of eleven divisions of the contributions to the government; its 
actual control, as I shall discuss, may have been even larger than the two parts 
assigned to it in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. The exact powers of the federal 
Boeotian government over the individual poleis are not clearly defined in our 
sources, but it is clear that the larger states and Thebes in particular were able to 
make decisions through the Constitution which were binding on the other 
Confederate participants.259 The Confederate constitution, I will argue, was designed 
to strengthen the hegemony of Thebes within Boeotia. 
The constitution of the Boeotian Confederation after 447 is partially attested in a 
now well-known and extensively-studied fragment of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 
(P.Oxy. 842).260 The information is conveyed in a tangent to the narrative of the 
                                                
255 Larsen (1955). 
256 See Larsen (1945), 74 n. 55, and (1968), xiii, more generally: the lack of a written analysis of the 
Boeotian constitution does not mean one was not or could not have been written. 
257 Rhodes and Lewis (1997), 122. 
258 See esp. Roesch (1965), 46–71. 
259 Demand (1982), 37. 
260 The relevant chapter number has been revised with the discovery of new fragments and the 
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Behrwald [2005], 26): Grenfell and Hunt 11 = Bartoletti 16 = Chambers 19. Here I use the numbering 
of Bartoletti’s first, better Teubner edition. 
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developments of 395, at the start of what would become the Corinthian War. The 
unknown author was perhaps a contemporary of the constitution he discussed, 
although the word τότε at the start of the tangent is widely interpreted as suggesting 
that the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia itself was written after 387 and the dissolution of the 
Boeotian Confederation in the form described, with the author (P) reminding his 
audience that the constitutions described differed from the present-day arrangement 
of Boeotia.261 It is a moot point whether τότε should be taken in a limited sense, “at 
that particular time”, referring solely to 395 (in which case P obliquely 
acknowledged the possibility of constitutional developments between 447 and 395); 
or more generally, “in those days”, in which case we should take the constitution 
described as definitive for the full period. Neither case can be clearly proven. P 
describes, in a fairly terse sketch, both the local constitutions (τὰ ἴδια) of the 
individual poleis and the Confederate constitution (τὸ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν). In the 
interests of clarity I have quoted and translated the digression in full: 
εἶχεν δὲ τὰ πράγµατα τότε κα[τὰ τὴ]ν Βοιωτίαν οὕτως· ἦσαν 
καθεστηκυῖαι βουλαὶ [τό]ǁ‖τε τέττα[ρες παρ’ ἑ]κάστῃ τῶν πόλεων, ὧν 
οὐ[χ ἅπασι] τοῖς πολ[ίταις ἐξῆ]ν µετέχειν, ἀ[λλὰ] τοῖς κεκ[τηµένοις] 
πλῆθός τ[ι χρηµά]των, τούτων δὲ τῶν βουλῶ[ν κατὰ] µέρος ἑκάσ[τη 
προκ]αθηµένη καὶ προβουλεύ[ουσα] | περὶ τῶν π[ραγµά]των εἰσέφερεν 
εἰς τὰς τρε[ῖς, ὅτι] δὲ δόξε<ι>ε[ν] ἁπάσα[ι]ς τοῦτο κύριον ἐγίγνετο. κ[αὶ 
τὰ µὲν] ἴδια διετέλουν οὕτω διοικούµενοι, τὸ δὲ τῶ[ν Βοι]ωτῶν τοῦτον 
ἦν τὸν τρόπον συντεταγµένον. [καθ’ ἕν]δεκα µέρη διῄρηντο πάντες οἱ 
τὴν χώραν οἰκοῦν[τες,] | καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ἕνα παρείχετο βοιώταρχον 
[οὕτω·] Θηβαῖοι µὲν τέτταρα<ς> συνεβάλλοντο, δύο µὲν ὑπὲ[ρ τῆς] 
πόλεως, δύο δὲ ὑπὲρ Πλαταιέων καὶ Σκώλου καὶ Ἐρ[υ]θρῶ[ν] καὶ 
Σκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τῶν πρότερον µὲν ἐκείνοις 
συµπολιτευοµένων, τότε δὲ συντε|λούντων εἰς τὰς Θήβας. δύο δὲ 
παρείχοντο βοιωτάρχας Ὀρχοµένιοι καὶ Ὑσιαῖοι, δύο δὲ Θεσπιεῖς σὺν 
Εὐτρήσει καὶ Θίσβαις, ἕνα δὲ Ταναγραῖοι, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον Ἁλιάρτιοι 
καὶ Λεβαδεῖς καὶ Κορωνεῖς, ὃν ἔπεµπε κατὰ µέρος ἑκάστη τῶν πόλεων, 
τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐ|βάδιζεν ἐξ Ἀκραιφνίου καὶ Κωπῶν καὶ 
Χαιρωνείας. οὕτω µὲν οὖν ἔφερε τὰ µέρη τοὺς ἄρχοντας· παρείχετο δὲ 
καὶ βουλευτὰς ἑξήκοντα κατὰ τὸν βοιώταρχον, καὶ τούτοις αὐτοὶ τὰ καθ’ 
ἡµέραν ἀνήλισκον. ἐπετέτακτο δὲ καὶ στρατιὰ ἑκάστῳ µέρει περὶ χιλίους 
µὲν | ὁπλίτας, ἱππέας δὲ ἑκατόν· ἁπλῶς δὲ δηλῶσαι κατὰ τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ 
τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέλαυον καὶ τὰς ε[ἰ]σφορὰς ἐποιοῦντο καὶ δικασ<τὰς> 
ἔπεµπον καὶ µετεῖχον ἁπάντων ὁµοίως καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. 
τὸ µὲν οὖν ἔθνος ὅλον οὕτως ἐπολιτεύετο, καὶ τὰ συνέδρια | {και} τὰ 
κοινὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἐν τῇ Καδµείᾳ συνεκάθιζεν. 
                                                
261 Cartledge (2000), 400, argues for a date after the reformation of the Confederation in 378. I will 
follow standard practice in referring to the author as “P” (Papyrus), though Cratippus is now favoured 
by many as the author: on the disputed identification of the author (Ephorus, Theopompus, Androtion 
or Cratippus?), see Harding (1987), Cartledge (2000), 398. 
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At that time, affairs within Boeotia were thus: at that time, four councils 
had been established in each of the cities [poleis], which not all of the 
citizens could take part in, but only those with some degree of wealth. 
Each of those councils sitting in turn and prejudging matters took them to 
the [other] three [councils], and what they all decided became lawful. 
Their local affairs they continued to arrange thus, but the affair of the 
Boeotians had been arranged in this way: all those who lived in the 
region were divided into eleven parts [µέρη], and each of these parts 
provided one Boeotarch thus. The Thebans contributed four, two on 
behalf of their city, and two on behalf of the Plataeans, and Scolus, 
Erythrae and Scaphae and the other areas which had previously been a 
political unit with them [συµπολιτευοµένων], but were at that time 
considered part of Thebes. And the Orchomenians and Hysians provided 
two Boeotarchs, the Thespians with Eutresis and Thisbae two, the 
Tanagrans one, and the Haliartans, Lebadeans and Coroneans another, 
whom each of the cities sent in turn, and by the same way he [a 
Boeotarch] came from Acraephnium, Copae and Chaeroneia. 
So thus the parts sent their magistrates, and they provided as well sixty 
councillors per Boeotarch, and they financed them every day. The army, 
too, was assembled from each part at around a thousand hoplites and one 
hundred cavalry each; simply put, they drew upon the common resources 
and made contributions and sent judges according to their magistracies, 
and took part in everything equally, the good and the bad. So the entire 
race [ἔθνος] took part in the government, and the common congresses 
[συνέδρια] of the Boeotians sat on the Cadmea. (Hell. Oxy. 16.2–4) 
The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia has been lauded for illuminating the otherwise poorly-
attested political situation in Boeotia in the late fifth and early fourth centuries.262 
However, there is good reason to believe that the description here is incomplete. The 
Hellenica Oxyrhynchia states that there are four councils in each of the Boeotian 
poleis (16.2), but at the confederate level mentions only councillors (βουλευταί, 
16.4), sixty to each Boeotarch. Thucydides, however, has the Boeotarchs consult 
“the four councils of the Boeotians” on the matter of an alliance with Corinth and 
Argos in 421: 
πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι 
βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ 
παρῄνουν γενέσθαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ 
σφίσι ξυνοµνύναι. 
Before oaths were taken, the Boeotarchs communicated these proposals 
to the four councils of the Boeotians, which were in fact fully in charge, 
and advised them to take oaths with the poleis which were willing to 
swear to a defensive alliance between each other. (Thuc. 5.38) 
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On the basis of this evidence it seems that P neglected to mention both the four 
councils at the federal level and their importance within the Confederate 
government. It is possible that either Thucydides or the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia has 
misrepresented the situation due to a confusion between the local and confederate 
arrangements, but neither source contradicts the details presented in the other 
description;263 they are both simply partial discussions. We should therefore take 
caution with the assumption that the information in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia is a 
full discussion. In particular, we should not assume that P largely neglected the 
financial or judicial aspects of the Confederation because they were a small part of 
its functioning;264 his discussion in the section is focused on the archons and 
deliberative bodies, as those most relevant to his discussion of Boeotian factionalism 
in 395.265 His discussion here is therefore incomplete. 
According to the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, representation in the Confederate 
government was weighted towards certain cities. Each Confederate division (µέρος) 
provided one Boeotarch, sixty councillors, one thousand hoplite soldiers, one 
hundred cavalry soldiers, and an equal portion of jurors (δικασταί) and an equal 
contribution (εἰσφοραί) to the confederate treasury. Thebes, with two divisions 
(µέρη), contributed approximately 2200 hoplites and cavalry to the confederate 
army, but it also had six times the number of votes on the sovereign councils than 
those of Haliartus, Lebadea, Coronea, Acraephnium, Copae and Chaeronea, which 
shared two µέρη between six poleis. The nature of the shared divisions is not entirely 
clear: P states that the poleis in the two shared µέρη sent their Boeotarchs in turns, 
but it is possible that the other contributions (councillors, jurors, military and 
financial levies) were proportioned rather than provided in turns.266 The number 
sixty given for Confederate councillors would suit a proportional representation, as it 
is easily divisible as would be necessary: divided by the three cooperating poleis, 
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twenty councillors each were provided,267 giving five councillors from each polis to 
each of the four confederate councils.268 It is clear, however, that the Theban polis 
was substantially represented at all times in the sovereign councils. No other 
Boeotian polis is ascribed two unshared µέρη in P’s description.269 This alone would 
give Thebes a substantial advantage in confederate decision-making. 
The numbers were further stacked in Thebes’ favour. Thebes controlled a further two 
µέρη “on behalf of” (ὑπὲρ) Plataea et al. It is not clear what this might mean. 
Perhaps Thebes took on the administrative matters of electing Boeotarchs from the 
Plataean region when the Plataean government could no longer do so,270 given the 
destruction of the city at the end of the Theban and Spartan siege, but by 427 the 
majority of the Plataean citizen population had fled, while those who remained were 
killed and enslaved when Spartan and Theban forces took the city (Thuc. 2.6.4, 
3.68.3). A few Plataeans, loyal to the Spartans, and Megarians were briefly resettled 
in the ruins (Thuc. 3.68.3). The size of this new settlement was surely not 
comparable to Thebes or the combined populations of Thespiae, Eutresis and Thisbe, 
and yet it continued to hold two µέρη in the Confederate government. It is certainly 
dubious that this much-reduced Plataea, even with the smaller cities, could furnish 
2,000 hoplites and 200 cavalry.271 
It is generally assumed that Thebes’ involvement in Plataea’s representation in the 
Confederation dated to the fall of Plataea in 427.272 However, there is no evidence 
that Plataea was involved in the Confederation prior to 431: in fact, although the 
Theban attack on Plataea in 431 was led by two Boeotarchs, neither the Theban 
invitation to pro-Confederation Plataeans on their incursion in 431, nor the Theban 
                                                
267 Salmon (1985), 302. 
268 Glotz (1908), 277–78. Cartledge (2000), 405, argues for careful calculation in the development of 
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Plataeans resisted the Theban incursion (Thuc. 2.78.3). Amit (1973), 93–94, estimated 5,000 (total 
population), Hansen (1997, 27–28), 2,000 (citizens) at the start of the Peloponnesian War. 
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justification during the trial of the Plataeans (Thuc. 3.53–68) of their actions, implies 
that the Plataeans had previously been participants in the Confederation: 
καὶ ἀνεῖπεν ὁ κῆρυξ, εἴ τις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων 
Βοιωτῶν ξυµµαχεῖν, τίθεσθαι παρ᾽ αὑτοὺς τὰ ὅπλα. 
The herald announced that if anyone wanted to join the symmachy, 
according to the ancient traditions of all the Boeotians, they should take 
up arms. (Thuc. 2.2) 
εἰ δὲ ἄνδρες ὑµῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήµασι καὶ γένει, βουλόµενοι τῆς µὲν 
ἔξω ξυµµαχίας ὑµᾶς παῦσαι, ἐς δὲ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια 
καταστῆσαι, ἐπεκαλέσαντο ἑκόντες, τί ἀδικοῦµεν; 
If the first men in your city both in wealth and ancestry, wanting to stop 
your alliances (ξυµµαχίας) with outsiders and to give you over to the 
ancestral commonwealth of all Boeotians, voluntarily called on us, what 
wrong did we do? (Thuc. 3.65) 
Both statements appeal to the ancestral Boeotian ways. As already discussed in 
chapter one, this was a significant rhetorical point in the conflict between Thebes 
and Plataea. However, in the first statement, the herald’s words only invite Plataean 
citizens to fight with other Boeotians. Buck asserts that the meaning of these two 
passages was an invitation for Plataea to return to the Confederation.273 It is unusual 
for καθίστηµι to imply “return” or “restore” without πάλιν; such usage only occurs 
in poetry.274 Barring the assumption that Plataea was encouraged to join the 
Boeotian Confederation in 519, which is central to much scholarly interpretation of 
the 431 dispute, there is little evidence to suggest that the Plataeans had participated 
in the Boeotian Confederation in the sixteen years between 447 and 431, much less 
joined and left the Confederation in that short period.275 
There is thus no reason to believe that the Plataean divisions of the Confederation 
existed before the fall of Plataea in 427. It seems equally possible that the Plataean 
divisions were established later than the other federal divisions, and were always 
intended to be subject to Theban control.276 
The answer to the question of Plataea’s contributions to the Confederation after the 
Theban occupation, and a hint at Thebes’ involvement in the Plataean divisions, may 
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to the Confederation would have rested on the democratic nature of their government. 
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be found in the description of other subordinate towns in the region. P states, as cited 
above, that the Plataeans shared their two divisions with the people of Scolus, 
Erythrae and Scaphae. Based on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia’s evidence alone, many 
scholars proposed that Plataea led a small sympolity, a genuine federation of towns 
in southern Boeotia in the mid-fifth century.277 However, Scolus and Copae were 
both known to adhere rather more closely to Thebes than Plataea before the Battle of 
Coronea.278 We must therefore construct a Plataean federation which drew in smaller 
cities from the Theban sphere of influence, with no evidence for what would 
doubtless have been a substantial point of tension between Plataea and Thebes; we 
would expect it to be mentioned as one of the Plataean transgressions in Thucydides’ 
Plataean Debate. Moreover, the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia states that these smaller, 
unwalled cities were synoecised with Thebes at the beginning of the Peloponnesian 
War: 
ἀρξαµένων γὰρ ἀν[ταίρ]ειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ συνῳκίσθησαν 
[εἰ]ς αὐ|τὰς οἵ τ᾽ ἐξ Ἐρυθρῶν καὶ Σκαφῶν καὶ Σκώλου κα[ὶ Αὐ]λίδος καὶ 
Σχοίνου καὶ Ποτνιῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἑτέρων τοιούτων χωρίων, ἃ τεῖχος οὐκ 
ἔχοντα διπλασίας ἐποίησεν τὰς Θήβας. 
When the Athenians began to move against Boeotia the residents of 
Erythrae, Scaphae, Scolus, Aulis, Schoenus, Potnia and many other such 
towns without walls were synoecised to [Thebes], and doubled the size of 
Thebes. (17.3) 
As Bruce argues, this must have been in 431.279 The threat from Athens does not 
make sense as a motivation if these cities were dependent on Plataea, which was 
supported by the Athenians and not besieged by Spartan forces until 429 (Thuc. 
2.71). It is perhaps more logical to interpret the phrase τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τῶν 
πρότερον µὲν ἐκείνοις συµπολιτευοµένων, as “the other regions which previously 
shared citizenship with the former [i.e. Thebes]”, taking ἐκείνοις as a marked 
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protection. Larsen (1968), 34, implies that the µέρος of Plataea, Scolus, Erythrae and Scaphae was 
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demonstrative pronoun, “the former”; the contrast drawn then is not one of 
hegemons, but of the relationship with the hegemon Thebes: they had previously 
shared Theban citizenship (i.e. after the synoecism of 431), but were now only 
dependent on Thebes.280 The change in citizenship increased the value of Thebes’ 
representation within the Confederation, which had perhaps been reduced by the 
synoecism at the start of the Peloponnesian War.281 
Even the new settlement at Plataea was in existence only briefly; Thucydides 
mentions in the same sentence that explains the resettlement that Plataea was razed a 
year later (Thuc. 3.68.3). Thereafter Plataea became the property of Thebes, and the 
land was rented out to Theban farmers. Bruce has suggested that the income from 
these leaseholdings may have given these Theban farmers full franchise (cf. Hell. 
Oxy. 16.2).282 It is far from certain that income rather than property-owning was 
sufficient to meet the qualifications vaguely described in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 
but it is clear that the conquest of Plataea entailed substantial profit both for the 
Theban state and for individual Thebans. 
The particular success of the Plataean conquest was Thebes’ transformation of the 
eviction of the population of its southern neighbour into a constitutional acquisition 
within the Boeotian Confederation. The people of the Platais, having succumbed to 
the siege by 427, fled to Attica, where they were offered a form of Athenian 
citizenship.283 It seems that the Athenians did not believe that Plataean territory 
would be reconquered again any time soon. This, after all, was not the typical result 
of wars between Greek states: usually, affairs returned to the status quo ante, with 
the losing state making only a few concessions for peace to the victor (the final 
result of the Peloponnesian War was notably such, although only the insistence of 
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Sparta spared Athens from much harsher penalties). The Plataean flight was a 
marker of the unusual circumstances of the Peloponnesian War. 
The presumption that the burdens of extra representation would make the acquisition 
of Plataean territory undesirable relies on the assumption that these outweighed the 
benefits in terms of voting rights.284 It is important to note here that there is no 
indication that the µέρη were anything more than a means of apportioning 
representation at the federal level.285 Poleis with two µέρη, it seems, did not operate 
these divisions separately: there is no suggestion in P that the greater poleis were 
split geographically or politically for federal purposes, nor anything to suggest a 
natural bipartite division in Boeotian states (Boeotia, like many Aeolian-speaking 
regions, did not reflect the φυλή-divisions of Ionian and Dorian regions at this 
time).286 Thebes, as a whole, provided double the number of federal officials and 
contributed double the number of soldiers to the federal forces as its neighbour 
Thespiae. This renders P’s assertion that Thebes operated the former Plataean µέρη 
more complex: if the µέρη were not tied to a particular geographical region, nor to a 
specific body of citizens (the citizens of Plataea having in any case evacuated to 
Attica), then Thebes had simply doubled again its representation within the League. 
This did not entail the maintenance of the existing proportionality of Boeotian 
government, as the destruction of Plataea and the removal of Plataean citizens to 
Athens should have resulted in the abolition of the Plataean µέρη, which no longer 
offered the same resources for the Boeotian forces. The Theban appropriation of two 
extra µέρη was a simple consolidation of power. 
Theban gerrymandering has more readily been recognised in the representation of 
Orchomenus. The dynamics of sharing multiple divisions between multiple centres 
are even less clear in P’s description than the description of the shared single 
divisions. Larson has proposed that on establishing the Boeotian Confederation, 
Orchomenus controlled three federal µέρη, including the two smaller towns 
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Chaeronea and Hysiae/Hyettus.287 Chaeronea was later detached by the Thebans and 
turned into a µέρος beyond the control of Orchomenus, thus rendering Orchomenus 
much weaker in the Confederation. The evidence for this is rather indirect: 
Thucydides says that Chaeronea depended on Orchomenus in 424 (4.76.3), while in 
the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia Chaeronea was part of one of the two divided µέρη. 
Little noted is that Thucydides’ notice of Chaeronea as dependent says Χαιρονείαν 
δὲ, ἣ ἐς Ὀρχόµενον ... ξυντελεῖ, “Chaeronea, which depends upon Orchomenus”: 
note the present tense of ξυντελεῖ. Larsen’s proposals for the date of Thebes’ 
interference (which per se acknowledge Thebes’ power in the Confederation) 
associate it with the attack on Thespiae in 424.288 This cannot be the case unless 
Thucydides’ notice itself was written ca. 424 and escaped later revision. Moreover 
the detachment must then have involved the sudden promotion of Chaeronea’s 
partners (Acraephnium and Copae) from no representation at all to one third of a full 
share in the µέρος which P describes.289 The idea is tenuous on a number of grounds, 
not least the presumption that the reduction of Chaeronea was the most aggressive 
move which Thebes could make against Orchomenus.290 Chaeronea clearly would 
not have been able to assert its own independence even if was explicitly granted its 
own µέρος, or else it would not have been necessary to reduce it to only one third of 
a division. It seems more likely that Chaeronea had always been afforded a partial 
representation in the Confederation. 
It is equally agreed that Orchomenus retained two µέρη until 395. However, to have 
control of two divisions (equal to the representation of Thebes) Orchomenus must 
have dominated the second grouping of poleis given in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 
(after Thebes et al.), and here too there is difficulty. The papyrus names Hysiae, a 
small town south of Thebes and a thoroughly unlikely bedmate for Orchomenus, in 
the same grouping.291 The reading has consistently been corrected to refer to 
Hyettus,292 but the corruption from Ὑήττοι to Ὑσιαῖοι is thoroughly unlikely, and P 
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has not made any other glaring errors here. Hysiae should stand uncorrected. It may 
still be possible that Orchomenus and Hysiae formed a non-contiguous group within 
the confederation, as did Acraephnium, Copae and Chaeronea. However, the 
presumption that P’s conjunction of the two towns is meaningful does not bear up 
under scrutiny. Firstly, the conjunction καὶ in the two shared divisions apparently 
denoted equal representation. No two groupings, however, are described with exactly 
the same formulae; it cannot therefore be presumed that καὶ means an equal 
relationship in the Boeotian constitution.293 There is, therefore, no explicit 
information in the description regarding the relationship. Secondly, the list of 
groupings follows no particular order, so it is not impossible that P described 
Orchomenus and Hysiae together without intending to associate the two towns. 
On the whole it seems quite possible that the Boeotian constitution gave just one 
representative division to Orchomenus, with another given to the small town of 
Hysiae near Thebes, and one third of a division to Orchomenus’ dependent 
Chaeronea.  
Thebes therefore provided or controlled 240 out of the 660 councillors for the 
Confederate Council. Moreover, the councils met and the treasury was kept on the 
Theban acropolis, a fact which must have been advantageous to Thebes.294 Not only 
were Theban councillors more conveniently able to participate in council, but 
opponents of Thebes had to come into the heart of Theban territory in order to 
participate at all. If councillors were required to be resident at Thebes, the volatility 
of Boeotian politics made them effectively hostages. Larsen argues that the central 
location of Thebes made it the most convenient administrative capital.295 However, a 
central and neutral location in Boeotia was not impossible, for such was Onchestus 
when it became the federal capital in 338. The determination of Thebes as the federal 
capital was surely more to the advantage of Thebes than for the convenience of the 
other federal poleis.  
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A handful of supporting votes from each of the other districts would have given 
Thebes a majority at the council.296 Prevalent factionalism in Boeotia, even with the 
aggressive oligarchic constitutions, probably entailed a pro-Theban party in each 
polis; but this was certainly also a problem in Thebes too. With no information about 
the selection of councillors for each polis, however, we cannot assume that every 
councillor from Thebes was a supporter of the leading party. However, while the 
council seems to have been the sovereign body, much of the actual government of 
the Confederation fell to the college of eleven Boeotarchs. Larsen suggests that this 
was a practical response to the logistical difficulties of holding the council meetings 
at Thebes.297 This cannot, however, have been an unexpected or accidental aspect of 
the Confederate council. The operative powers of the Boeotarchs were carefully 
designed to place the majority of power with a very small group of people. Thebes’ 
control of four divisions would have provided a stronger presence within the college 
of eleven Boeotarchs. 
THE CONFEDERATION IN PRACTICE 
It seems that Boeotarchs did not expect their guidance to be rejected by the Boeotian 
federal councils.298 Thucydides records a proposed alliance between Boeotia, 
Corinth, Megara and Argos which failed when the Boeotian councils rejected the 
Boeotarch’s advice. This is the only account of the internal decision-making process 
of the Boeotian Confederation in practice; Thucydides makes it clear that the failure 
was exceptional: 
Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ 
Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θρᾴκης πρέσβεσιν ὀµόσαι ὅρκους ἀλλήλοις ἦ 
µὴν ἔν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀµυνεῖν τῷ δεοµένῳ καὶ µὴ πολεµήσειν τῳ 
µηδὲ ξυµβήσεσθαι ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώµης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς 
καὶ Μεγαρέας (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργείους σπένδεσθαι. 
πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὅρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι 
βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ 
παρῄνουν γενέσθαι ὅρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ 
σφίσι ξυνοµνύναι. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες οὐ 
προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες µὴ ἐναντία Λακεδαιµονίοις ποιήσωσι, 
τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφεστῶσι Κορινθίοις ξυνοµνύντες· οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ 
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βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίµονος, οἰόµενοι τὴν βουλήν, κἂν µὴ 
εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. 
In the meanwhile, the Boeotarchs, Corinthians, Megarians and the 
ambassadors from Thrace decided firstly to swear oaths with each other 
to give help as required and to not go to war or to peace without common 
consent, and thus the Boeotians and the Megarians (who were doing the 
same thing) would make treaty with the Argives; but before the oaths 
were done the Boeotarchs publicised these things to the four councils of 
the Boeotians, which are entirely sovereign, and advised them to make 
the oaths with the poleis which there willing to enter into defensive 
alliance with them. But the Boeotians in the councils did not approve the 
proposal, afraid that they might displease the Lacedaemonians by making 
treaty with the Corinthians who had deserted them. For the Boeotarchs 
had not explained to them what had happened at Lacedaemon … 
assuming that even if they did not say, the council would not vote for 
anything other than what they had decided and advised. (5.38) 
It is possible that the rejection represents a party conflict within Boeotia, but this is 
speculative.299 The failure did not come because the Boeotian council took exception 
to the Boeotarchs arranging foreign policy, but only because the Boeotarchs did not 
communicate an important piece of information. The reason which Thucydides 
gives, that they had not thought it necessary to explain the proposal, indicates that in 
the normal state of affairs the council generally ratified proposals from the 
Boeotarchs without question. Practical power in the Confederation lay with the 
Boeotarchs, a small college of eleven men, at least four of whom were Thebans. The 
selection process for the Boeotarchs is unclear, but it seems likely that they were 
more easily controlled by the Theban faction in power than the wider councils.  
In practice, a single Boeotarch often seems to have been plenipotentiary:300 the 
attack on Plataea in 431 was led by two Boeotarchs, not the full college (Thuc. 
2.2.1). In most cases the active Boeotarchs, where identifiable, were Theban. The 
Boeotarchs at Plataea, Pythangelus and Diemporus, are both known to be Thebans, 
leading an apparently Theban force, as was Scirphondas (Thuc. 7.30). Pagondas, the 
Theban Boeotarch at the Battle of Delium (here referred to as one of two Theban 
Boeotarchs), was hegemon at the time and therefore made the final decision to 
conduct the battle. The Boeotarchs who prevented Agesilaus from sacrificing at 
Aulis are not identified in Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.4), but Plutarch notes that Agesilaus 
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was “enraged at the Thebans” (τοῖς τε Θηβαίοις διωργισµένος, Ages. 6) for the 
intervention of the Boeotian officials. Only the Boeotarchs involved in the 
diplomatic mishaps at 5.37–38 are not named or limited; this may have been the full 
college. There is no individual Boeotarch who may be identified as non-Theban 
before the Peace of Antalcidas. Given the powers of the Boeotarchs, this makes 
evident the degree of agency which the Thebans possessed in the Confederation. 
In 423, the Thebans tore down the city walls of their neighbour Thespiae for its 
Atticism. Thucydides’ description of the act provides three illuminating details on 
the relationship between Thebes and Thesipae: 
ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιῶν τεῖχος περιεῖλον ἐπικαλέσαντες 
ἀττικισµόν, βουλόµενοι µὲν καὶ αἰεί, παρεσχηκὸς δὲ ῥᾷον ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐν 
τῇ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους µάχῃ ὅτι ἦν αὐτῶν ἄνθος ἀπωλώλει. 
In the same summer, the Thebans removed the wall from Thespiae, 
having accused them of Atticism, which they had been wanting to do 
forever, but it was then an easy matter, as the flower of their youth had 
died in the battle against the Athenians. (4.133.1) 
Firstly, the aorist aspect of ἐπικαλέσαντες implies that Atticism was not simply the 
pretext under which the Thebans acted at Thespiae, but an earlier complaint, perhaps 
even a formal charge made in the context of the Boeotian League or the Spartan 
alliance.301 Thucydides certainly implies that the charge is false by offering no 
substantiation of the Theban accusation nor of a swing in Thespian sentiments; he in 
fact highlights the recent Thespian losses in the anti-Athenian cause (at the Battle of 
Delium). Larsen suggests that the casualties may have reduced the strength of the 
oligarchs in Thespiae, but Thucydides mentions the losses only in terms of the 
advantage this gave Thebes.302 Atticism was eventually to come at Thespiae (in 414: 
Thuc. 6.95.2), in the form of an attempted democratic revolution which Thebes 
helped to suppress, but there is no evidence of such, as yet, in 423.303  
The destruction of the walls is unambiguously depicted as a direct act of the Thebans 
against the Thespians as a whole.304 There is no implication of a complicit party 
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Thebans “undoubtedly had secured in advance a federal judgement against the city”. 
302 Larsen (1968), 38. 
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within Thespiae, as there is when Thebes helped to suppress the democratic 
revolution in 414. In fact, the violence of the act is clearly indicated by Thucydides’ 
note that it was “even more easily achieved” when Thespiae’s military was already 
depleted by the heavy losses at Delium, but “even more” suggests that although 
Thebes (or perhaps Thucydides himself) expected resistance of some kind, it was not 
a concern sufficient to discourage Thebes’ attempt to dismantle the walls. 
The suggestion that Thebes was accomplishing something “they had always wanted” 
is clearly a hyperbole on Thucydides’ part (although one which acknowledges the 
antagonistic tendencies of neighbouring states). In particular, destruction of the walls 
was not a simple act of hostility: the destruction of the walls of Athens in 404 was 
not only a physical marker of Athenian defeat, but intentionally crippled Athenian 
defences and Athens’ ability to assert its autonomy. Thespiae was then Thebes’ 
closest neighbour, and without its walls could no longer be a potential safe haven for 
Atticist enemies, or anyone who wished to move against Thebes.305 The destruction 
of the walls was also an attack on the status of Thespiae: Greek discourse (if not 
actual Greek practice) placed a heavy emphasis on walls as a key feature of the 
autonomous polis.306 There was potentially as much symbolic as practical value in 
removing Thespiae’s walls. 
It must be concluded then that Thebes took an aggressive, and apparently unilateral, 
step to further disable the defences of its ally and closest neighbour without formally 
interfering with Thespiae’s autonomy or effecting any open change in the 
relationship. Although Thespiae maintained control over its own affairs, Thebes 
ensured that the government of the other city retained a particular form. These acts 
are that of an established dominant state towards its subject; tellingly, there is no 
mention of even token resistance actually occurring. The brevity of the description 
suggest that Thucydides found the event largely unremarkable, and even unimportant 
in the context of the Peloponnesian War. Such behaviour is to be expected of 
Thebes: here, Thucydides acknowledges with little hesitation Thebes’ position as the 
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long-standing hegemon within Boeotia. The aggression here, however, perhaps 
allowed Thebes to gain effective control of another two µέρη in the Confederation. 
THE LOCAL CONSTITUTIONS 
The Boeotian poleis all shared the same oligarchic constitution between 447 and 387 
(Hell Oxy. 16.2).307 There is no indication that this was necessitated by the 
arrangements of the Boeotian Confederation. Although Thucydides referred to the 
“four councils of the Boeotians” (5.38.2), parallel to the four councils in each of the 
poleis, the confederate and local governments do not seem to have depended on each 
other. Indeed the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia explicitly distinguished the local, but 
parallel, governments from the confederate government in its description of 
constitutional affairs in Boeotia. The Confederate government probably had the 
same restricted franchise as the local oligarchies (cf. Hell. Oxy. 16.2),308 and the 
representatives to the Confederate government were probably selected by the local 
governments, but neither of these is incompatible with idiosyncratic local 
constitutions. There is no reason then that the members of the Confederation all 
needed to have the same constitution. 
The circumstances of the foundation of oligarchies throughout Boeotia after Coronea 
are not clear. We must assume ex silentio that the oligarchic constitutions were 
established directly after Coronea: there is no direct evidence for constitutional 
reforms in Boeotia between 447 and 387.309 Obviously the restricted franchise 
benefited the oligarchs who had brought down the democracies.310 Prominent 
democrats, such as the Theban Ptoeodorus, seem to have gone into exile (Thuc. 
4.76.2). Parallel oligarchic constitutions perhaps provided a necessary degree of 
stability for cooperation between Boeotian states. A long history of pro- and anti-
oligarchic (or pro- and anti-democratic, or pro- and anti-Athenian/Spartan) 
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factionalism had been at the root of upheavals within various poleis, but they also 
affected interstate relations (cf. Hell. Oxy. 17.2). It is clear that factions with shared 
ideals cooperated across state borders; democracies neighbouring oligarchies 
destabilised oligarchic constitutions (and vice versa), providing support and if 
necessary a base of operations for disempowered discontents. Suppressing such 
factionalism helped to preserve the oligarchic ideals of the anti-Athenian rebels and 
of the Confederation as a whole. 
Not every polis, however, participated so willingly in the revolt against Athenian 
occupation in 447. Thespiae, for example, was not prominent in the revolt and was 
still accused of being pro-Athenian (i.e. pro-democratic) in 421. The oligarchic 
constitutions were greater impositions for some states than others, as the Athenian-
imposed democracies had been. Thebes, however, was aggressively involved in the 
establishment of the new oligarchies: Aristotle’s statement (Pol. 1302b) about 
Theban dissolution of the Athenian-imposed democratic constitution does not 
necessarily mean that Thebes was the first Boeotian polis to revolt, but implied a 
degree of deliberate action in the establishment of a new constitution, which cannot 
be demonstrated for the other Boeotian poleis. Thebes played an active role in the 
formation of the oligarchic constitutions which were imposed on all Boeotian states 
in the late fifth century. 
THEBES, BOEOTIA AND THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS 
Clear condemnation of the Boeotian Confederation as an imperialist enterprise is 
delivered by the discourse preceding the settlement of the King’s Peace or Peace of 
Antalcidas (the first of the attempts throughout the fourth century to establish a 
“common peace” in Greece, mooted 392–91, first executed in 386).311 Sparta, as 
προστάτης, aggressively applied the terms of this common peace, asserting the 
autonomy (αὐτονοµία) of all Greek states; Boeotia was explicitly included in this 
rearrangement of Greek interstate relationships over the objections of the Theban 
delegates. By examining the meaning of αὐτονοµία, and the characterisations of 
Xenophon and Andocides of Theban resistance to the terms of the Peace, it can be 
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seen that the Spartan arrangers of the Peace problematised not Boeotian federalism, 
but Thebes’ power within Boeotia, and identified the Boeotian Confederation as the 
mechanism by which Thebes was controlling other Boeotian poleis. 
The common peace, by its ideology, encompassed all Greek poleis; the Boeotian 
Confederation was not singled out by the terms. The terms of the Peace, dictated by 
the Persian king Artaxerxes, required that all Greek poleis “be permitted to be 
autonomous”, with certain substantial exceptions: 
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νοµίζει δίκαιον τὰς µὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ 
εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζοµενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας 
πόλεις καὶ µικρὰς καὶ µεγάλας αὐτονόµους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήµνου καὶ 
Ἴµβρου καὶ Σκύρου· ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων. 
King Artaxerxes thinks that it is just that the cities in Asia should be his, 
and Clazomenae and Cyprus in the islands, but the other Greek cities 
both great and small should be permitted to be autonomous, except 
Lemnus, Imbrus and Scyrus; these should be the Athenians’ as in the 
past. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.32) 
The terms of the Peace are sweeping, and identify only relationships which are 
exempt (recognising, incidentally, that those poleis were not autonomous and would 
continue to be so). There is nothing which specifically marks the Boeotian 
Confederation or any other specific target. Hansen has argued that the literal sense of 
the main clause was so broad that it would have dissolved almost any interstate 
relationship within Greece not specifically identified as exempt.312 It was therefore a 
matter of interpretation, dependent largely on the προστάτης’ – i.e. Sparta’s — 
vision of αὐτονοµία, which applied the Peace’s terms to Boeotia in particular. 
The critique of the Boeotian Confederation as a structure which diminished the 
autonomy of its members predated the peace conference of 386 by almost a decade. 
Lysander, standing beneath the walls of Haliartus in 395, during the early stages of 
the Corinthian War, first suggested that the Haliartians were oppressed; the Theban 
forces within the city immediately put down an apparently impromptu revolt: 
καὶ τὸ µὲν πρῶτον ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ἀφίστασθαι καὶ αὐτονόµους 
γίγνεσθαι· ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων τινὲς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τείχει διεκώλυον, 
προσέβαλε πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος.  
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Firstly he tried to persuade them to revolt and become autonomous. But 
when some of the Thebans who were inside the wall prevented them, he 
made an attack on the wall. (Xen. Hell. 3.5.18) 
The Orchomenians had already revolted (specifically from Thebes: Ὀρχοµενίους 
ἀπέστησε Θηβαίων, “he made the Orchomenians revolt from the Thebans”, Xen. 
Hell. 3.5.6).313 With Orchomenians in Lysander’s besieging force and Thebans 
inside Haliartus, the political situation leaves little doubt that Lysander envisioned a 
close relationship between Theban occupation and Haliartus’ apparent lack of 
autonomy. 
Spartan concerns must have been restated as part of the failed negotiations for 
common peace in 392–91, under the same general terms as finalised in 386. 
Andocides’ On the Peace provides an insight into the debate which is largely 
ellipsed by Xenophon, and Boeotia’s acquiescence (as Athenian allies in the 
Corinthian War) to the peace forms a major point of his rhetoric. He focuses solely 
on Orchomenus as the beneficiary of the autonomy clause: 
εἰ τοίνυν ἡµῖν τέ ἐστι τοῦτο παρὰ Λακεδαιµονίων, τὸ µηκέτι ἀδικεῖσθαι, 
Βοιωτοῖς τε δέδοκται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην ἀφεῖσιν Ὀρχοµενὸν 
αὐτόνοµον, τίνος ἕνεκα πολεµήσωµεν; 
If then we are promised by the Lacedaemonians that we will no longer be 
mistreated, and the Boeotians have decided to set Orchomenus free and 
make peace, why should we fight? (Andoc. 3.13) 
Βοιωτοὶ δ᾽ αὖ πῶς τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται; οἵτινες τὸν µὲν πόλεµον 
ἐποιήσαντο ἕνεκα Ὀρχοµενοῦ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιτρέψοντες αὐτόνοµον εἶναι, 
νῦν δὲ τεθνεώτων µὲν αὐτοῖς ἀνδρῶν τοσούτων τὸ πλῆθος, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐκ 
µέρους τινὸς τετµηµένης, χρήµατα δ᾽ εἰσενηνοχότες πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ 
δηµοσίᾳ, ὧν στέρονται, πολεµήσαντες δὲ ἔτη τέτταρα, ὅµως Ὀρχοµενὸν 
ἀφέντες αὐτόνοµον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται καὶ ταῦτα µάτην πεπόνθασιν· 
ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐῶσιν Ὀρχοµενίους αὐτονόµους εἰρήνην 
ἄγειν. οὗτοι δ᾽ αὖ τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ τὸν πόλεµον καταλύονται. 
In what circumstances are the Boeotians making peace? They made war 
because of Orchomenus, so as not to give it up to being autonomous, but 
now with the majority of its men dead, and a large part of its territory 
devastated, having expended much money both public and private, which 
is wasted, they have fought for four years and nevertheless permit 
Orchomenus to be autonomous and make peace and have suffered these 
things in vain, for they could have left the Orchomenians autonomous at 
the beginning and made peace. In this way they are ending the war. 
(Andoc. 3.20) 
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This does not necessarily imply that the Boeotian Confederation was offered an 
exception from the terms of the peace, as Athens and Persia were offered (limited) 
exceptions in 386.314 Orchomenus might have stood pars pro toto for all non-
autonomous Boeotian poleis, as it was clearly the most vocal dissident.315 More 
importantly, Orchomenus had already plainly ceased to cooperate with the rest of the 
Boeotian Confederation and had asserted independent policies, but had only gained  
its αὐτονοµία more recently, and by explicit grant.316 Perhaps, as seems to have been 
the case in Haliartus, Orchomenus was subject to a Theban garrison. 
The meaning of the statements is, however, obscured by Andocides’ use of Βοιωτοί 
throughout the speech. This by no means indicates that the Boeotian Confederacy as 
a whole was willing to release Orchomenus: with no evidence for any reversion of 
the ἀποστασία of Orchomenus between 395 and 392, the proposed terms of the 
peace settle the ongoing question of Orchomenus’ secession, already identified as 
“from Thebes” (Xen. Hell. 3.5.6, see above). Xenophon’s concluding remarks about 
the effectiveness of the King’s Peace repeat the same: 
προστάται γὰρ γενόµενοι τῆς ὑπὸ βασιλέως καταπεµφθείσης εἰρήνης καὶ 
τὴν αὐτονοµίαν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττοντες, προσέλαβον µὲν σύµµαχον 
Κόρινθον, αὐτονόµους δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων τὰς Βοιωτίδας πόλεις 
ἐποίησαν, οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύµουν, ἔπαυσαν δὲ καὶ Ἀργείους Κόρινθον 
σφετεριζοµένους, φρουρὰν φήναντες ἐπ' αὐτούς, εἰ µὴ ἐξίοιεν ἐκ 
Κορίνθου. 
For having become protectors of the peace which had been ordained by 
the King and establishing the autonomy in the poleis, they gained an ally, 
Corinth, and made the Boeotian poleis autonomous from the Thebans, for 
which they had long been eager, and stopped as well the Argives from 
appropriating Corinth by threatening to set a guard against them, unless 
they left Corinth. (Xen. Hell. 5.1.36)  
In light of the clear naming of Thebes, it is tenuous to suggest that the Spartan 
objection was to the concept of federalism. Andocides speaks in broader terms; 
Xenophon clearly indicates that Spartan concerns about Boeotian autonomy were 
directed at Thebes. It is disingenuous to suggest that Xenophon falsely presented 
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 98 
Thebes as Sparta’s concern when the only other source, Andocides, does not in fact 
contradict him. 
Thebes clearly conceded to the argument that the Boeotian states under the 
Confederation were not autonomous. Xenophon highlights, somewhat contrary to 
Andocides’ account of the early negotiations, Theban reservations about the terms of 
the Peace in 391:  
ἐφοβοῦντο … οἵ τε Θηβαῖοι, µὴ ἀναγκασθείησαν ἀφεῖναι τὰς Βοιωτίδας 
πόλεις αὐτονόµους 
The Thebans, too, were afraid that they would be forced to allow the 
Boeotian poleis to be autonomous. (Hell. 4.8.15) 
Fundamental to Theban fears is the admission that the Boeotian poleis could validly 
be identified as non-autonomous. Such fears confirm that not only Orchomenus was 
at stake in these negotiations. The Thebans made a token attempt again to resist the 
terms of the peace in 387: 
καὶ οἱ µὲν ἄλλοι ἅπαντες ὤµνυσαν ἐµπεδώσειν ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι 
ἠξίουν ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν ὀµνύναι. ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος οὐκ ἔφη 
δέξασθαι τοὺς ὅρκους, ἐὰν µὴ ὀµνύωσιν, ὥσπερ τὰ βασιλέως γράµµατα 
ἔλεγεν, αὐτονόµους εἶναι καὶ µικρὰν καὶ µεγάλην πόλιν. οἱ δὲ τῶν 
Θηβαίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεσταλµένα σφίσι ταῦτ' εἴη. Ἴτε νυν, 
ἔφη ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, καὶ ἐρωτᾶτε· ἀπαγγέλλετε δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ταῦτα, ὅτι εἰ 
µὴ ποιήσουσι ταῦτα, ἔκσπονδοι ἔσονται. οἱ µὲν δὴ ᾤχοντο. ὁ δ' 
Ἀγησίλαος διὰ τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἔχθραν οὐκ ἔµελλεν, ἀλλὰ πείσας 
τοὺς ἐφόρους εὐθὺς ἐθύετο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐγένετο τὰ διαβατήρια, 
ἀφικόµενος εἰς τὴν Τεγέαν διέπεµπε τῶν µὲν ἱππέων κατὰ τοὺς 
περιοίκους ἐπισπεύσοντας, διέπεµπε δὲ καὶ ξεναγοὺς εἰς τὰς πόλεις. πρὶν 
δὲ αὐτὸν ὁρµηθῆναι ἐκ Τεγέας, παρῆσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι λέγοντες ὅτι ἀφιᾶσι 
τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόµους. καὶ οὕτω Λακεδαιµόντιοι µὲν οἴκαδε ἀπῆλθον, 
Θηβαῖοι δ' εἰς τὰς σπονδὰς εἰσελθεῖν ἠναγκάσθησαν, αὐτονόµους 
ἀφέντες τὰς Βοιωτίας πόλεις.  
And all the other states swore to observe these terms, but the Thebans 
claimed the right to swear on behalf of all the Boeotians. However 
Agesilaus refused to accept their oath, unless they swore, just as the 
king’s letter said, that any polis, small or great, would be autonomous. 
The Theban ambassadors said that this was not what they had been 
arranged to do. “Go now,” Agesilaus said, “and ask. Announce this to 
them as well: that unless they do this, they will be outside the treaty.” So 
they did go, but Agesilaus out of hatred for the Thebans did not wait for 
them, but persuaded the ephors and immediately made the sacrifices for 
war. When his offerings were favourable, he came to Tegea and sent 
around some horsemen to speed up the perioeci, and he also sent hiring 
agents to the cities. Before he could set out from Tegea, though, the 
Thebans arrived saying that they were releasing the poleis to autonomy. 
And thus the Lacedaemonians returned home, and the Thebans were 
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forced to come into the treaty, leaving the Boeotian cities autonomous. 
(Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–33) 
The claim to the right to swear for all the Boeotians is an oddity. Cartledge has 
suggested that the Thebans in principle now saw the Boeotian states as a single 
polis.317 If Thebes now wished to present the Confederation as a new polis, it was 
not one which resulted from συµπολιτεία: most telling was the (unstated) absence of 
any other Boeotian representatives at the peace conference.318 There is, however, no 
evidence for any wider discourse regarding merging Boeotian poleis. Quite aside 
from the continuing use of the plural poleis to refer to Boeotia, in discussions and 
elsewhere, Xenophon reports no actual attempt to justify Thebes’ claim. In fact, the 
ambassadors’ protestations that they had not been sent to swear the exact words of 
the autonomy clause of the treaty suggest that Thebes hoped (perhaps against hope) 
to swear to the peace without actually swearing to grant autonomy to the Boeotian 
states.319 The speedy acquiescence thereafter suggests that they had no particular 
rhetoric to defend their relationship with the Boeotian poleis.320 The Thebans 
acknowledged, as early as 392, that the Boeotian Confederation interfered with the 
autonomy of its other members, and that this was due to Thebes’ construction of the 
Confederation. 
It is important then to consider what exactly the principle of autonomy was, and how 
Thebes oppressed the autonomy of the other Boeotian poleis. Αὐτονοµία is not 
strictly the same thing as “autonomy”. To begin with, αὐτονοµία was not 
fundamental to statehood; i.e. αὐτόνοµος πόλις is not a pleonasm.321 On the one 
hand, Ostwald concluded that αὐτονοµία referred to the ability to make some 
decisions, particularly internal ones, independently, and that the presence of a 
hegemon did not strictly interfere with the principle of autonomy.322 With such an 
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clauses, although it would have been high sophistry (or impiety: Keen [1995], 114) to avoid the 
clause on these grounds. 
320 Hansen (1996), 129, claims that the Thebans had nothing to fear if they believed the Boeotian 
states to be αὐτονοµοί. This is a difficult counterfactual; Lysander at Haliartus and the negotiations of 
392–91 had surely already asserted Sparta’s position on Boeotian αὐτονοµία. 
321 Hansen (1995a), 21–43. 
322 Ostwald (1982). 
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interpretation the condemnation of the Boeotian Confederation in the fourth century 
is a clear indication that Thebes was overreaching. On the other hand, Hansen has 
argued against the communis opinio that αὐτονοµία was something less than absolute 
independence, particularly in the case of the King’s Peace.323 However, the 
suggestion that “everybody seems to agree that autonomia is incompatible with 
being a member state of a federation” lacks evidence.324 The only examples which 
Hansen can adduce relate to Boeotia, and are insufficiently clear to define a 
principled juxtaposition of federalism and autonomy. The sources do not identify the 
cooperative aspect of Boeotian interstate relations as the problem. Autonomy was 
the sole cause of Spartan consternation. Our sources are more expansive on the 
application of autonomy to the other participants in the Corinthian War: the 
συµπολιτεία of Argos and Corinth, which Sparta classified as Argive 
“appropriation” of Corinth (Xen. Hell. 5.1.36, see above), is specifically addressed. 
In the second iteration of the Peace, in 371, the συµµαχία of the Second Athenian 
Confederacy was problematised (though the charter recognised members’ 
autonomy).325 No more definitive issue is given in the consideration of Boeotia: 
Thebes oppressed the Boeotian states before the King’s Peace; afterwards, it 
stopped. The internal process is hidden from history. 
Analysis of Theban control of Boeotia as imperialist was persistent, and Xenophon 
clearly linked Thebes’ treatment of Boeotia with Greek analysis of imperialism. In 
the Memorabilia, Xenophon presents a conversation between Socrates and Pericles 
the Younger, which includes the following characterisation of the relationship 
between Thebes and Boeotia: 
Οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει µὲν οὐδὲν µείους εἰσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι 
Βοιωτῶν; 
Οἶδα γάρ, ἔφη.  
Σώµατα δὲ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ πότερον ἐκ Βοιωτῶν οἴει πλείω ἂν 
ἐκλεχθῆναι ἢ ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν;  
Οὐδὲ ταύτῃ µοι δοκοῦσι λείπεσθαι. 
Εὐµενεστέρους δὲ ποτέρους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι νοµίζεις; 
                                                
323 Hansen (1995a). 
324 Hansen (1995a), 35. 
325 For the charter, see Diod. 15.28.4. 
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Ἀθηναίους ἔγωγε· Βοιωτῶν µὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ πλεονεκτούµενοι ὑπὸ 
Θηβαίων δυσµενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν, Ἀθήνησι δὲ οὐδὲν ὁρῶ τοιοῦτον. 
“Do you not think,” he [Socrates] said, “that the Athenians are no less in 
numbers than the Boeotians?” 
“I do,” he [Pericles] said. 
“And do you think that more noble and good bodies could be chosen 
from the Boeotians than the Athenians?” 
“They do not seem to me to be left behind in that.” 
“Which do you think are more friendly to each other?” 
“The Athenians, for my part; for many of the Boeotians, suffering from 
Theban greed, dislike them, while I see no such thing in Athens.” (Xen. 
Mem. 3.5.2) 
The term πλεονεξία, “greed”, is a matter of moral philosophy, although it is not at all 
unusual in historiography.326 Plato’s Gorgias makes evident the ties between the 
verb πλεονεκτέω and the root πλέον ἔχειν, “to have more”, and the dysphemistic 
nature of this term:327 
ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωµενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας 
πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα µὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ 
ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ πλέον τῶν ἄλλων 
ζητεῖν ἔχειν· 
[The weak] frighten the stronger people and those able to have more, in 
order that they not get more than themselves; they say that it is shameful 
and unjust to be greedy, and that this is injustice, to seek to have more 
than others. (483c) 
LSJ specifically glosses the Xenophontic passage as “being overreached or 
defrauded by” the Thebans.328 Balot, however, has demonstrated that greed was one 
of the moral underpinnings of Greek historical analysis of imperialism from the fifth 
century onwards. This appears throughout Herodotus, and very tellingly in 
Thucydides: πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἡ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιµίαν, “the 
cause of all of this was rule for the sake of greed and ambition” (3.82.8, on 
Corcyra).329 At Athens, Pericles was a force of moderation.330  
                                                
326 LSJ s.v. πλεονεξία and πλεονεκτέω, with examples there. 
327 See Balot (2001), 5–7, for an exegesis of greed in the Gorgias. Plato does continue to specifically 
link “having more” with “ruling” (483d). 
328 LSJ s.v. πλεονεκτέω II a. 
329 See Balot (2001), ch. 4, on greed and imperialism in Herodotus, ch. 5 on Thucydides. 
330 Balot (2001), 172–73. 
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It seems clear then that Xenophon’s description of Theban “greed” was not an 
abstract or general critique of Thebes’ treatment of Boeotia. In the scope of interstate 
relations “greed” or “the desire to have more” was an indicium of imperialist 
tendency; Xenophon uses terminology which implicitly compares Thebes with his 
own earlier discussion of Athenian greed and imperialism implicit in his attempts to 
disprove accusations of greed leveled at Socrates and to distance his mentor from the 
greedy imperialist Alcibiades.331  
The supposed date of the conversation is unclear: Xenophon says only “once”, ποτε 
(3.5.1). The obvious terminus ante quem is Pericles the Younger’s execution after 
the Battle of Arginusae; the suggestion at 3.5.4 that the Boeotians almost threaten to 
overrun Attica on their own power suggests a point in the Decelean War. However, 
it seems more likely that the conversation is a work of historical fiction which is not 
intended to really reflect an exact point in time. The passage in many ways seems to 
presuppose the political situation of the Theban hegemony after Leuctra; we might 
assume therefore that the passage was written after 371. However, in the use of 
Socrates and Pericles the Younger the passage clear allows us to see the discussion 
here as an analysis of Thebes’ position in the Boeotian Confederation at the time of 
the Peloponnesian War. In the memory of the mid-fourth century, Thebes had been 
imperialist in the fifth century. 
CONCLUSION 
The weight of power was unambiguously given to Thebes in the supposedly 
equitable regional government of Boeotia in the mid-Classical period. Thebes held 
outright a near-majority of four divisions in the federal councils and the college of 
Boeotarchs. The attack on Thespiae in 423 may have been an attempt to coerce the 
Thespians into following Thebes more closely, giving it effective control over 
another two divisions. Everything about the structure of the Boeotian Confederation 
was designed to diminish opposition to Thebes’ control, from the use of the Theban 
acropolis as the capital, to the division of representation in other poleis, to the 
oligarchic constitutions established in Boeotia after the Battle of Oenophyta. 
                                                
331 Balot (2001), 230–31. Xenophon also distances Socrates from Critias. 
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Interference in internal affairs constitutes Finley’s second criterion; Thebes 
moreover appropriated part of the local governments of the Boeotians to its own 
acropolis, as part of a federal government structure which was under its own control. 
The use of Boeotian troops throughout the period, often apparently under Thebes’ 
command, was a form of economic exploitation (Finley’s sixth criterion); the nature 
of payments to the federal treasury alluded to in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, and 
what they were used for, is too unclear to state with certain whether the fourth 
criterion, payment of ‘tribute’, was or was not true in Boeotia. 
It is frequently held that the Boeotian confederation was a voluntary union. It might 
more accurately be described as one in which the members were not seen to object. 
The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia states only that “the entire ἔθνος was thus involved in 
the government [ἐπολιτεύετο]”. When they did object, as Thespiae and Orchomenus 
seem to have done, Thebes freely employed force in order to maintain its control. In 
the Corinthian War, Spartan rhetoric consistently objected to Thebes’ relationship 
with the Boeotian poleis as interference in their autonomy. It is clear that it was this 
relationship, and not the concept of federal relationships, which Sparta found 
objectionable. Sparta aggressively campaigned to end Thebes’ control of Boeotia, 
and ultimately succeeded. Perhaps due to Spartan rhetoric, Greek memory of the 
Classical Boeotian Confederation seems to identify Thebes as imperialist. 
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4  
MAD HERACLES: THEBES AND BOEOTIAN 
COOPERATIVE COINAGE 
The coinage of Boeotia in most modern scholarship is intimately tied up with the 
discussion of the Boeotian Confederation. From the earliest issues it is clear that the 
Boeotian poleis did not mint their coinage entirely independently: in particular, the 
common weight standard and the shared iconography, particularly the so-called 
“Boeotian shield”, indicate a monetary union in Boeotia. However, the numismatic 
evidence for Boeotia is so problematic that it must be treated carefully. 
The dating of Boeotian coinage is notoriously difficult:332 the Boeotian poleis seem 
to have take to coinage with some gusto, producing over a hundred different coinage 
types in under two centuries.333 This is even more striking considering that almost 
every Boeotian coin bore the same shield symbol (the so-called “Boeotian shield”) 
on one side; diversification was largely limited to the reverse. Find context has 
provided very little grounds on which to date the bredth of Boeotian coinage; Head’s 
On the Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Boeotia (1881), which remains the 
standard (and most thorough) discussion of Boeotian coinage to date, dated the coins 
largely on stylistic grounds. Recent revisions have heavily condensed the earlier 
stages of Head’s timeline, and suggested a number of simplifications.334 However, as 
Hansen has pointed out, Head’s discussion especially of the chronology of coins was 
heavily influenced by his understanding of the historical situation in Boeotia, i.e. on 
non-numismatic evidence brought to bear on monetary evidence without any definite 
relationship between the two.335 Unlike Athenian coinage, there is no body of 
evidence from inscriptions or literary sources which relates to Boeotian coinage in 
this period. We cannot be confident about anything more than a very general 
progression of coin types. There is therefore an alarming tendency towards circular 
                                                
332 Larson (2007), 71–73. 
333 Head counts 81 different types of stater and drachma between the first issues and 379 (1881, 9–
60), after which individual Theban magistrates seem to have taken on the responsibility of issuing 
coins for Boeotia, resulting in a large number of very similar issues (see Head 1881, 61–72). 
334 Larson (2007), 68–71. 
335 Hansen (2004), 432–33. 
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or near-circular arguments on Boeotian history based on numismatic “evidence”: for 
example, the Tanagran issues, noteably with both ethnic and civic inscriptions,336 
have been taken as evidence for the rise (real or aspirational) of Tanagra in the 
second quarter of the fifth century: what evidence is there to date these coins apart 
from a little dubious literary evidence on Tanagra at the time? Hansen suggests that 
these, along with the so-called “independent issues” dated by Head to the period 
after the Peace of Antalcidas, were probably minted and circulated over a broader 
period than the precise dates suggested by Head. 
Although it has long been recognised that the monetary evidence of Boeotia requires 
reevaluation, a full revision of the coinage remains to be done, and is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. For this reason, and considering the widely-acknowledged 
problems of numismatic evidence in general for historical analysis, I deviate from 
the typical approach of modern historians of Boeotia and consider Boeotian coinage 
on its own merits as much as possible. Here I will discuss mainly those things which 
can be firmly established from the coinage: the development of the Boeotian 
monetary union and the interpretation of the iconography. 
BOEOTIAN MONETISATION, CA. 525 BCE 
Between the explosion of coinage in Greece (ca. 550) and the end of the Archaic 
Period,337 Aeginetan coinage perhaps served as the common-use coinage within 
Boeotia.338 However in the second half of the sixth-century, Boeotian poleis began to 
issue their own coinage in a massive proliferation.339 For the most part, each polis 
produced its own coinage, bearing legends with the civic (usually abbreviated). 
However, all Boeotian coinage was produced on the same weight-standard as 
                                                
336 Boeotian coins sometimes bore the name of the polis, sometimes of the ἔθνος, sometimes both. In 
keeping with my general practice (see p. 3 n. 15), I refer to polis legends as civic, not ethnic, legends. 
337 On the date for the Greek adoption of coinage, see Schaps (2004), 93–96 (for a date ca. 620, based 
on electrum coinage from the Artemisium at Ephesus) and 101–102 (for a date in the early sixth 
century, based on the later Greek tradition of Pheidon of Argos as the inventor of coinage).  
338 Head (1881), 9. The two earliest known coin hoards from Boeotia (IGCH 59, 65), both from the 
mid-fourth century, predominately feature coins from the Boeotian poleis, but IGCH 59 also contains 
34 Aeginetan staters, the heaviest representation by far of any non-Boeotian mint. 
339 Larson (2007), 68. Head’s early sixth-century dating of the first Boeotian issues (1881, 3, 9–12) is 
now widely rejected for a later date: Kraay (1976), 109; his thesis of a gradual development of issues, 
beginning with Tanagra, Thebes and Haliartus, although not accepted by Larson, still has some 
currency. 
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Aeginetan coinage (a 6.2gm drachm). More significantly, although the Boeotian 
coin-types often bore some civic iconography, almost Boeotian coinage until the 
Hellenistic period bore on one side a distinctively-shaped shield, with the exception 
of coins from Orchomenus (signed ΕΡΧ for Ἐρχόµενος, the Boeotian name of the 
polis). Many types, assigned by Head to earlier periods, also bore an incuse mill-sail 
shape already well-known from the coinage of Aegina; in these types only the civic 
mint-mark indicated that the coins came from a particular polis.  
The common characteristics of Boeotian coinage leave little doubt that the most of 
the Boeotians were in a monetary union from the very first issues. Overwhelmingly 
these have been used as evidence for the early Boeotian confederation. Mackil and 
Van Alfen have argued extensively that federal structures were just one possible 
reason for a monetary union; given that there is little other evidence for Boeotian 
confederation during the development of common Boeotian coinage, it is not 
necessarily true that the coinage reflects wider political organisation.340 This does 
not preclude the leadership of Thebes in monetisation. The motivation for beginning 
to produce local coinage is unclear:341 it was perhaps the expression of a new 
federation,342 or a celebratory issue for the Pamboeotia festival held at the sanctuary 
of Athena Itonia.343  
In either case it must be acknowledged that the coinage expressed Boeotian unity 
(whether forced or not); it is important to examine the use of iconography on these 
first issues, for even in the Archaic Period coinage was a prevalent resource 
(χρήµατα in Greek, which increasingly took on the meaning “money” in the 
Classical Period),344 and its circulation involved the daily reproduction of the issuing 
body’s iconography. Coinage, perhaps more than any other common-use functional 
item in the Archaic and Classical Greek world, asserted the authority of the state; 
when this was not a polis but a super-civic body it was even more important to 
reassert a guarantor and testify to the weight-standard of the coinage. 
                                                
340 Mackil and van Alfen (2006), 202–3. 
341 The monetisation of Boeotia is a somewhat separate issue; many if not most Greek poleis began to 
issue their own coinage by the end of the Archaic Period, rather than rely on a flow of coinage from 
trade with other poleis. 
342 Head (1881), 10; Larsen (1968), 29. 
343 Larson (2007), ch. 3. 
344 Von Reden (2011), 6. 
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Due to the lack of clear evidence for this early period, much of the discussion of the 
process by which Boeotian poleis began to mint similar coins locally must remain 
speculative. In this section, I attempt to establish a few possibilities based on the 
features of the coinage: firstly, I investigate the origins of the Aeginetan influence on 
the weight-standard and iconography, and the significance of shared coinage for 
Boeotian trade; secondly, I investigate the choice of iconography to represent 
Boeotia on its coinage. In both cases I argue that the influence of Thebes is clear. 
Thebes had the strongest ties to Aegina in the late Archaic period, while the so-
called “Boeotian shield”, which remained the symbol of Boeotian coinage for 
centuries, has the most indentifiable significance outside of coinage for Thebes. 
a. Aeginetan Influence and Boeotian Markets 
Greek tradition from the fourth century associated the invention of silver coinage 
with the rule of Pheidon of Argos, who in these tales (and only these tales) was also 
the ruler of Aegina. In this tradition, Aeginetans were the minters par excellence of 
the Archaic Aegean.345 It may be, as Head originally speculated, that Aeginetan 
experts were brought in to conduct the first issues of Boeotian coinage.346 There is 
no particular evidence for this apart from the Aeginetan characteristics on Boeotian 
coinage, but the use of the Aeginetan weight standard, the Aeginetan mill-sail 
incuse,347 and the turtle-ish shape of the Boeotian shield give the early issues a 
broadly Aeginetan flavour.348 These characteristics are enough to prompt 
investigation into the ties between Aegina and Boeotia in the period.  
Head has speculated that Orchomenus was perhaps key to the involvement of 
Aeginetans in the first program:349 Strabo (8.6.3, 14) attests that “Minyan 
Orchomenus”, along with Aegina and five other poleis from the Saronic Gulf formed 
the amphictyony which governed the sanctuary of Poseidon on Calauria (off the 
coast of Troezen). Orchomenus was by far the most distant of these states, although 
                                                
345 Kagan (1960) is the classic discussion of the many issues with the story of Pheidon, not least is the 
exact date of his rule; see also Kagan (1982); Kroll and Waggoner (1984) are ill-convinced. Von 
Reden (2011), 71–72, on the significance of Aegina’s role in trade. 
346 Head (1881), 10. 
347 See e.g. Seltman (1955), 38. 
348 Larson (2007), 75, who sees this as simply a matter of imitation. 
349 Head (1881), 9. 
 108 
the cult of Poseidon was prominent in Boeotia generally.350 However, Orchomenus’ 
access to the sea, fairly essential for their involvement in the amphictyony, ended in 
the eighth century and has itself been used as a limit for the dating of the 
amphictyony.351 There must have been some form of contemporary contact, for the 
Orchomenian representation of the mill-sail developed as the Aeginetans changed 
the style of their incuse.352 Moreover, Orchomenus did not participate in the 
common issues of the Archaic Period; the independent Orchomenian series, without 
the Boeotian shield, is used as evidence for Orchomenus’ non-participation in the 
confederation in general until after the Persian Wars.353 
What is attested is a close relationship between Thebes and Aegina around the late 
sixth century. Herodotus claims that the Thebans sought out an alliance with Aegina 
in order to seek revenge on the Athenians in 506 (5.81–87). Aegina had a long 
history of rivalry with Athens and was a logical choice of ally for such a mission, but 
Herodotus makes no appeal to logic in his explanation: instead, he cites an 
aetiological myth: Ἀσωποῦ λέγονται γενέσθαι θυγατέρες Θήβη τε καὶ Αἴγινα, “they 
say that Thebe and Aegina are the daughters of Asopus [the deification of the river 
south of Thebes]” (5.80.1). This is not a purely Herodotean invention: the same myth 
is referred to by Pindar in his Isthmian 8 (ca. 478): 
χρὴ δ᾽ ἐν ἑπταπύλοισι Θήβαις τραφέντα 
Αἰγίνᾳ Χαρίτων ἄωτον προνέµειν,  
πατρὸς οὕνεκα δίδυµαι γένοντο θύγατρες Ἀσωπίδων  
ὁπλόταται , Ζηνί τε ἅδον βασιλέϊ.  
ὃ τὰν µὲν παρὰ καλλιρόῳ  
Δίρκᾳ φιλαρµάτου πόλιος ᾤκισσεν ἁγεµόνα·  
σὲ δ᾽ ἐς νᾶσον Οἰνοπίαν ἐνεγκὼν 
κοιµᾶτο 
A man nursed in seven-gated Thebes to Aegina must offer first the 
Graces’ flower; for they [i.e. the eponymous nymphs Thebe and Aegina] 
were twin daughters of one father, youngest of the Asopids; and they 
pleased king Zeus. One of these [Thebe] did he settle by Dirce’s lovely 
waters, queen of this city of charioteers, but you [Aegina] he carried to 
Oenopia’s isle and wedded.” (Pind. Isthm. 8.16) 
                                                
350 CB 2:206–25 enumerates a number of sanctuaries to Poseidon in Boeotia. 
351 Breglia (2005). 
352 Head (1881), 9. 
353 Head (1881), 19–20. 
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A special relationship between Thebes and Aegina would go some way to explaining 
the presence of Aeginetan symbols on Boeotian coinage. The myth of Thebe and 
Aegina is clearly propagandic.354 It is significant that in both Herodotus’ story and 
Pindar’s myth there is a clear directionality: the Thebans seek out the Aeginetans, 
the nymph Aegina was of Boeotian origin and taken away by Zeus to her island. In 
both cases the story tries to bring Aeginetan ties into Boeotia. Moreover, in 
Herodotus’ tale Thebes does not initially understand the Pythia’s reference to 
Aegina, instead assuming that it refers to her “usual allies”: Aegina is therefore 
framed as a new contributor to the standing Boeotian community. 
Literary evidence attesting to a popular recognition of links between Thebes and 
Aegina shortly after the time that Boeotian coinage develops suggests that the 
Aeginetan features of Boeotian coinage were at least active imitation, if not the full 
participation speculatively suggested by Head. If we recognise the Aeginetan 
features in Boeotian coinage, then it is important to note that the links known to us 
are specifically between Thebes and Aegina. This suggests that Thebes took an 
active role in the creation of Boeotian coinage. 
The common weight standard of Boeotian coinage allowed for the seamless 
replacement of Aeginetan coinage with local coinage of the same standard. The 
reasons for the monetary union are, like much of the cooperation, obscure, but it 
seems highly unlikely that the coinage was produced for the taxation or 
recompensation in the federal government.355 However, we can suggest that it 
created a common market of tender: as long as every polis accepted that the coins of 
its fellow poleis were minted to the same standards, the coinage was largely 
interchangeable between the neighbouring states of Boeotia.356 Such an economic 
commune was highly unusual in the Archaic Period: in particular, it is worth noting 
that all the regions near Boeotia (with the exception of Delphi) employed different 
standards, thus requiring at least mathematical if not more physical exchange of 
                                                
354 Demand (1982), 29, argues that the poem reflects Thebes’ post-war attempts to reestablish old 
political relationships, cf.  
355 Pace Mackil and Van Alfen (2006), 223–24. 
356 Von Reden (2011), 20, notes that a common weight standard was atypical of the central and 
northern Greek ἔθνη. 
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coinage.357 The strategy of adaptating weight standards to encourage trade between 
particular areas in the Archaic Period is suggested by the reports that Solon reformed 
Athens’ weight standards in the very early sixth century ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 10).358 
Thebes, positioned at the crossroads of the passages between southern and northern 
Greece and the inland road from Tanagra and Euboea, would have profited most 
from an invigoration of internal Boeotian trading. The use of Aeginetan weight 
standards may also have opened up trade with other Aeginetan-standard areas. 
b. The Boeotian Shield  
With the sole exception of Orchomenus’ issue,359 all Boeotian issues until the mid-
fifth century adopted the same type, with a distinctively-shaped shield on the 
obverse, almost circular with semi-circular openings at the mid-point of the flat rim 
on either side, and an Aeginetan mill-sail incuse on the reverse (see Figure 2a–f).360 
The distinctively-shaped shield has been so strongly associated with Boeotia that 
shields of this type in modern scholarship are generally referred to as “Boeotian 
shields”, even when the shield is largely devoid of Boeotian context. There is no 
evidence from the ancient world which associated the Boeotians with a particular 
shield-type;361 it is possible that this is the shield which was called “ox-hide”, βοῦς 
or βοείη in Homer, for the presumed material of the shield.362 Indeed, the shield of 
Ajax fashioned by a (Boeotian?) man from Hyle is described as a tower shield: 
Αἴας δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠΰτε πύργον 
χάλκεον ἑπταβόειον, ὅ οἱ Τυχίος κάµε τεύχων 
σκυτοτόµων ὄχ᾽ ἄριστος Ὕλῃ ἔνι οἰκία ναίων, 
ὅς οἱ ἐποίησεν σάκος αἰόλον ἑπταβόειον 
ταύρων ζατρεφέων, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὄγδοον ἤλασε χαλκόν. 
Ajax approached, holding his shield, like a tower, bronze and seven 
oxhides, which Tychius labored upon for him, by far the best 
leathercutter in his house, in Hyle, who made for him the brilliant shield 
                                                
357 See Von Reden (2011), 206–8, for a categorisation of Archaic issues by weight standard. 
358 Von Reden (2011), 65–66. 
359 See Head (1881), 9 and 19, on the different iconography of Orchomenus’ first issue, which is 
usually cited as evidence of Orchomenus’ abstention from the Archaic phase of the Boeotian League 
(see Larsen [1968], 28–29). 
360 Head (1881), 11–12, 14–17; Seltman (1955), 54–55; Kraay (1976), 108–109. See p. 3 n. 15 on the 
terminology “obverse” and “reverse”. 
361 Larson (2007), 80–93. 
362 Larson (2007), 78–79. 
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from seven hides from fat bulls, and upon it he drew an eighth layer of 
bronze. (Il. 7.220–25) 
Why was this shield chosen as the iconographic representation of Boeotia for their 
first issue of coinage? Civic issues from the Archaic Period invariably chose images 
which were distinctive symbols of the particular polis: the Athenian owl and 
helmeted woman’s head on the Archaic Owls together could only denote Athens’ 
patron goddess and namesake, but these worked together and were accompanied by 
the civic legend ΑΘ.363 The Boeotian shield coinage lacks even an explanatory 
legend; the only symbol apparently unique to Boeotia was the shield. A pragmatic 
consideration may have influenced the choice of image; the oval shield with its flat 
rim and points at the openings was much the same shape as the Aeginetan turtle.364  
Many coins of this series bear one of a variety of initialisms usually interpreted as 
the mint-mark of an individual polis, although the modern scholarly difficulty of 
assigning mint-marks to poleis suggests that this system was either haphazard and 
prone to overlapping mint-marks or understood in a system which is not known to 
us. A distinguishing mark was not effective if it could not be understood to 
distinguish (see Figure 2b and e, signed with the closed eta, for either Haliartus or 
Hyettus).365 It is possible that two-letter mint marks were deployed in order to solve 
ambiguity; unabbreviated legends did not appear until the fourth century.366 The 
most common finds of the series which bears the Boeotian shield and Aeginetan 
mill-sail, however, were without legend. Head identifies these as Theban issues,367 
although the mint-mark of a cross-barred theta is usually identified as representing 
Thebes.368 
Earlier scholars suggested that the shield was perhaps intended to represent the 
shield of Athena Itonia, whose sanctuary near Coroneia was the site of the 
                                                
363 Kraay (1976), 60–63. 
364 Cf. Head (1881), 9, who draws a similar parallel between the shape of the Orchomenian corn and 
the Aeginetan turtle.  
365 Ashton (1995), 11–15. 
366 See Larson (2007), 68–69 n. 6, on reattribution work. 
367 Head (1881), 10; Kraay (1976), 109. 
368 As Larson (2007), 68, points out, it could also represent Thespiae. 
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Pamboeotian Games in the Hellenistic Period.369 The nature of the Pamboeotia being 
sufficiently archaic to posit a beginning much earlier than its first attestation,370 it is 
possible that the earliest issues of Boeotian coinage not only represented the shield 
of Athena Itonia, but were issued in by various Boeotian states as a celebration of the 
festival. However, the antiquity of the games should not be overestimated: Pindar 
(Ol. 7.84–85) mentions ἀγῶνές τ᾽ ἔννοµοι | Βοιωτίων “lawful games of the 
Boeotians” in the early fifth century, but this follows directly on from a description 
of the prizes in Arcadia and Thebes: we should not be overly confident in reading the 
brief τε as a disjunction;371 a fragment of a Partheneia (fr. 94b.43–48 Race) mentions 
victories in horse races at the temple of Poseidon at Onchestus and the temple of 
Itonia near Coronea: 
τί- 
µαθεν γὰρ τὰ πάλαι τὰ νῦν 
τ' ἀµφικτιόνεσσιν 
ἵππων τ' ὠκυπόδων πο[λυ- 
γˈνώτοις ἐπὶ νίκαις, 
αἷς ἐν ἀϊόνεσσιν Ὀγχη[στοῦ κλυ]τᾶ̣ς, 
ταῖς δὲ ναὸν Ἰτωνίας α̣[.......]α 
χαίταν στεφάνοις ἐκό- 
σµηθεν ἔν τε Πίσᾳ πε̣ριπ̣[ 
For he was honoured before and now by his neighbours and for his 
famous victories with swift-footed horses, those on the shores of famous 
Onchestus and those … the temple of Itonia, he was crowned on his hair 
with a wreath in Pisa too… 
This confirms that games were conducted at two different Boeotian sancutaries. 
These are not securely pan-Boeotian in character: the victor celebrated in Olympian 
7 was Diagoras of Rhodes! It should be noted in particular that the secure evidence 
for the Pamboeotia coincides with the use of the sanctuary of Athena Itonia as the 
capital of the Boeotian League, having replaced the Cadmea at Thebes in the later 
fourth century (IG ix2 1.170, SEG 18.240; cf. Hell. Oxy. 16.4, which places Boeotian 
federal councils on the Cadmea).372 It is therefore somewhat tenuous to suggest that 
the games at the sanctuary of Athenian Itonia were so important in the sixth century 
                                                
369 Head (1911), 343; Seltman (1955), 55; contra, Lacroix (1958), 7; On the Pamboeotian games, see 
Strab. 9.411. 
370 Buck (1979), 88–89. 
371 Roesch (1975), 6; Robert (1979), 208–10. 
372 See CB 1:123 for discussion of the inscriptions. Polybius (4.3.5) directly attests the existence of 
the Pamboeotia in the 220s. 
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as to prompt the beginnings of Boeotian minting. The conjunction of (Hellenistic) 
Boeotian federal activity and Boeotian ethnic activity is cause for caution: we cannot 
be completely confident that the councils were removed to a sanctuary which already 
had federal significance. 
The use of divine imagery on coinage was not unusual; as von Reden points out, a 
supernatural figure was a useful guarantor of coinage,373 and this must have been 
even more true for a coinage which was apparently shared in common between a 
number of poleis, and therefore (perhaps) accepted as fiduciary coinage beyond the 
borders of the issuing polis on a regular basis. We should not, however, ignore the 
distinction between a depiction of the god him- or herself and a symbol of the god. 
Nor can we conclusively link the Boeotian shield with Itonia: while Athena is 
generally armed, and her shield plays a significant part in both descriptions and 
depictions of Athena, she is not depicted with this shield.374 An early Boeotian 
lekane (c. 550–500 BCE; British Museum B80) appears to depict Athena at her altar, 
awaiting a sacrifice: she holds a shield aloft, but even in profile it does not have the 
distinctive cut-outs of the Boeotian shield.375 Ure, based on the raven (κορώνη) 
which accompanies her suggested that this was in fact a depiction of Itonia from 
Coronea.376 Other contemporary depictions identified as showing the Itonian rites 
likewise lack the Boeotian shield.377 
Lacroix maintains that the shield on the reverse of Boeotian coinage is an ox-hide 
shield and a reference to the folk etymology of Boeotia from βοῦς (cattle).378 
However, there is no evidence that the Archaic Boeotians actually identified their 
ethnic with the word for cattle.379 The use of this pun might have been reinforced by 
                                                
373 Von Reden (2011), 156. 
374 Larson (2007), 80. 
375 CVA 24930; CB 1:122. 
376 Ure (1929), 170; see also CB 1:122 n. 3. 
377 See CB 1:122 and nn. 5–6. 
378 Lacroix (1958). 
379 Euripides, in the the fragmentary Melanippe Bound (before 411) provides Athenian evidence for 
the punning association of Boeotus with βοῦς (τὸν δ᾽ ἀµφὶ βοῦς ῥιφθέντα Βοιωτὸν καλεῖν, “he is 
called Boeotus for he was cast amongst the cattle”, fr. 489); we might note that the Athenians devoted 
some effort to Boeotia-related humour, while Pindar’s famous reference is not to Boeotian cattle but 
pigs (see p. 115). 
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a secondary pun, for in Homer oxen were used as the standard measure of value.380 
However, there seems to have been little afterlife for the Homeric agricultural value 
system: the vocabulary of coinage from the very earliest stages focuses on utensil-
based metaphors (ὀβολοί, δραχµαί).381 
Punning coins appear in some few poleis at the end of the Archaic Period: Larson 
cites examples from Phocaean, Melian, and Selinuntine coinage.382 Although the use 
of punning iconography is attested contemporary with the first Boeotian issues, the 
puns employed require very little direct interpretation, e.g. seal = φώκη = Phocaea. 
Reading the Boeotian shield as a pun requires shield (≠ ἀσπίς/σάκος) = βοείη = βοῦς 
≈ Boeotia. The particular difficulty of the last equivalence is demonstrated by 
Antagoras of Rhodes’ attempt to make Boeotia a pun on a cow’s ear (οὖς, stem ὠτ-) 
instead.383 The pun is further strained by employing the shield, rather than an ox 
head, as the reference.384  
If the shield on Boeotian coinage is not the symbol of the patron goddess of 
Boeotian unity, nor a pun on the name “Boeotia”, where did it come from? There is 
good literary evidence to suggest that the shield was a significant symbol, not of 
Boeotia, but one which was associated more heavily with Thebes and its 
inhabitants.385 The Cadmeians are described as φερεσσακέας “sakos-bearing” in the 
Shield of Heracles ([Hes.] Asp. 13), a poem of potentially Boeotian origins, if not 
strictly Theban.386 In a version of the Heraclean myth which emphasised his Theban 
origins rather than the Argive, the Shield as a whole focuses on the depiction of the 
                                                
380 Von Reden (2011), 5–6; Schaps (2004), 69–71; cf. Il. 23.705 (τεσσαράβοιον, a slave “four-oxen’s-
worth”); Od. 1.431 (ἐεκοσιάβοια, Laertes gave “twenty-oxen’s-worth”). Schaps (2004), 70, makes a 
distinction between worth and market value; in light of this distinction it does not necessarily follow 
that the ancient Greeks would have understood a link between monetary objects and Homeric forms 
of estimating value. 
381 Schaps (2004), 82–88. 
382 Larson (2007), 79, esp. n. 61. 
383 δικαίως καλεῖσθε Βοιωτοί· βοῶν γὰρ ὦτα ἔχετε, “You are rightly called Boeotians, for you have 
cow’s ears.” (Gnomologium Vaticanum 109) 
384 Larson (2007), 79. 
385 contra Larson (2007, 80–104), whose discussion largely ignores the Theban rather than generally 
Boeotian origin of her exempla. 
386 See p. 53 n. 183. Nonnus uses the term φερεσακής at several points in his Dionysiaca, almost 
undoubtedly in response to its use here: the Theban context, at least, holds; likewise P. Berol. 5226v. 
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shield of the hero Heracles.387 This shield is referred to as a σάκος throughout the 
poem, which suggests not a round shield (as Lacroix asserted) but a body shield.388 
Lacroix rejected the association with Heracles’ shield on the dubious grounds that 
Heracles is not consistently depicted with a shield in the Boeotian shape in 
depictions of the fight with Cycnus which is the subject of the poem.389 The shield is 
also frequently invoked in Attic tragedy when referring to Theban military force.390 
Coinage was not high art but a highly functional item; its iconography needed to be 
understood at a glance by the general populace. It is therefore worth drawing on 
popular versions of myth and its associations for the interpretation of coinage 
iconography, rather than (albeit debatably) prestige items such as individual vases. 
Martin has recently argued that the Shield is representative of a popular tradition of 
epic;391 likewise tragedy in its initial performances appealed to a broad (in the case 
of the Great Dionysia, even Panhellenic) audience. There is very little evidence to 
associate the particular shield-type with collective Boeotian identity. Considering the 
relationship between Thebes and Aegina which is attested soon after the first 
Boeotian coins, the association between Thebans and shields is more informative. 
FEDERAL COINAGE 
In the mid and late fifth century and early fourth century, the monetary union of 
Boeotia continued. A single very brief statement in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 
attests to a possible use for cooperative coinage, in order to pay federal councillors, 
but on the whole there is still little evidence to relate them to the political situation. 
The legends on Tanagran coins from the mid-fifth century have been interpreted by 
Fowler as evidence of Tanagran ambitions to hegemony in this period. However, the 
evidence is circumstantial; the most we can contend is that the coins were patriotic. 
However, Theban coins of the late fifth century seem to have dominated Boeotia 
monetarily. These were bore distinctive symbols of Thebes. In particular, the use of 
                                                
387 Head (1881), 10, did acknowledge the possibility that the shield was Heracles’ and had its origins 
in Theban cult;  
388 Asp. 139, 334, 363, 455, 460. The title, which may be later, is Aspis: see Bershadsky (2011) on the 
possible equivalence of the two terms. Larson (2007), 80; contra Lacroix (1958), 15. 
389 Lacroix (1958), 10. 
390 Aspidephoros: Aesch. Septem 13; Eur. Supp. 390; Bacch. 781; of Argives, Aesch. Ag. 825. 
391 Martin (2005). 
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Heracles in arms may have been an iconographic reference to Theban domination of 
Orchomenus. 
a. So-Called Tanagran Hegemonic Issues 
On the basis of an unusual series of coins bearing both the mint mark of Tanagra 
(ΤΑ) and an ethnic inscription (ΒΟΙ), Head and Fowler have suggested that Tanagra 
took (or aspired to take) Thebes’ position of authority in the Boeotian League in the 
twenty three years between the end of the Persian Wars and the Battle of 
Oenophyta;392 Fowler states that these coins, “unique in their double inscriptions, are 
unmistakable evidence that Tanagra … at the time claimed leadership of the 
League.”393 The interpretation, however, relies on an unsupportable precise dating of 
the coins to this period. I have already considered the issues in an optimistic reading 
of Thucydides’ account of Oenophyta and the presumption of a power vacuum in 
Boeotia.394 
Head placed the Tanagran coins at the start of the Classical Period, after a break in 
minting, making Tanagra the first Boeotian city to issue coins in the post-war 
period.395 These new types from Tanagra largely resemble the Archaic type, but 
sometimes replaced the mill-sail incuse with a four-spoked wheel, perhaps borrowed 
from the coin-types of the near-by Euboean polis Chalcis.396  
Fowler bases her interpretation heavily on the significance of the double inscription 
on Tanagran coinage: it is true that these issues alone bear both a civic and an ethnic 
inscription, and were the first issues to bear an ethnic inscription at all. That this 
represents a claim to leadership of the federation, however, is a stretch. There is no 
comparative evidence to assert that the combination of two inscriptions was an 
aggressive move, and no clear indication at all that Tanagra made any other claims to 
a strong position within Boeotia.397 We might more readily attribute the double 
                                                
392 Head (1881), 20–23, first proposed the idea that the coins represented Tanagran ambition. 
393 Fowler (1957), 166. 
394 See p. 71. 
395 Head (1881), 20–23. See Kraay (1976), 110 n. 1, on the difficulties of dating these Tanagran types, 
although he accepts Fowler’s (and by extension Head’s) dating. 
396 Head (1881), 20–23; Seltman (1955), 57; Kraay (1976), 110. On the relationship between 
Tanagran and Euboean coinage, see Seltman (1955), 57; Fowler (1957), 167 n. 9. 
397 contra Fowler (1958). 
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inscription to ethnic pride at a time when Boeotia as a whole was diminished, and 
remember Tanagra was perhaps amongst the first to adopt the unifying iconography 
in the sixth century.398 Seltman suggests that Tanagra, with its harbour and 
connection to Euboea, perhaps represented the financial capital of Boeotia, and 
therefore the polis with the most pressing need for coinage.399 Larson suggests that 
these may have been festival coins.400 The Gorgoneion sometimes used on these 
coins would suggest a festival for Athena Itonia, possibly the Pamboeotia. 
b. Theban Federal Issues 
In the later fifth century, the plain decoration of the earliest issues was replaced by a 
proliferation of much more individualistic types, dated to the assertion of Athenian 
hegemony over Boeotia after Oenophyta (457–447),401 which employed local 
iconography—although these replaced not the Boeotian shield but the Aeginetan 
mill-sail incuse.402 The profusion of new styles has been interpreted as evidence for a 
break-down of the Boeotian Confederation,403 but given the dubious evidence for the 
existence of the Archaic Confederation (as argued in chapter two), and the likelihood 
that the dates of these issues are broader than the ten-year period of Athenian 
hegemony, we should acknowledge equally with the changed types the continuities 
of weight standard and the Shield obverse type which indicate the continuation of a 
unifying sentiment in Boeotia at the time. 
Thebes seems to have been the only polis in Boeotia to issue coinage for the later 
half of the fifth century.404 The numerous series of coins produced were decisively 
Theban: although the coins all bear, as we would by now expect, the Boeotian 
shield, the coins bore the civic legend, and the reverse types represent three 
categories of Theban myth.405 These types were much more elaborate than the earlier 
Theban issues, with depictions of Heracles in a variety of mythical scenes (in 
                                                
398 Head (1881), 11. 
399 Seltman (1955), 55. 
400 Larson (2007), 73. 
401 See Thuc. 1.108, 4.95. 
402 Kraay (1976), 110–11. 
403 Kraay (1976), 110–12. Contra, Buck (1979), 148, who argues that the continuity of the shield 
suggests that the union was not disestablished after 457. 
404 Head (1881), 30–33; Seltman (1955), 156; Kraay (1976), 111. 
405 See Head (1881), 30–42; Kraay (1978?), 111, describes these as “the most original designs ever 
produced in Boeotia”. They clearly represent the Theban cultural floruit of the late fifth century. 
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combat, with his bow, removing the Delphic tripod, strangling serpents, see Figure 
3b–e), the eponymous nymph Thebe seated on a throne (see Figure 3f) and profile 
heads of Dionysus and Heracles.406 These were undeniably propagandistic, focused 
on promoting Thebes’ hegemony within Boeotia through Theban iconography. 
The Theban chauvinism of the coins is remarkable given that these coins seem to 
have replaced the wide proliferation of Boeotian coinage from the period of the 
Athenian hegemony (457–447 BCE). The use of Heracles as the most frequent 
symbol is particularly aggressive considering the mythical relationship between the 
Theban hero Heracles and King Erginus of Orchomenus.407 These were for everyday 
use, and must have circulated fairly widely around Boeotia. The imagery appealed to 
the violent myth of Theban subjugation of Orchomenus, a fairly threatening piece of 
iconography. 
There was no pressing need for every city in Greece to mint coins on its own behalf, 
and the Theban coinages of this period do seem to be federal issues, and therefore 
open to the rest of Boeotia. Coinage must have been required by the individual 
poleis, who paid a per diem to the councillors which they sent to Thebes (Hell. Oxy. 
16.4).408 However, we do not know how the process of minting for the 
Confederation worked: did individual states provide silver to the Theban mint to be 
coined? This was an unusual situation if so: particularly those cities which had 
already been responsible for their own minting presumably had not lost the 
technology. 
Perhaps more likely is that Thebes minted silver (and, late in the period, gold) coins 
which were then bought by the other Boeotian poleis. Demand for Boeotian coinage 
may well have been high, as those who served on the various councils of the 
Boeotian Confederation were paid. Theban control over Boeotian coinage therefore 
                                                
406 Kraay (1976), 111, separates the profile heads into a distinct series, slightly later than the earlier 
types; I will treat them together here, as they generally part of the same coinage scheme. The Thebe 
coins represent two different types, sometimes interpreted as Thebe and Harmonia (Cadmus’ wife), 
but see Kraay (1976), 111 n. 2. 
407 See pp. 40–44, and Demand (1982), 48–52, on the popularity of Heracles at Thebes in the fifth 
century. 
408 They may also have paid their hoplites, as they did in the later fourth century: Mackil and Van 
Alfen (2006), 223. 
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becomes a mark of Theban imperialism within Boeotia: in order for the states to 
finance their representatives within the Boeotian government individual poleis were 
forced to trade with Thebes. Such monetary control was of course not unknown in 
the late fifth century, as Athens famously required its imperial subjects in the islands 
to pay their tribute in Athenian Owls.409 This may constitute another form of Theban 
economic exploitation of Boeotia in the Classical Period. 
CONCLUSION 
Boeotian coinage was a monetary union; its relationship to the political situation of 
Boeotia in the Archaic Period and early fifth century must be drawn with caution by 
historians, for there is no historical evidence regarding Boeotian monetisation. The 
argument that Tanagra aspired to take leadership of Boeotia from Thebes relies too 
heavily on the circumstantial evidence of a dubious dating of a coin (which while 
innovative was not aggressive) with the presence of Spartans near Tanagra in 457. 
The historical casuations of Boeotian monetisation are unrecoverable. The evidence 
of the coins themselves, however, suggests that the coins were intended to create a 
trade union within Boeotia, and they seem to have borne, as a long-standing 
Boeotian symbol, a distinctive shield shape which is more easily related to Thebes 
than to Boeotia. 
By the late fifth century, we can observe that the Theban coinage, which seems to 
have been the most prevalent in this period, bore symbols of Theban patriotism 
which were often rather aggressive in their nature. Rather than bearing an ivy-
wreathed amphora (see Figure 3a), or the head of a god or hero, they bore images of 
the Theban hero Heracles prepared for battle. Given the likelihood that these coins 
circulated around Boeotia, the use of a Theban hero who was associated in myth 
with the conquest of another Boeotian polis must have been a startling threat. It is 
possible as well that the Theban coins were the only federal coins produced in this 
period, although this relies on the dubious evidence of dating. If this was so, then the 
Thebans, like Athens, may have compelled the other Boeotian states to use its own 
coinage, for money was a necessary part of the Confederation.  
                                                
409 Kraay (1976), 70–71. 
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Figure 2: The earliest coins 
From left to right: a: Tanagra; b: Haliartus; c: unsigned (Thebes?); d: Mycalessus; e: 
Haliartus; f: Pharae. a–b: signed obverse in recesses of shield; d–f: signed reverse in centre 
of mill-sail. Kraay (1976), pl. 19, nos. 338–343. 
 
 
Figure 3: Theban coins, late fifth century? 
From left to right: a: amphora, period of Athenian hegemony; b: Heracles in combat; c: 
Heracles with bow; d: Heracles with tripod; e: infant Heracles strangling serpents; f: 
Thebe/Harmonia seated. All signed ΘΕΒ[Α] reverse. Kraay (1976), pl. 19, nos. 350–355. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thebans appropriated Boeotian identity in the late sixth century. By 479, Thebes had 
been at the core of four different “Boeotian actions” in twenty years, and asserted 
leadership of a substantial group of Boeotian poleis. The military cooperation in this 
group was, it seems, not bound by any formal agreement but by an unwritten rule of 
international relations. The nature of this leadership is unclear: the military aspect 
suggests that Thebes was a hegemon, but Theban rhetoric in the late fifth century 
implied a metropolis relationship with the rest of Boeotia. This same rhetoric 
appealed to a much stronger relationship than the military unity suggested in our 
sources. Historiographical sources frequently acknowledged the separate existence 
of the Boeotian states, but Thebes was continuously singled out as the leader of this 
group. At the same time, the development of Boeotian coinage reflected an almost 
region-wide cooperation, but the Boeotian coins bore Theban symbols. By the time 
of the Persian Wars, Theban aristocrats considered themselves responsible for 
Boeotia’s welfare. It seems probably that Thebes was in control of Boeotian poleis’ 
foreign relations at this time and led the Boeotian states, with the notable exception 
of Thespiae and Plataea, into Medism.  
In the fifth century, Boeotia arose from the apparent depressions of the Persian Wars 
and Athenian control to construct a formal and enduring relationship between the 
Boeotian states, with an independent regional government. There is little 
historiographical evidence to support Buck’s argument that Orchomenus and not 
Thebes led Boeotia in the development of the Boeotian Confederation; by the 
beginning of the Peloponnesian War, Thebes was clearly in control of the 
Confederation. Although the Boeotian government in theory employed a system of 
proportional representation, Thebes held the most substantial portion of this 
representation and may have moved to take an outright majority in its attack on 
Thespiae. The practical evidence of the Boeotian League demonstrates Thebes’ 
control, and suggests that the threat of force was also employed to keep the other 
Boeotian states in line. This threat is reflected in the iconography of Theban coinage 
of the late fifth and early fourth century, which includes many types which reflect 
the Theban and anti-Orchomenian hero Heracles in battle panoply. 
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The international reaction to the Boeotian Confederation, particularly in the context 
of the Peace of Antalcidas, clearly saw Thebes as the controlling element of Boeotia. 
Spartan rhetoric from the Battle of Haliartus, at the start of the Corinthian War, 
referred to Boeotia’s loss of autonomy and encouraged “rebellion” from Thebes in 
Boeotia. Only under the threat of Spartan action were the Thebans forced to admit 
that their position in Boeotia abrogated the Boeotian poleis’ autonomy. Xenophon, 
writing later in the fourth century, characterised Thebes’ treatment of Boeotia as 
πλεονεξία, a word which was used in historiography to characterise imperialistic 
movements. The breadth of Theban control of other Boeotian states is affirmed by 
the characterisation of the relationship as imperialist. 
As I have argued, there is very little evidence that any Boeotian state acted 
independently of Thebes in the period between ca. 525 and 386. Those few 
exceptions—Plataea and Thespiae in the fifth century, and Orchomenus in the fourth 
century—are clearly presented as exceptions to the rule and their actions often 
resulted in attempts at retribution from Thebes. Thebes’ control of the Boeotians was 
persistant and regularly backed by force or the threat of force. The degree of 
violence and the domains of control which are evidenced in our sources align with 
Finley’s typology of imperialism. 
One of the conclusions which has arisen from the work of the Copenhagen Polis 
Centre is that Archaic and Classical poleis were not autonomous (or αὐτόνοµοι) by 
definition.410 This leaves us with a much broader scope for discussing unequal 
relationships between Greek states than has previously been allowed: the term 
hegemonic has been employed to describe Thebes, but this does not adequately 
encompass Thebes’ systematic violence towards Boeotian states, nor the degree of 
influence and sometimes outright control which it exercised over the Boeotian poleis 
between the late sixth century and the Peace of Antalcidas. I have tried to use 
imperialism here as a spectrum, rather than an absolute, to fill the gaps in the current 
analysis of Classical Boeotian history. Champion complained quite recently that the 
                                                
410 Hansen (1995a). 
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concept of imperialism was overused by historians,411 but a systematic approach to 
the relationships between small and great poleis is still lacking.  
Although we cannot observe the substance of Thebes’ motivations due to the nature 
of our sources, we can see a potential motivation. The benefits which Thebes reaped 
from Boeotia should not be underestimated. Epameinondas famously won the Battle 
of Leuctra by deploying an incredibly deep line of troops. This was a repeat of 
Pagondas’ tactic at the Battle of Delium in 424: Thucydides’ description of the 
Boeotian battle line (Thuc. 4.93.4) makes it clear that Pagondas was only able to 
form such a line, twenty-five men deep, because he had the full array of Boeotian 
troops to fill out the rest of the line. The same use of Boeotian troops seems to have 
made Thebes’ victory at Leuctra, and therefore Theban hegemony throughout 
Greece, possible. 
                                                
411 Champion (1999), 87. 
 124 
WORKS CITED 
Amit, Moshe. 1971. “The Boeotian Confederation During the Pentecontaetia”. 
Rivista storica dell’antichità 1: 49–64. 
———. 1973. Great and Small: A Study in the Relations Between the Great Powers 
and the Small Cities in Ancient Greece. Latomus 134. Bruxelles: Latomus. 
Andreiomenou, Angheliki. 1989. “Böotien in der Zeit von 1050-800 v.Chr.”. In 
Beister and Buckler eds. (1989), 253–64. 
Andrewes, A. 1978. “Spartan Imperialism?” In Garnsey and Whittaker eds. (1979), 
91–102. 
Anson, Edward M. 2009. “Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language”. Glotta 85: 5–
30. 
Aravantinos, V.L. 2006. “A New Inscribed Kioniskos from Thebes”. BSA 101: 369–
77. 
Ashton, R.H.J. 1995. “Pseudo-Rhodian Drachms from Central Greece”. Numismatic 
Chronicle 155: 1–20. 
Badian, Ernst. 1989. “Plataea between Athens and Sparta: In Search of Lost 
History”. In Beister and Buckler eds. (1989), 95–112. 
Bakhuizen S.C. 1989. “The Ethnos of the Boeotians”. In Beister and Buckler eds. 
(1989), 65–72. 
———. 1994. “Thebes and Boeotia in the Fourth Century B.C.” Phoenix 48.4: 307–
30. 
Balot, Ryan K. 2001. Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
Baragwanath, Emily. 2008. Motivation and Narrative in Herodotus. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bauslaugh, Robert A. 1991. The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Beck, Hans. 1997. Polis und Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur 
der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Historia 
Einzelschrift 114. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
Bederman, David J. 2001. International Law in Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Behrwald, Ralf. 2005. Hellenika von Oxyrhynchos. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft. 
 125 
Beister, Harmut. 1989. “Hegemoniales Denken in Theben”. In Beister and Buckler 
eds. (1989), 131–54. 
Beister, Hartmut, and John Buckler (eds.) 1989. Boiotika: Vorträge vom 5. 
Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium: Institut für Alte Geschichte Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität München 13.-17. Juni 1986. Munich: Editio Maris.  
Bershadsky, Natasha. 2010. “The Unbreakable Shield: Thematics of Sakos and 
Aspis”. C Phil. 105.1: 1–24. 
Bonner, Robert J., and Gertrude Smith. 1945. “Administration of Justice in Boeotia”. 
C Phil. 40.1: 11–23. 
Bowen, A.J. 1992. Plutarch: The Malice of Herodotus. Warminster: Aris & Phillips. 
Breglia, Luisa. 2005. “The Amphictyony of Calaureia”. Ancient World 36.1: 18–33. 
Bruce, I.A.F. 1967. An Historical Commentary on the “Hellenica Oxyrhynchia”. 
London: Cambridge University Press. 
———. 1968. “Plataea and the Fifth-Century Boeotian Confederacy”. Phoenix 22.3: 
190–99. 
Buck, Carl Darling. 1955. The Greek Dialects: Grammar, Selected Inscriptions, 
Glossary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Buck, Robert J. 1972. “The Formation of the Boeotian League”. C Phil. 67.2: 94–
101. 
———. 1979. A History of Boeotia. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. 
———. 1993. “The Outbreak of the Boiotian War”. In Fossey ed. (1993), 91–99. 
———. 1994. Boiotia and the Boiotian League, 432-371 B.C. Edmonton: University 
of Alberta Press. 
Buckler, John. 1980. The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 BC. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press. 
Buckler, John, and Hans Beck. 2008. Central Greece and the Politics of Power in 
the Fourth Century BC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Buckley, Terry. 1996. Aspects of Greek History, 750–323 BC: A Source-Based 
Approach. London and New York: Routledge. 
Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
Bury, J.B. 1959. A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great, third 
edition. London: Macmillan. 
 126 
Cain, Peter J., and Mark Harrison (eds.) 2001. Imperialism: Critical Concepts in 
Historical Studies. London and New York: Routledge. 
Camp II, John McK. 2000. “Walls and the Polis”. In Flensted-Jensen, Nielsen and 
Rubinstein eds. (2000): 41–51. 
Cartledge, Paul. 2000. “Boiotian Swine F(or)ever?: The Boiotian Superstate 395 
BC”. In Flensted, Nielsen and Rubinstein eds. (2000), 397–418. 
Cassio, Albio Cesare. 2009. “The Language of Hesiod and the Corpus Hesiodeum”. 
In Montanari, Rengakos and Tsagalis eds. (2009), 179–202.  
Cawkwell, G.L. 1972. “Epaminondas and Thebes”. CQ 22.2: 254–78. 
Champion, Craige B. 2009. “Imperial Ideologies, Citizenship Myths, and Legal 
Disputes in Classical Athens and Republican Rome”. In A Companion to 
Greek and Roman Political Thought, edited by Ryan K. Balot, 85–99. 
Malden: Blackwell. 
Cloché, Paul. 1952. Thèbes de Béotie, des origines á la conquête romaine. Namur: 
Secrétariat des publications, Facultés universitaires. 
Collard, Christopher, and Martin Cropp. 2008. Euripides: Fragments, volume 1. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Davies, John K. 1994. “On the non-usability of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in an 
ancient Greek context”. In Foresti et al. eds. (1994), 51–65. 
Demand, Nancy. 1982. Thebes in the Fifth Century: Heracles Resurgent. London: 
Routledge. 
De Romilly, Jacqueline. 1963. Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, translated by 
Philip Thody. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Debnar, Paula Arnold. 1996. “The Unpersuasive Thebans (Thucydides 3.61–67)”. 
Phoenix 50.2: 95–110. 
Desborough, Vincent Robert d’Arba. 1964. The Last Mycenaeans and their 
Successors: An Archaeological Survey c. 1200–c. 1000 B.C. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.  
Develin, R. 1990. “Numeral Corruption in Greek Historical Texts”. Phoenix 44.1: 
31–45. 
Diamant, Steven. 1982. “Theseus and the Unification of Attica”. In Studies in 
Athenian Epigraphy, History and Topography, presented to Eugene 
Vanderpool, 38–47. Hesperia Supplement 19. Princeton: American School of 
Classical Studies at Athens. 
Doyle, Michael W. 1986. Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 127 
Ducat, Jean. 1973. “La Confédération béotienne et l’expansion thébaine à l’époque 
archaïque”. BCH 72: 59–73. 
Dull, Clifford John. 1976. “A Study of the Leadership of the Boeotian League from 
the Invasion of the Boiotoi to the King’s Peace”. PhD diss., University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 
Ebbott, Mary. 2010. “Error 404: Theban Epic Not Found”. Trends in Classics 2.2: 
239–58. 
Eckstein, Arthur M. 2006. Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of 
Rome.  
Edwards, Anthony T. 2004. Hesiod’s Ascra. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Ehrenberg, Victor. 1969. The Greek State, second edition. London: Methuen. 
Ferguson, William Scott. 1913. Greek Imperialism. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Fibiger Bang, Peter, and C.A. Bayly (eds.) 2011. Tributary Empires in Global 
History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fine, John V.A. 1983. The Ancient Greeks. Cambridge, MA & London: Belknap. 
Finkelberg, Margalit. 2005. Greeks and Pre-Greeks: Aegean Prehistory and Greek 
Heroic Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Finley, M.I. 1959. The Greek Historians: The Essence of Herodotus, Thucydides, 
Xenophon, Polybius. New York: Viking Press. 
———. 1972. “Introduction”. In Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War, 
translated by Rex Warner [1954], 9–32. London: Penguin. 
———. 1978a. “Empire in the Greco-Roman World”. Greece & Rome 25.1: 1–15. 
———. 1978b. “The Fifth Century Athenian Empire: A Balance-Sheet”. In Garnsey 
and Whittaker eds. (1978), 103–126. 
Flensted-Jensen, Pernille, Thomas Heine Nielsen and Lene Rubinstein (eds.) 2000. 
Polis & Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History. Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum. 
Flower, Michael A., and John Marincola. 2002. Herodotus: Histories Book IX. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Foresti, Luciana Aigner, Alberto Barzanò, Cinzia Bearzot, Luisa Brandi and 
Giuseppe Zecchini (eds.) 1994. Federazioni e federalismo nell’Europa 
antica: Bergamo, 21–25 settembre 1992. Milan: Università Cattolica del 
Sacro Cuore. 
 128 
Fossey, John M. 1988. Topography and Population of Ancient Boeotia. Chicago: 
Ares. 
——— (ed.) 1993. Boeotia Antiqua III: Papers in Boiotian History, Institutions and 
Epigraphy in Memory of Paul Roesch. Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben. 
Foster, Edith. 2010. Thucydides, Pericles and Periclean Imperialism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Fowler, Barbara Hughes. 1957. “Thucydides 1.107–108 and the Tanagran Federal 
Issues”. Phoenix 11.4: 164–70. 
Funke, Peter (n.d.), “Boeotia, Boeotians”, in Brill’s New Pauly, edited by Hubert 
Cancik and Helmuth Schneider. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/ 
entries/brill-s-new-pauly/boeotia-boeotians-e218930 
Garnsey, Peter, and C. R. Whittaker (eds.) 1979. Imperialism in the Ancient World: 
the Cambridge University Research Seminar in Ancient History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Georgiádou, Aristoúla. 1996. “Pro-Boiotian Traditions in the Fourth Century BC: 
Kallisthenes and Ephoros as Ploutarkhos’ Sources in the Pelopidas”. In 
Boeotia Antiqua VI: Proceedings of the 8th International Confederence of 
Boiotian Antiquities (Loyola University of Chicago, 24-26 May 1995), edited 
by John M. Fossey, 73–90. Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben. 
Giovannini, Adalberto. 2007. Relations entre états dans la Grèce antique: du temps 
d’Homère à l’intervention romaine (ca. 700–200 av. J.-C.) Historia 
Einzelschrift 193. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
Glotz, G. 1908. “Le conseil fédérale des Béotiens”. BCH 32: 271–78. 
Gomme, A.W., A. Andrewes and K.J. Dover. 1945–81. A Historical Commentary on 
Thucydides, five volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Gray, Vivienne. 1989. The Character of Xenophon’s Hellenica. London: Duckworth. 
Grote 1907 Grote, George. 1869. A History of Greece: From the Earliest Period to 
the Close of the Generation Contemporary with Alexander the Great. 
London: Murray. 
Gruen, Erich S. 1984. The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Gschnitzer, F. 1955. “Stammes- und Ortsgemeinden in alten Griechenland”. Wiener 
Studien 68: 120–44. 
———. 1960. Gemeinde und Herrschaft: von den Grundform griechischer 
Staatsordnung. Graz: Hermann Böhlaus. 
 129 
Guillon, Pierre. 1963. Études béotiennes: le Bouclier d’Héraclès et l’histoire de la 
Grèce centrale dans la période de la première guerre sacrée. Aix-en-
Provence: Faculté des Lettres. 
Hall, Jonathan M. 1997. Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. 2000. “Sparta, Lakedaimon and the Nature of Peroikic Dependency”. In 
Further Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis, edited by Pernille Flensted-
Jensen, 73–89. Historia Einzelschrift 138. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
———. 2002. Hellenicity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. 2007a. “International Relations”. In The Cambridge History of Greek and 
Roman Warfare, volume one, edited by Philip Sabin, Hans van Wees and 
Michael Whitby, 85–107. Cambridge: Cambidge University Press. 
———. 2007b. “Polis, Community and Ethnic Identity”. In The Cambridge 
Companion to Archaic Greece, edited by H.A. Shapiro, 40–46. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Hammond, Mason. 1948. “Ancient Imperialism: Contemporary Justifications”. 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 58/59: 105–161. 
Hammond, N.G.L. 1976. Migrations and Invasion in Greece and Adjacent Areas. 
Park Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press. 
———. 2000. “Political Developments in Boeotia”. CQ 50.1: 80–93. 
Hansen, Mogens Herman. 1995a. “The ‘Autonomous City-State’. Ancient Fact or 
Modern Fiction”. In Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis, edited by Mogens 
Herman Hansen, 21–44. Historia Einzelschrift 95. 
———. 1995b. “Boeotian Poleis: A Test Case”. In Sources for the Ancient Greek 
City State, edited by Mogens Herman Hansen, 13–63. Acts of the 
Copenhagen Polis Centre 2. Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes 
Selskab. 
———. 1996. “Were the Boiotian Poleis Deprived of Their Autonomia?” In Hansen 
and Raaflaub eds. (1996), 127–136. 
———. 1997. “The Polis as an Urban Centre: The Literary and Epigraphical 
Evidence”. In The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community, 
edited by Mogens Herman Hansen, 9–86. Acts of the Copenhagen Polis 
Centre 4. Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. 
———. 2004. “Boiotia”. In An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, edited by 
Mogens Herman Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen, 431–461. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 130 
Hansen, Mogens Herman, and Thomas Heine Nielsen. 2004. “Introduction”. In An 
Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, edited by Mogens Herman 
Hansen and Thomas Heine Nielsen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hansen, Mogens Herman, and Kurt Raaflaub (eds.). 1996. More Studies in the 
Ancient Greek Polis. Historia Einzelschrift 108. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Harding, Philip. 1987. “The Authorship of the Hellenika Oxyrhynchia". Ancient 
History Bulletin 1: 101–104. 
———. 2007. “Local History and Atthidography”. In A Companion to Greek and 
Roman Historiography, volume one, edited by John Marincola, 180–88. 
Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harris, William V. 1979. War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 B.C. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Head, B.V. 1881. On the Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Boeotia. London: 
Rollin and Feuardent. 
———. 1911. Historia Nummorum, second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hope Simpson, R., and J.F. Lazenby. 1970. The Catalogue of Ships in Homer’s 
Iliad. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hornblower, Simon. 2002. “Herodotus and His Sources of Information”. In Brill’s 
Companion to Herodotus, edited by Egbert J. Bakker, Irene J.F. De Jong and 
Hans van Wees, 373–386. Leiden: Brill. 
Hornblower, Simon. 1991–2008. A Commentary on Thucydides, three volumes. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
How, W.W., and J. Wells. 1912. A Commentary on Herodotus with Introduction and 
Appendices, two volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Janko, Richard. 1988. Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in 
Epic Diction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jehne, Martin. 1994. Koine Eirene: Untersuchungen zu den Befriedungs und 
Stabilisierungsbemuhungen in der griechischen Poliswelt des 4. 
Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Hermes Einzelschrift 63. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 
Jones, C.P. 1996. “ἔθνος and γέένος in Herodotus”. Cl. Ant. 46.2: 315–20. 
Jones, John Melville. 1986. A Dictionary of Ancient Greek Coins. London: Selby. 
Kagan, Donald. 1960. “Pheidon’s Aeginetan Coinage”. TPAPhA 91: 121–36. 
———. 1982. “The Dates of the Earliest Coins”. AJA 86.3: 343–60. 
Keen, Antony G. 1996. “Were The Boiotian Poleis Autonomoi?” In Hansen and 
Raaflaub eds. (1996), 113–25. 
 131 
Kirk, G.S. 1985. Iliad: A Commentary, volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity 
Press. 
Knoepfler, Denis. 1981. Review of R.J. Buck (1979), A History of Boeotia. Gnomon 
53: 140–50. 
Kõiv, Mait. 2011. “A Note on the Dating of Hesiod.” CQ 61.2: 355–77. 
Konstan, David. 2001. “To Hellēnikon ethnos: Ethnicity and the Construction of 
Ancient Greek Identity”. In Malkin ed. (2001), 29–50. 
Kowalzig, Barbara. 2007. Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in 
Archaic and Classical Greece. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kraay, Colin. 1976. Archaic and Classical Greek Coins. London: Methuen. 
Kroll, John H., and Nancy M. Waggoner. 1984. “Dating the Earliest Coins of 
Athens, Corinth and Aegina”. AJA 88.3: 325–40. 
Kurke, Leslie. 1991. The Traffic in Praise: Pindar and the Poetics of Social 
Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Lacroix, Léon. 1958. “Le Bouclier, emblème des Béotiens”. Revue belge de 
philologie et d’histoire 36: 5–30. 
Larsen, J. A. O. 1968. Greek Federal States: Their Institutions and History. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
———. 1945. Representative Government in Greek and Roman History. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
———. 1955. “The Boeotian Confederacy and Fifth-Century Oligarchic Theory”. 
T&PAPhA 86: 40–50. 
———. 1960. “Orchomenus and the Formation of the Boeotian Confederacy in 447 
B.C.”. C Phil. 55.1: 9–18. 
Larson, Stephanie L. 2000. “Boiotia, Athens, the Peisistratids, and the Odyssey's 
catalogue of heroines”. GRBS 41.3: 193–222. 
———. 2007. Tales of Epic Ancestry: Boiotian Collective Identity in the Late 
Archaic and Early Classical periods. Historia Einzelschrift 197. Stuttgart: 
Steiner. 
Lehmann, G.A. 1980. “Der ‘Erste Heilige Krieg’ – ein Fiktion?” Historia 29: 242–
46. 
Lichtheim, George. 1971. Imperialism. New York: Praeger. 
Liddell, H. G., and Scott, R. (1968) A Greek-English Lexicon, ninth edition, revised 
by Henry Stuart Jones. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
 132 
Low, Polly. 2007. Interstate Relations in Classical Greece: Morality and Power. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ludden, David. 2011. “Process of Empire Frontiers and Borderlands”. In Fibiger 
Bang and Bayly eds. (2011), 132–150. 
Macdonald, David. 1987–88. “The Significance of the ‘Boiotian League/Chalkis’ 
Silver Issue”. Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte 37/38: 23-29. 
Mackil, Emily. 2003. “Koinon and Koinonia: Mechanisms and Structures of 
Political Collectivity in Classical and Hellenistic Greece”. PhD diss., 
Princeton University. 
Mackil, Emily, and Peter G. van Alfen. 2006. “Cooperative Coinage”. In 
Agoranomia: Studies in Money and Exchange Presented to John H. Kroll, 
edited by Peter G. van Alfen, 201–26. New York: American Numismatic 
Society. 
Malkin, Irad (ed.). 2001. Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Martin, Richard P. 2005. “Pulp Epic: the Catalogue and the Shield”. In The Hesiodic 
Catalogue of Women: Constructions and Reconstructions, edited by Richard 
Hunter, 153–75. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press. 
McInerney, Jeremy. 2001. “Ethnos and Ethnicity in Early Greece”. In Malkin ed. 
(2001), 51–74. 
McKechnie, P.R., and S.J. Kern. 1988. Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. Warminster: Aris & 
Philips. 
McQueen, E.I. 2000. Herodotus: Book VI. London: Bristol Classical Press. 
Meiggs, Russell, and David Lewis. 1989. A Selection of Greek Historical 
Inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C., revised edition. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Montanari, Franco, Antonios Rengakos and Christos Tsagalis (eds.) 2009. Brill’s 
Companion to Hesiod. Leiden: Brill. 
Moretti, Luigi. 1962. Ricerche sulle Leghe Greche (Peloponnesiaca-Beotica-Licia). 
Rome: L’Erma di Bretschneider. 
Morgan, Catherine. 2001. “Ethne, Ethnicity, and Early Greek States, ca. 1200–480 
B.C.: An Archaeological Perspective”. In Malkin ed. (2001), 75–112.  
———. 2003. Early Greek States Beyond the Polis. London: Routledge.  
Morris, Ian, and Barry Powell. 2006. The Greeks: History, Culture and Society. 
Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
 133 
Mossman, J.M. 1995. “Tragedy Epic in Plutarch’s Alexander”. In Essays on 
Plutarch’s Lives, edited by Barbara Scardigli, 209–28. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Nagy, Gregory. 1996. Homeric Questions. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
———. 2009. “Hesiod and the Ancient Biographical Traditions”. In Montanari, 
Rengakos and Tsagalis eds. (2009), 271–312.  
Ostwald, Martin. 1982. Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History. American 
Classical Studies 11. Atlanta: American Philological Association Scholars’ 
Press. 
Page, Denys Lionel. 1959. History and the Homeric Iliad. Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press. 
Pavese, C.O. 1998. “The Rhapsodic Epic Poems as Oral and Independent Poems”. 
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 98: 63–90. 
Pelliccia, Hayden. 2009. “Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides”. In Cambridge 
Companion to Greek Lyric, edited by Felix Budelmann, 240–63. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pelling, Christopher (ed.) 2010. Plutarch: Rome in Crisis. London and New York: 
Penguin. 
Pelling, Christopher. 2011. Plutarch and History: Eighteen Studies. Swansea: 
Classical Press of Wales. 
Raaflaub, Kurt. 1996. “Born to be Wolves? Origins of Roman Imperialism”. In 
Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360-146 B.C. in 
honor of E. Badian, edited by Robert W. Wallace and Edward M. Harris. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Ready, Jonathan L. 2007. “Homer, Hesiod, and the Epic Tradition”. In The 
Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece, edited by H.A. Shapiro, 111–140. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Reynolds, Charles. 1981. Modes of Imperialism. Oxford: Martin Robinson. 
Rhodes, P.J., and D.M. Lewis. 1997. The Decrees of the Greek States. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press. 
Robert, L. 1977. “Les fêtes de Dionysos à Thèbes et l’amphictyonie”. Archaiologike 
Ephemeris 1977: 195–210. 
Rockwell, Nicholas. 2008. “The Boeotian Army: The Convergence of Warfare, 
Politics, Society and Culture in the Classical Age of Greece”. PhD diss., 
University of California-Los Angeles.  
Roesch, Paul. 1965. Thespies et la Confédération Béotienne. Paris: E. de Boccard. 
 134 
———. 1975. “Les Heracleia de Thèbes”. ZPE 17: 1–7. 
———. 1981. Review of Buck (1979). Phoenix 35.3: 267–71. 
Russell, D.A. 1973. Plutarch. London: Duckworth. 
Rzepka, Jacek. 2010. “Plutarch on the Theban Uprising of 379 B.C. and the 
Boiotarchoi of the Boeotian Confederacy Under The Principate”. Historia 
59.1: 115–18. 
Saïd, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. 
———. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf. 
Salmon, Pierre. 1958. “Les districts béotiens”. Revue des Études Anciennes 58: 51–
70. 
———. 1976. Étude sur la Confédération béotienne: Son organisation et son 
administraton. Brussels: Académie Royale de Belgique. 
———. 1985. “Droits et devoirs des cités dans la Confédération béotienne 447/6-
386). In La Béotie Antique, Lyon - Saint-Étienne, 16-20 mai 1983, edited by 
Gilbert Argoud and Paul Roesch, 301–6. Paris: Centre National de la 
Récherche Scientifique. 
Schachter, Albert. 1981–94. Cults of Boeotia. BICS Supplement 38, four volumes. 
London: Institute of Classical Studies. 
———. 1989. “Boiotia in the Sixth Century B.C.” In Beister and Buckler eds. 
(1989), 65–72. 
———. 1994. “Gods in the service of the state: the Boiotian experience”. In Foresti 
et al. eds. (1994), 67–85. 
———. 1996. “Costituzione e sviluppo dell'ethnos beotico”. Quaderni Urbinati di 
Cultura Classica 52.1: 7–29. 
Schaps, David M. 2004. The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient 
Greece. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Scheidel, Walter. 2011. “Fiscal Regimes and the ‘First Great Divergence’ between 
Eastern and Western Eurasia”. In Fibiger Bang and Bayly eds. (2011), 193–
204. 
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1919 [1951]. “The Sociology of Imperialisms”. In Imperialism 
and Social Classes, translated by Heinz Norden, 3–101. Cleveland: Meridian 
Books. 
Seltman, Charles. 1955. Greek Coins: A History of Metallic Currency and Coinage 
down to the Fall of the Hellenistic Kingdoms, second edition. London: 
Methuen. 
 135 
Shrimpton, Gordon S. 1984. “When Did Plataea Join Athens?” C Phil. 79.4: 295–
304. 
Skinner, Marilyn B. 1983. “Corinna of Tanagra and Her Audience”. Tulsa Studies in 
Women's Literature 2.1: 9–20. 
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford and New York: 
Blackwell. 
Sordi, Marta. 1951. “I caratteri dell’opera storiografica di Senofonte nelle 
Elleniche”. Athenaeum 1950: 3–53; 1951: 273–348. 
———. 1993. “La battaglia di Ceresso e la secessioni di Tespie”. In Fossey ed. 
(1993), 25–32. 
———. 1994. “Il federalismo Greco nell’età classica”. In Foresti et al. eds. (1994), 
3–22. 
Ténékidès, George. 1954. La notion juridique d’indépńdance et la tradition 
hellenique. Athens: Institut Français d’Athènes. 
Thompson, Margaret, Otto Mørkholm and Colin Kraay (eds.). 1973. An Inventory of 
Greek Coin Hoards. New York: American Numismatic Society. 
Tuplin, Christopher. 2007. “Continuous Histories (Hellenica)”. In A Companion to 
Greek and Roman Historiography, volume one, edited by John Marincola, 
159–70. Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell. 
Von Reden, Sitta. 2010. Money in Classical Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Weber, Max. 2001. “Structures of Power”. In Cain and Harrison eds. (2001), 325–
37.  
West, Martin L. 1966. Hesiod: Theogony. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1978. Hesiod: Works & Days. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1985. Hesiodic Catalogue of Women: Its Nature, Structure and Origins. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
———. 1988. “The Rise of the Greek Epic”. JHS 108: 151–72. 
———. 1999. “Frühe Interpolationen in der Ilias”. Nachrichten der Academie der 
Wissenshaften in Göttingen (Phil.-hist. Kl.) 1999.4: 183–91. 
———. 2001. Studies in the Text and Transmission of the Iliad. Munich and 
Leipzig: K.G. Saur. 
———. The Making of the Iliad: Disquisition & Analytical Commentary. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 136 
Wight, Martin. 1977. Systems of State. Leicester: Leicester University Press. 
Worthington, Ian (ed.). n.d. Brill’s New Jacoby. Leiden: Brill. 
http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/brill-s-new-jacoby. 
Zeitlin, Froma I. 1989. “Thebes: Theater of Self and Society in Athenian Drama”. In 
Nothing to Do With Dionysus? Athenian Drama in Its Social Context, edited 
by John J. Winkler and Froma I.  Zeitlin, 130–167. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
